GENDER AND VIOLENCE IN BRITISH INDIA

THE ROAD TO AMRITSAR, 1914-1919



ROBERT MCLAIN

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The Road to Amritsar, 1914–1919

Robert McLain

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For Amy, Evan, and Mollie

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Resituating Gender and Violence during the Great War

This book investigates the multiple and contradictory ways in which the Great War tore at the gendered ideologies of the Indo-British relationship. It is my contention that the war of 1914–1918, along with the intense stress it placed on the British Raj's dominant notions of colonial masculinity and femininity, ultimately culminated in the killing or wounding of over 1,600 Indian civilians by Gurkha soldiers under the command of General Reginald Dyer at the Punjab town of Amritsar in April of 1919.[1] The killings at Amritsar marked a defining moment in Anglo-Indian relations, but too often the event is portrayed only as a catalyst for a triumphant interwar march toward Indian independence, or alternately as a singular lapse of judgment by one man, General Dyer, that undermined generations of generally well-intentioned colonial leadership in South Asia. I take issue with both of these views in that Amritsar is best viewed from the other direction, not as a beginning but as a tragic coda to the accelerating social and political anxieties that wracked the late-Victorian and Edwardian imperial and domestic public spheres just prior to the war.[2]

To be sure, World War I has much left to tell us about the indissoluble bond between gender and violence as conceptual guarantors for the empire's political and military power, both at home and abroad.[3] Conventional imperial wisdom held that the Briton alone possessed the inherently "manly" traits of logic and self-control necessary for good governance. This complemented the belief that India's western-educated nationalist elite suffered from a crippling effeminacy of body and mind that precluded political power and independence. In between these masculine/feminine margins lay the subcontinent's "martial races"—the Punjabi, Sikh, and Gurkha soldiers of the Indian Army whom the Raj considered

masculine enough to fight side-by-side with, but who needed the guiding hand of the steady British officer to control their wild and child-like natures. By 1914, these variegated masculine/feminine identities had been firmly established in the political and popular culture of the colony.

The arrival of the war and India's tremendous role in it threatened to upset these delicately balanced equations of imperial gender and power. Both regional and all-India nationalists increasingly used the conflict to challenge the tenets of colonial masculinity and resituate themselves as members of a "loyal opposition" rather than as radicals intent on destroying foreign rule. Indeed, the unusually hot summer of 1914 witnessed a striking imperial unity. Mohandas Gandhi had just arrived in London from South Africa, where he had lived for over 20 years, quite literally at the moment England had issued its declaration of war against Germany. He immediately rallied Indian students living in the metropole, organizing them into an ambulance corps for service on the Western Front. Donations and telegrams of support poured in from India's conservative and loyal princely states, which, under autonomous rulers, technically controlled about two-fifths of the country.[4] By the end of October 1914, a complement of over 24,000 Indian soldiers began to arrive in France, staving off disaster for a decimated British army. By 1917, this initial good feeling had deteriorated into an increasingly bitter dispute regarding the extent of post-war political reform in India. Moreover, the clash over India's future drew extensively on the existing tropes of the effeminacy of the "educated" classes and the wildness of the hyper-masculine martial races in declaring the colony unfit for "self-rule." The rhetorical ferocity of this debate, I argue, ended in the physical violence at Amritsar.

To be clear, I begin from the assumption that the alchemy of gender and violence was indispensible not only to the establishment and maintenance of imperial power, but also to the emotional appeal of nationalist anti-colonial resistance, whether in its "moderate" constitutional form or in the guise of bloody, revolutionary terror. Put more directly, it is historically improbable that modern empires could have endured solely by referencing the iconography of the European "man on the spot" and his counterpart, the dutiful imperial woman. Colonial power ultimately, and always, rests on the threat of coercion.[5] Similarly, Irish, Indian, African, and Asian nationalists drew sustenance from the likeness of an irredentist manhood brought low by colonialism, yet salvageable through either a gradual and indirectly resistant demonstration of masculinity and self-sufficiency or, more extremely, murderous opposition. It follows, then, that if the maintenance of colonial masculinity implied the threat of violence, so too

did challenges to its ideological potency. Both imperial coercion and the resistance to it, embodied in the multiple epistemological and physical violences of colonialism and anti-colonialism, relied on sheer bloody-mindedness as a functional means to an end.

This "functionality" and its means/ends rationality suggest two interconnected problems as well, both of which explain the lack of theorization about the mechanics of colonial violence in the imperial setting. First, violence was, and is, Janus-faced in nature. Violence was by definition conservative when protecting the empire, radical when in pure opposition to it, and surprisingly "moderate" when seeking a path somewhere between accommodation and rebellion. Gandhi intended his pledge to defend England in 1914 to be an indicator of the colony's suitability for autonomy. Ironically, it meant fighting for the empire as a means of eventually breaking away from it.[6] In this formula, India would reach par with the white settler colonies of South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, all of whom emerged from the war with stronger nationalist identities and better economic positions vis-à-vis the metropole.[7] More importantly for our purposes, it shows the limits of Gandhi's concept of non-violence, or *ahimsa*. Second, the inherent ambiguity of colonial violence, and its functional role in the differential equations of colonial power, leads historians into an old trap, namely explaining the phenomenon as a by-product of imperial ideology rather than as a subject worthy of deeper consideration on its own merits, or demerits, as the case may be. Simply put, as a "signifier," violence encompassed every masculine and feminine trope in the colonial environment; its cruel versatility demands that we at least consider how violence and gender operated across differing imperial terrains and chronologies.

My approach is bound to vex readers in two ways. First, there exists a lingering tendency to view hegemonic colonial violence as more "legitimate" because it ostensibly involved the preservation of "Order" by forces of the State. Second, despite the fact that gender as a "useful category of analysis" has become well-established in "new imperial" history, there will always be scholars who reject or downplay its analytical value. Herein lies the crux of the problem: too often the paternalistic, protective *language* of empire differed dramatically from the *actuality* of colonialism's intense physical brutality, both in contemporary accounts and in later histories that relied on imperial word-of-mouth. As Mary Renda has so effectively argued in her study of early twentieth-century US intervention in Haiti, imperialism was, and is, "masked as benevolent by its reference to paternal care and guidance," yet it is "structured equally by its reference to

paternal authority and discipline. In a sense, paternalism should not be seen in opposition to violence, but rather as one of several cultural vehicles for it."[8] Purnima Bose and Laura Lyons' claim that "brutality . . . far from being an anomaly, is a constitutive part of colonialism" takes on a tangible form when one consults the litany of carnage that is part and parcel of empire, whether in the indirect form of Indian famine polices or in the overt use of airpower to strafe civilians in "rebelling" villages in the mandate of 1920s Iraq.[9]

Violence, moreover, was never limited to faceless, institutionalized governmental forms, for cruelty in the colonial setting often expressed itself in intensely interpersonal ways reminiscent of racial violence in the American South. Jordanna Bailkin's study of European homicides committed against Indians reveals that white authorities often downgraded murder charges through a rhetorical strategy that removed the *intent* to kill—the argument being that the robust Anglo-Indian had simply failed to recognize the frailty of the "native" before striking them.[10] Indian Viceroy Lord Curzon (1899–1905) privately expressed his loathing for the open disdain his countrymen expressed toward "natives." Nor, as Ivan Evans has suggested, was this limited to India. In prewar "shooting of native" cases, white *platteland* Afrikaners who murdered blacks often faced a cursory examination, whereas black assaults on whites usually drew a stiff sentence.[11] Such individualized violence unsurprisingly came in the midst of "rape panics," in which white women were supposedly threatened by "native" men. In the case of Amritsar there existed a similar "panic," animated by months of heated rhetoric and an actual assault on an Englishwoman just prior to the mass shooting. These historical claims make even greater sense when placed against the tumult of the Great War era, when *fin-de-siècle* anxieties over the erosion of British power abroad, not to mention tensions at "Home" regarding Ireland, labor, women, and "traditional" societal and familial roles, lay thick and heavy in the British and imperial presses.

What makes the larger context of empire so disturbing though is not just its concomitance with violence, but also its genealogical links to the modern, mechanized mass homicides of twentieth-century Europe. Indeed, Hannah Arendt argued that imperialism's emphasis on civilization, bureaucratic rationality, and racial difference was in fact a milepost on the road to the "Final Solution." In her estimation, the murder of the Jews and racial Others amounted to nothing more than a form of "continental imperialism," an inward-looking intra-European version of empire that carried out the same types of annihilative violence that stalked nineteenth-century Asia and Africa. Continental imperialism, however,

lacked the "geographic space" that provided for colonialism's forgotten massacres, many of which received little notice in Europe.[12] The slaughter of Hereros, Hottentots, and Congolese was too geographically distant, and the belief in biological superiority and Social Darwinism so entrenched that most Europeans, particularly the outward-looking bourgeoisie who believed that colonial projects ensured national survival, simply accepted direct and indirect violence as part of the natural order of things. Horror and revulsion only came later, after the ideologies of empire were adapted to *Endlösung* and the victims shifted from being faceless and "uncivilized" "others" to neighbors who spoke the same language. While Arendt notes that British rule stopped far short of Belgian and German levels of atrocity, she nonetheless pointed to proposals by white officials in India to initiate famines, or "administrative massacres," as a way of maintaining control over the country. Cooler and more humane heads prevailed, however, and the proposal was never carried out. Still, Arendt charged that once the "English conqueror in India became an administrator who no longer believed in the universal validity of law, but was convinced of his own capacity to rule and dominate . . . the stage seemed to be set for all possible horrors." The ideological techniques and physical technologies of nineteenth-century imperialism had become commonplace, "lying under anybody's nose" and freely available for creating a race-based totalitarian government.[13] Her words continue to resonate.

Violence in the name of "Order" and "Civilization" resides in the very ontology of empire—it cannot be parsed out. More to the point, it is a deeply flawed view that looks back on empire as a generally benign phenomenon punctuated by occasional violence that was always, somehow, exceptional to the overall tenor of colonialism. I utterly reject the notion that varieties of ruling practices and physical terrains make generalization about imperial violence impossible; multiple sites of empire simply mean multiple sites of violence. The frequency with which individual officials and soldiers rode, marched, or sailed to and from postings in Ireland, Africa, India, and Australasia is striking. And while it did produce varying practices of governance, what is more remarkable is the predictability of violent response to both real and perceived threats to imperial rule, whatever "style" of governance might be in vogue in a particular region. The urge to preserve "Order" was typical in colonial societies where a heavily outnumbered ruling class perceived the indigene, whether Irish, African, or Asian, as lacking the even more purposeful rioting of an English laborer. The child-like colonial subject had to be controlled by a chastising parental violence insomuch that children, like "natives,"

understood the language of bodily force. Losing control of "natives" meant putting individual Europeans in danger, particularly when such resistance threatened to spill over into the European domiciled "civil lines." The import of colonial discipline was not lost on Michael O'Dwyer, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, or Reginald Dyer, the commander at the city of Amritsar, also in the Punjab. Both were raised entirely or partly in Ireland and had experienced its tumult. O'Dwyer's memoirs recounted agrarian attacks against his family's estate, while Dyer's family, survivors of the 1857 Indian Army Mutiny, had sent him from India to Ireland to complete his education. It was in 1886 that a 21-year-old Dyer learned the value of riot control, when sectarian fighting shook Belfast on the occasion of William Ewart Gladstone's First Home Rule Bill. It requires no evidentiary leap of faith to see the impact of their Irish experience on their later actions.

To be sure, one may reasonably claim that the "new" empires of late nineteenth-century Europe were always violent in varying degrees, but particularly at moments of inception, crisis, and dissolution. Indeed, while the real sticks and stones of empire may have broken bones, it was the enduring constructs of the colonial subject that allowed the hand to grasp the weapon and legitimate firing it. More precisely, the alloyed concepts of Indian effeminacy/fragility and British masculinity, when viewed holistically, represent far more than historical abstractions. The culture of paternal colonial masculinity metastasized ostensibly political questions such as "native self-rule" as threats to the English hearth and home and, by way of implication, to the very existence of the empire. The petty and dehumanizing aspects of colonial subjectivity, so often expressed in terms of masculinity and a "civilizing" mission, are intimately connected to the physical assaults embedded in the building and maintenance of empire, both in its British guise and its revamped twenty-first-century form. The difference between the word and the deed of imperialism is so stark that one wonders what there is, ultimately, to argue about.[14]

Excavating Masculinity and Femininity in the Prewar Empire

By the latter half of the eighteenth century, the growing commercial presence of the British East India Company [EIC] in South Asia led to the systematic study of the region's history and culture.[15] These early efforts, often financed by the company or conducted independently by "gentlemen scholars" in the service of the EIC, relied on Hindu experts (*pundits*) to translate and interpret classical Sanskritic texts.

Additionally, British officials surveyed sources from the Mughal Empire, hoping to gain insight into how to rule newly acquired territories and further build a base of knowledge regarding Indian society.[16] Indeed, while the pundits aided the efforts of EIC officials to understand the country's religious complexities and legal system, Mughal sources made the epistemological case for a gendered hierarchy that distinguished between the "manly" imperial court of the north and the "effeminate," primarily southern, Hindu. It was all too easy for a developing British imperial culture, already armed with its own domestic and military codes of manliness, to glom onto established Mughal notions of martialized masculinity and culture. These hybridized codes of masculinity, as Ashis Nandy has argued, became sharper in colonial society over the course of the long nineteenth century, with both European and Indian emphasizing a hyper-masculine persona as a means, respectively, of control and resistance.[17]

Among the first works to call attention to Indian decadence were Alexander Dow's *History of Hindostan* (1770), and Robert Orme's three-volume *A History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan from 1745* (published from 1763–1778). Dow established a strong link between the "enervating" effects of the Indian climate and the general "languor" of the "Hindoo." As Dow saw it, the Muslim conquest of the subcontinent made perfect sense, since the country's tropical milieu had sapped the Hindu of the vigor needed to repel outside invasion. This debilitation, of course, made the country's aboriginal inhabitants the ideal subjects for Muslim conquest and the rule of "oriental despotism."[18] The next six centuries of Mughal domination, when combined with climatic factors, had thoroughly stamped out any desire for freedom and independence in the Hindu. The British, in Dow's opinion, were in fact doing nothing more than assuming the mantle of power from the tyrannical Muslim rulers and beginning the "arduous" and "almost impossible" process of returning to India the "Public Virtue" that it had lost.[19] Robert Orme picked up the strands of Dow's work in describing the Hindu as the "most effeminate inhabitant of the globe" and an easy mark for the "fierce" and "hardy" Muslim warrior. Furthermore, Orme paid special attention to the Bengali, whom he determined to be "of weaker frame and more enervated character" than even his fellow Indians.[20] As should be clear, Dow and his reliance upon a framework of climatic degeneracy, effeminacy, and general impotence had a formative effect on the ideologies that eventually guided the Raj.[21]

Early nineteenth-century experts reiterated the concept of the effeminate Bengali with a strikingly casual certitude. EIC official James Mill and his *History of India* (1818) confirmed Hindus as "litigious, untrustworthy, and predisposed to lying," a defect made more marked by their "softness both in their persons and in their address" when compared to the "manlier races" of Europe.[22] Mill had produced an essential text for early to mid-nineteenth century thought on the colony, lending an additional sanctity of truth to existing suspicions and providing conceptual sustenance for future generations of administrators and self-made colonial "specialists."[23] That Mill could dismiss with the stroke of a pen several centuries of rich historical and literary tradition testifies to the deep power of imperial texts to forge dominant colonial masculinities and attitudes. For many officials the initial reality of India lay as much in words as in actual experience. Mill's eight-volume history, which had entered its fourth edition by the 1840s, surveilling the land from a position of manly rationalism and supposed objectivity, passed judgment on an area many times the size of England and far more populous. Even more remarkably, Mill's lack of first-hand experience did nothing to diminish the influence of his work. Even 70 years after Mill's death, Lord Sydenham, a hardliner who would later lead the charge against wartime political concessions for the colony (see Chapter 5), recalled in his memoirs that he "had studied India on paper" before departing for the governorship of Bombay in 1907.[24]

Yet, it would be a mistake to see British writers as dictating the construction of the effeminate Bengali and the masculine Englishman in a monolithic manner, for colonial gender roles proved just as unstable and subject to challenge as their domestic counterparts. As early as the 1860s the literary Tagore family of Jorasanko organized *melas* (gatherings or fairs) that attempted to reinforce indigenous culture and re-establish Indian manliness in a "space 'unconstrained' by colonial interference." The gatherings drew upward of 20,000 visitors at the height of their popularity. They prominently displayed Indian handicrafts and agricultural products, in addition to staging patriotic essay and song contests.[25] The mela's utilization of gymnastics and athletic competitions indicates that Bengal's intelligentsia recognized at a very early juncture the need to perform Indian masculinity. The organizers pointedly invited British officials so that they could personally witness the physical prowess of the supposedly "emasculated" Bengalis. And while the Tagores admitted in an 1867 article that the "educated" babu required much physical improvement, they contrarily claimed that there existed plenty of muscle among the *lahtiyals*—the men from the lower rungs of society who acted as enforcers and

protectors for the landowning *zamindars*. Following this line of thought, one author wondered why "Bengali low class men can be employed for such purposes" yet not "be brought up for the better purpose of being soldiers?"[26] This refrain re-emerged during the war scares with Russia and, more tellingly as we shall see, from 1914–1918.

Despite the Tagores' suggestion that "natives" possessed a masculine and martial spirit, Bengali satirists themselves had begun using the self-reflexive term "babu" early in the century as a way to parody the province's rising middle-class, a group that had initially adopted Persian mannerisms only to yield to Anglo affectations as British power increased.[27] Mrinalini Sinha further reminds us that the changing economic and material conditions of the later 1800s gave the "babu" greater specificity. An increasing number of Bengalis, pushed out of the business sector by Anglo-Indians, pursued a western education as a means of gaining administrative and professional positions in colonial government and society.[28] Many of these "educated Indians" emerged with an inadequate education and job prospects that were made worse by discriminatory practices.[29] Those who succeeded came to occupy what Anglo-Indians saw as archetypal "babu" jobs: lower-level civil service posts, positions in law, and, most dangerously of all, seditious journalistic endeavors. In the eyes of the Raj, the "educated classes" were the worst of the empire's subcontinental subjects—unctuous, untrustworthy, and dangerously lacking the simple honesty of the sturdy peasant farmer as well as the rough and wild manliness of northern India's "martial races" that served in the Indian Army.

The culturally thick replication of the effeminized "native" had a natural corollary in the reinforcement of British masculine identity and the underwriting of supposedly objective "manly" knowledge and power.[30] The cult of masculinity had a special resonance in late-Victorian Britain, permeating the public and private sphere and working in harness with social phenomena such as religion, as in the case of muscular Christianity.[31] More than this, manliness implied all that the "native" lacked, namely the shunning of emotion and the ability to exert steely self-control. As John Stuart Mill once suggested, England was "the country in which social discipline has most succeeded, not so much in conquering, as in suppressing whatever was most likely to conflict with it. The English more than any other people, not only act but feel according to rule." As Michael C. C. Adams observed, this disciplining of the passions helped create the reserve and coolness under both literal and figurative fire that constituted "good form," and allowed "a proper Englishman to block out the feminine . . . associated with the expression of sentiment."[32] "Good form" meant

mastering one's emotions under the most stressful of situations and most decidedly *not* expressing feelings that might be construed as "feminine." In this ideological milieu, it was simply inconceivable for Government of India administrators to consider that any indigenous male could replace the imperial "man on the spot."[33] Only the Briton had the inherently masculine traits of detachment, logic, and common sense necessary for governing India's "credulous" and "excitable" peasantry. This same masculinity signaled a sexual self-control as well, one lacking in the effeminized and eroticized imaginary of colonial India. The alliteration of "educated," "emasculated," and "effeminate" thus came to represent virtually the same thing in British colonial vernacular—an effete, unmanly, and untrustworthy Indian upper crust. More tellingly, such "effeminate" Indians eventually comprised the bulk of the country's Indian National Congress [INC].

As much as masculinity was the portal to rule, it was equally a path to redemption, for the more radical members of the burgeoning anti-colonial movement welcomed the chance to rehabilitate Indian masculinity through a campaign of assassination and terror. The popular radical Aurobindo Ghose's series of articles for the Marathi paper *Indu Prakash* in 1893 laid bare the idiom of national humiliation and the need to retrieve "native" manliness by direct action. "Our actual enemy," declared Ghose, "is not any force exterior to ourselves, but our own crying weakness, our cowardice, our selfishness, our purblind sentimentalism." The country's path to salvation lay in a trial by fire and "our own reviving sense of manhood," not the "resolutions and constitutional platitudes" propagated by INC moderates.[34] What makes this so ironic is that Ghose had been thoroughly Anglicized as a young man. His father belonged to the politically moderate middle-class and reformist *Brahmo Samaj* movement and gave Aurobindo the middle name "Ackroyd" in honor of an English friend.[35] He forbade his children from speaking Bengali in the home and allowed his wife to forego *purdah*. Ghose later earned the Rawley Prize for Greek iambics and high marks in his classics Tripos at Cambridge. He possessed the ideal educational background for a colonial administrator, "trained for nothing but ready for anything" by dint of common sense and the value of classical instruction. Ghose easily passed the Indian Civil Service [ICS] written exam in 1890, yet protested its physical requirement, the horse-riding test, by deliberately refusing to take it. While Anglo officials argued that the ability to ride was essential to the duties of the ICS, particularly when visiting far-flung villages, Indians like Ghose chaffed at the requirement, pointing out that most "native" candidates would have no

opportunity to gain riding experience.[36] Ghose not only rejected the riding test, but came to reject every aspect of his English identity—personality, clothing, and middle name included. By the early 1900s, he had become thoroughly radicalized. As Lord Minto, then Viceroy (1905–1910), put it, "he is the most dangerous man we have to reckon with."[37]

Ghose likewise reflects the tensions of India's nascent, late-Victorian nationalist movement and the growing rift between a moderate leadership bent on gradual and constitutional methods and a younger, more radical left-wing. Indeed, the INC, formed in 1885 in response to the "Ilbert Bill" controversy, was initially modest in number and in its demands.[38] It had as its nucleus those "natives" who had traveled to London in the late 1860s and early 1870s to study law or to prepare for entry into the ICS.[39] There, they had fallen under the influence of Dadabhai Naoroji, a prominent Indian businessman and publicist who would later win election to British House of Commons in the mid-1890s.[40] The INC experienced rapid growth despite its seemingly unimpressive start. By 1890, organizers of the Congress' annual convention had to limit the number of delegates to one thousand so as to avoid a logistical nightmare. The size of the yearly Congress, however, tended to fluctuate with India's political temperature, and periods of controversy encouraged more active participation. Attendance in 1904, for instance, roughly doubled from the 538 representatives of the previous year when it became evident that the Viceroy, Lord Curzon, intended to partition the province of Bengal into Hindu and Muslim halves.[41]

The Bengal partition presaged a split between the INC's developing left-wing and its senior leadership. Younger members of the Congress charged that Curzon had bisected the province into predominantly Muslim and Hindu portions in order to exploit communal tensions and fracture the nationalist movement along the country's diverse religious, ethnic, and provincial lines. Moreover, the pressure exerted by the "advanced" section of the Congress led even moderate Congress members, who traditionally advocated constitutional methods of agitation, to reluctantly support *swadeshi*—a boycott on British goods such as cotton and tobacco.[42] Moderates in the Congress agreed with most of these positions, yet they were alarmed by the radical's persistent demands to extend the direct action of swadeshi beyond Bengal. These tensions came to a head in 1907, when a the left-wing triumvirate consisting of the Marathi publisher Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Bipin Chandra Pal of Bengal, and the Punjab's Lala Lajpat Rai attempted to gain control of the Congress meeting at Surat. The party's old guard of moderate leaders, Gopal Krishna Gokhale and

Sir Pherozeshah Mehta, successfully fended off the extremist challenge, but at the cost of splitting the party. The subsequent expulsion of Tilak and his supporters from the meeting lasted until early in the war, when the deaths of Gokhale and Mehta allowed the exiled left-wing to capture the party leadership. The "Lal, Bal, Pal" trio frequently both lamented and challenged Indian "effeminacy" in thinly veiled articles that endorsed revolutionary violence as a form of resistance. The Raj watched all three men closely and at times used press censorship and jail terms to muzzle them.

That same year marked the publication of *The Indian Unrest* by Valentine Chirol. As the foreign editor for *The Times*, Chirol was a close observer of India, visiting the country and getting an earful of advice from ICS members who imagined danger in every village.[43] It is unsurprising that Chirol saw the growing number of "educated natives" as a direct threat to the empire, given his main informants. The intellectual quality of India's western-educated students, he argued, had declined since the mid-nineteenth century, yielding to a mentally inferior student produced by equally substandard schools.[44] These inadequately trained students, he continued, no longer learned but simply crammed for exams in hopes of raising their social and professional status. Furthermore, he charged that their poor preparation left them little real prospect for success. In Bengal, surmised Chirol, the situation was more severe, inasmuch that "large batches of youths with a mere smattering of knowledge are turned out into a world that has little or no use for them." These disappointed and disaffected students were "ripe for revolt" and constituted "the material the leaders of unrest have most successfully worked."[45] Chirol undoubtedly noted the spike in the number of "outrages," or terror attacks in Bengal in the years just prior to the war. Violence became more common, and more dramatic—in 1912 the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, narrowly escaped death when a Bengali revolutionary threw a bomb into the *howdah* of the elephant he was riding.[46] Chirol saw the Raj as simply staggering from one political crisis to another between 1880 and 1914. Each controversy, from the turmoil of the Ilbert Bill to the debate over the Age of Consent Law and Native Volunteer Movement, as well as the unrest over the partition of Bengal in 1905 and its attendant outbreaks of terror and swadeshi boycotts, perpetuated the fear among Anglo-Indians that revolutionary violence lurked everywhere in the subcontinent's recesses and bazaars. Chirol's argument, that India had remained more or less violent since 1857 and that the "educated" classes would incite a second Mutiny if not carefully watched, rested on pre-existing and culturally thick descriptions. The sheer density of violent artifacts in the Anglo-Indian imagination helps

explain why so many of them felt that they lived on a carefully balanced edge between order and chaos. Men like Reginald Dyer saw themselves as set in a dangerous world, one where massacre quite literally seemed a viable solution to political unrest.

It may prove instructive here to also remember that imperialism's gendered anxieties had their analog in metropolitan controversies such as the suffragettes' sometimes violent campaign for women's rights. Emmeline Pankhurst's Women's Social and Political Union, formed in 1903 out of frustration with the slow pace of reform, began its more militant phase of window smashing and hunger strikes at a time when terror attacks in India were themselves on the rise. Once the war began, though, Pankhurst suspended violent resistance and urged support for the country. Feminist leaders took virtually the same tack as nationalists in both the French and British empires in arguing that wartime participation broadened the parameters of citizenship.[47] Ella Hepworth Dixon maintained that Englishwomen were in fact "more patriotic and public spirited than the men who refuse them the vote. . . . This war has proved once and for all that the women are as useful to the state as the men."[48] Naturally, concluded Dixon, women deserved full political rights because of their loyalty. The entry of tens of thousands of women into the munitions and other industries clearly enhanced this rhetoric over the course of the war.[49] Moreover, while Antoinette Burton and Anna Davin have rightly pointed to prewar claims of "imperial" maternity as significant for post-war suffrage, it would be difficult to argue that women would have gained the vote as soon without it.[50] The somewhat limited gains made not only in England, but also France and the United States, suggests the war was the decisive factor in securing the Representation of the People Act in 1918.

While Anglo-Indians saw the educated Indian as the epitome of effete sensuality and political danger, they contrarily imagined the Sikh and Muslim "martial races" of the Punjab, along with the Gurkhas of Nepal, as the closest approximation of British manhood on the subcontinent. These northern ethnic groups had escaped the purportedly deleterious effects of India's southern climate and thus retained manliness to spare. Nevertheless, administrators and Indian Army officers familiar with the martial races argued that the "fighting classes," some two-thirds of the army's 150,000-man roster, had not yet attained a level of civilization equivalent to that of the European.[51] Left alone, the martial races would raid, ransack, and murder their neighbors. Moreover, the presumably wild and simple nature of the "fighting classes" led army commanders to conclude that only the paternalistic guiding hand of the British officer and a heavy leavening of

British "tommies" could control and guide the ordinary Indian soldier on the battlefield. The ethnographic manuals used for recruitment by the Indian Army consistently emphasized this point: "native" troops were capable of great bravery and astounding feats of endurance—as long as the manly Briton was there to direct them. Last and most importantly, the martial races fulfilled a crucial ideological function insomuch that they allowed for a further compartmentalization of Indo-British society, one in which only the Briton had the full veneer of both masculinity and civilization. As should be clear, the sifting of colonial subjects into gendered categories during the long nineteenth century, so much a part of the trajectory of gender, power, and violence in Anglo-India, foreshadowed how both Britons and Indians would react to the Great War.

Both colonizer and colonized clearly perceived that the alloyed ideologies of racial and civilizational decay, at their most basic level, ultimately stood or fell on the ability to distinguish the "manly" Englishman and his claims to superiority. Similarly, if the individual colonial male, for example, the "educated Indian," could claim to have reached a stage of full masculine recovery, then what of India itself? Would that then signal the completion of one of colonialism's main stated goals—the rehabilitation of the subcontinent—and the time for a British withdrawal? The war raised a disturbing possibility, namely that the empire's most valued possession might use the *sturm und drang* of conflict to shake off foreign rule once and for all. More pointedly, it is too easy for historians to forget just how traumatic the wartime experience was for many Britons, and just how frightened many of them felt. The constant propaganda of an England locked in a war of national survival against a militaristic Germany only exaggerated the fear of imperial loss and a future world where Britain went the way of ancient Rome. National and imperial survival became inseparable; an empire devoid of India would be a shade of its former self. The periodic stresses and strains of empire took on a whole new significance once the war came—one in which challenges to masculine roles were in fact perceived as *existential* dangers to home, hearth, nation, and empire.

This study will cross a number of imperial terrains: the institutional space of the martial races; the geographic zones of Britain, India, France, and the United States and, in the case of the latter chapters, the hotly contested intellectual zone of the Indian and British review presses. Thus equipped, we may be able to discern more clearly how dominant notions of masculinity managed to operate across the variegated terrains of empire with a significant degree of cohesion. Chapter 2, "The Violent Mahatma:

Gandhi and the Rehabilitation of Indian Manhood" draws upon sources from the imperial press as well as Gandhi's *Collected Works* in determining why Indian nationalists across the political spectrum would tender their support to the empire at the start of the war. Historians have ascribed this loyalty to a number of factors, ranging from political opportunism on the part of the radicals to genuine patriotism in the case of more moderate politicians. While both of these interpretations have validity, I maintain that many indigenous leaders backed the war effort in the hope that it would revitalize the country's manhood and recapture an "imagined community" based upon the lost glory of ancient India. Only then could South Asia overcome the emasculating power of empire and regain its autonomy. The chapter concludes with a brief look at the ambivalent British reaction to India's entry into the war in 1914 and the anxiety of British administrators who feared that the conflict might fundamentally alter the colonial relationship.

Chapter 3, "Measures of Manliness: The Martial Races and the Wartime Politics of Effeminacy," shifts existing scholarship on the martial races away from its military emphasis, focusing instead on the ways in which the superior "manliness" of the martial races over the "effeminate" nationalist served to protect the structures of imperial power. As the war progressed, the initially supportive Indian intelligentsia increased demands for political concessions on the basis of the country's immense manpower contributions. Contrarily, pro-imperialists pointedly noted that the martial races had done all of the fighting—and dying. The colony's intelligentsia, so the argument ran, could by no means justify their claims to autonomy by clambering over the bodies of "native" soldiers. Importantly, this chapter also considers the impact of the Ghadar movement—a radical revolutionary group made up primarily of Sikhs caught up in India's global diaspora—on the mindset of Anglo-Indian officials, particularly Michael O'Dwyer.

Chapter 4, "Frontline Masculinity: The Indian Corps on the Western Front, 1914–1915," begins by exploring the deployment of the 26,000 man Indian Corps to France at the start of the war. Extant histories of the Indian Corps have exhibited a lingering orientalism in their overreliance on sources written by British officers who subscribed fully to the tenets of imperial masculinity, particularly the martial races theory. Predictably, the ordinary Indian soldier, or "sepoy," emerges as helpless without his paternalistic British officer and prone to self-inflicted wounds if his officer was killed or wounded. While the evidence does show that some Indian units experienced morale problems, the need to reinforce the indispensability of

the white officer, and indeed British rule itself, should be taken into account. Moreover, we should ask if British observers exercised a freer hand in criticizing the Indian soldier as compared to his British counterpart, many of whom also suffered significant problems with morale. The chapter concludes with an examination of the Mesopotamian Campaign of 1916, where the British surrendered over 13,000 troops—a figure rivaled only by the surrender of Lord Cornwallis to American revolutionary forces at Yorktown. For critics of the Raj, the "Mespot" disaster signaled the bankruptcy of a key British rhetorical strategy, namely the claiming of superior masculine "efficiency" in matters of war and politics.

Chapter 5, "The Road to Amritsar," examines the vehement debate that followed in the wake of the August of 1917 "Declaration" by Sir Edwin Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, that "natives" should have a greater role in government with autonomy being the eventual outcome. Conservatives at Home and in India saw Montagu's proposition as potentially fatal to the empire. Scholars have thoroughly scrutinized the "Montagu Declaration" as a political phenomenon, yet utterly failed to look at it through the lens of colonial masculinity. In past debates, Government of India administrators had portrayed Indian rule as a sexual danger for the Englishwoman. Yet, the need for India's support in the war, and the desire to avoid alienating "native" opinion, placed this established formula in abeyance. Opponents of reform, particularly—the high ranking retirees of the Indian Army and Civil Service now living in England, instead shifted their arguments, touting the indispensability of the British "man on the spot" and the need to protect imperial "prestige" and "efficiency." While these terms became synonymous with the ability to maintain masculine self-control and good judgment, the undercurrent of sexual danger remained a potent cultural artifact among Anglo-Indians. This factor, along with the persistent stress that the war had put on the dominance of imperial masculinity, culminated in the Amritsar Massacre in April of 1919.

2

The Violent Mahatma: Gandhi and the Rehabilitation of Indian Manhood[1]

In the opening weeks of the Great War, Charles Roberts, Britain's Under Secretary of State for India, addressed Parliament on the colony's role in the conflict and its seemingly heartfelt rallying to the imperial cause. There appeared little doubt, he remarked, that "India claims not to be a mere dependent of but a partner in the Empire, and her partnership with us cannot but alter the angle from which we shall look . . . at the problems of the government of India."[2]

Roberts' observations dealt not so much with India *per se*, but more with the pledges of loyalty from the Raj's most ardent critics, the "educated classes." Anglo administrators welcomed the declarations, but they also found them bewildering given the persistent cultural referents of India as an unruly and dangerous land. England had commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of the Mutiny just seven years before the war began, and enough survivors remained to animate the fear of a second uprising. Valentine Chirol's work too ensured that the menacing schema of the "educated Indian" endured, and not without some justification. British authorities recorded over two hundred "revolutionary outrages," or terror attacks, and another hundred unsuccessful assaults from 1906 to mid-war in 1917. They attributed the bombings, shootings, hackings, and acts of sabotage to an irresponsible and radical indigenous press, a group comprised entirely of "educated" Indian journalists and lawyers like Ghose, Rai, and others.[3]

Given Chirol's emphasis on the dominant role of the journalistic and legal professions in critiquing the Raj, the ensuing chapter will draw significantly from both the "home" and Indian presses to analyze Gandhi's

approach to the war and India's place in the empire.[4] This is an eminently sensible approach insomuch that the *fin-de-siècle* press transgressed national borders and articulated the "categories of racial hierarchy and the exclusionary premises of political citizenship circulated through the culture at large."[5] Indeed, the upsurge in "educated Indians" that Chirol so deplored fed a tremendous growth in India's print culture during the 1870s and 1880s.[6] Moreover, virtually every major Anglo newspaper sought to counter this trend by maintaining correspondents at government headquarters in Calcutta and Simla. Retired ICS officials also frequently served in a journalistic capacity both in India and in the metropole. To wit, early wartime articles demonstrate just how crucial the imperial press was in shaping the Indo-British relationship and colonial identity. "Educated Indians," complained the author of a 1915 article, "deplore the slackness" with which the *Times* and other conservative organs dealt with "matters which deeply affected their country [India]." The same author attacked Chirol for failing to consult "with the leaders of Indian thought . . . and discover the source of the ills he was expected to investigate" during the tour that resulted in his work *The Indian Unrest*.[7]

Despite a generation of vitriol, even the most radical Indian newspapers softened their rhetoric once the conflict began. The change in tone had a demonstrable effect. The number of "outrages" significantly decreased as the conflict progressed, and the country itself remained comparatively tranquil for most of the war despite the large numbers of Indian Army troops serving in the Middle East and Europe.[8] Imperial historiography has depicted the colony's relative peace in terms of genuine sympathy from moderates like Gandhi and lurking political opportunism on the part of more radical nationalists.[9] Scholars have also noted that the strict controls over the "native" press, via the Defence of India Act, helped the government suppress its more vocal opponents.[10] These are valid historical claims, reflective of the diversity of opinion among India's regional and sectarian nationalist cadre as well as the success of British efforts in controlling the flow of information in a volatile environment. Still, these interpretations remain incomplete because they rest on political teleologies that utterly fail to account for gender and violence as indispensable and interconnected elements of colonial ideology.

Arguably, a more robust analysis would correct this by examining how the pressures of the Great War affected the rhetorical and physical forms of colonial masculinity and its operation as a nexus of authority in the Indo-Anglo relationship. It is my contention that there existed a symbiotic link between "emasculation" as an element of colonial power and the

fulfilling of India's regenerative-millenarian nationalist vision. Simply put, my primary claim is that a majority of nationalists backed the war effort because they believed that the surest and quickest path to recapturing the country's presumably lost glory was by crossing the field of battle. Ironically, the vision of India as virile, independent, and powerful became directly linked to its role in defending the Empire. The war effectively presented an opportunity for the colonial subject to show the ability to carry out properly sanctioned state violence. For Gandhi, in particular, fighting for the empire would serve as a metonym for "manliness" and governing ability, concepts that were inextricably linked in the colonial imagination. This metamorphosis of manhood, as it were, had the potential to reinvent the "native" male on the battlefield and reconfigure the image of India in the imperial public sphere as a trustworthy partner, and one ready for self-rule. It is at this point that one must temporarily dispense with Gandhi as the Mahatma of peace and see him as a war leader. In doing so a key problematic emerges, namely, explaining his willingness not just to tolerate, but to actively support, the mechanized slaughter of World War I.

Wartime Emasculation and Imperial Consensus

It would be easy to dismiss masculinity as a primary factor in the bloody struggles of empire if violence and gender were somehow exceptional or confined to the territorial edges of red maps, but this was simply not the case. The lexicon of violence and masculinity permeated global imperial culture, whether external colonialism in the case of Africa and Asia, or "internal" in the instances of the American West and Ireland. Writers in the "second wave" of modern anti-colonial nationalism themselves adopted a *quid pro quo* rhetoric, often blaming colonial rule for enervating its subjects and drawing powerfully on historical mythology and the language of bloody revolution to envision an autonomous future.[11] Padraic Pearse, writing contemporaneously with insurgent South Asian journalists shortly before his execution as a conspirator in the 1916 Easter Rebellion, frequently called for blood sacrifice as a means of masculine renewal and national freedom. Irish men, Pearse argued, had lost any sense of masculinity by allowing themselves to be "disarmed" and failing to seize the chance to rearm themselves and fight foreign rule. As a result, Ireland would "not know Christ's peace until she has taken Christ's sword." His poem *Peace and Gael* proved even more explicit, claiming forthrightly that the "old heart of the earth needed[s] the warmth of the red wine of the

battlefields. Such august homage was never before offered to God as this, the homage of millions of lives given gladly for love of country."[12]

The Punjabi radical Lajpat Rai, writing from the shelter of America in 1917, echoed Pearse's sentiments. Rai attributed Indian loyalty not to any great love of foreign rule, but to the fact that the people had been "emasculated, emasculated so completely that they are absolutely helpless against your organized brigandage." He chillingly reminded authorities that "sixty-four years ago," during the Mutiny, "we were not so helpless."[13] Bal Gangadhar Tilak reiterated similar sentiments late in the war, charging that India had not participated to its fullest potential "because her sons are emasculated under the Bureaucratic policy. No one can now save the Bureaucracy from its policy of emasculating the people of the country. It is a great humiliation for the empire that at this time of crisis it has to appeal to Japan and America, when it could have availed itself to *crores* of Indian subjects." In the same vein "Bureaucratic administration," meaning the ICS, had given India railways, telegraphs, and post offices, [but] its more serious outgrowth had been the "emasculation of this country."[14] While one has to question Tilak's sincerity in regard to helping the empire given the fact that he tacitly approved revolutionary terror in his newspapers, it is clear that he saw colonialism as an enervating force. Annie Besant, the English feminist, mystic, and leader of the Theosophist movement in India, used the backdrop of the war to bring forward precisely the point, albeit with less fire. The "British aim [has] been to turn the whole Indian nation into a race of clerks." The "steady crushing pressure over a whole population," charged Besant, "has produced a serious result: it has emasculated the nation. Indians hesitate where they should act; they ask where they should take; they submit, where they should resist; they lack self-confidence and the audacity that commands success." Manliness, regarded as "admirable . . . in every other civilized nation," became "seditious and treasonable in the Indian." Unless India could "again develop the old vigor, courage, and initiative," she opined, the country had no future.[15] The British had suppressed the "virile qualities" out of fear, an accurate enough assumption given the practice of segregating even the "martial races" by language, caste, and sect out of a concern that they might otherwise cooperate should the army mutiny ever again.[16]

This odd intra-colonial consensus on the concept of emasculation meant that the tensions in the Anglo-Indian relationship turned less on the notion that the colony was actually inferior and more on the apparent pathologies and remedies for such degradation. While Rai, Besant, Gandhi, and others linked "emasculation" to foreign dominance, British

authorities took a longer and more anthropological view in insisting that the searingly hot climate, along with centuries of racial miscegenation, had effeminized the "native" male, especially in the south. In essence, much of India, but especially Bengal and the southern reaches, were already emasculated when the English arrived in the early seventeenth century. How could they avoid lording over such a docile and enervated people? Correspondingly, northern India's "Aryan" populace had escaped the deleterious climate, and though more manly, simply had not yet reached a level of civilization commensurate with that of their distantly related Anglo-Saxon cousins. If India's Darwinist racial decline had followed a long evolutionary process, then so too would its rebirth. The subcontinent's real hope lay in continued genuflection to the Raj and a slowly rising tide of British genius that would lift all boats.

One old India hand, Sir Francis Younghusband, confirmed this view while conceding the arguments made by his Indian counterparts. Younghusband noted that the imperial gelding had resulted from doing "too much ourselves" while leaving "too little to them." Britain had, by taking "on our own shoulders the burden of defending India and maintaining internal peace . . . atrophied the muscles of the Indians."[17] While Besant had implied a servility born of psychological castration, Younghusband interpreted the emasculation as literal, arguing that the Indians' "muscles [had] grown limp and they are not strong enough to defend themselves." As "discreditable" as it was, the British would necessarily remain on the subcontinent longer than either they or the Indians wanted so as to help protect the country's "soft and flabby" peoples.[18] Younghusband mulled the problem of emasculation over much of his long career, so much so that he made it the subject of a short chapter in his book of post-war ruminations, *Dawn in India*. What makes him so intriguing, however, is not that he concurred with nationalist claims that colonial rule had crippled Indian manliness, but rather his solution to the problem. While asserting that "emasculation must be stopped and remasculation must begin," he did not advocate the militarization of previously "nonmartial" groups advocated by leaders like Gandhi during the Great War. In a striking overlay of metropolitan and peripheral intellectual terrains, he suggested that the masculine and feminine aspects of Indian manhood should remain separate spheres. The Bengalis, he argued, had "never made such good soldiers as the Sikhs and Pathans of the North," but because they were "more distinguished intellectually" they would naturally assume the political and diplomatic duties of a reconfigured India. The mentally gifted but physically limited "babu" would certainly not approach

"manliness" for many generations. Until that time, he could fill a special niche in a rehabilitated country by helping to guarantee the "safety, honor, and tranquility of India." Working in this manner, the Bengali's political contribution would be "as valuable in its own way as the contribution of the more martial Punjabis."[19] Younghusband had articulated a uniquely colonial doctrine of separate spheres; the Bengali and martial northerner together occupied a social space normally filled by a *single* Englishman.[20]

The prevalence of these discourses, not just in India and Ireland but across the "new" empires of the late nineteenth century, speaks to the importance of gender as a strategy for reinforcing and/or challenging the relative masculinity and femininity of the colonial subject. More directly, it provides a fertile ground for examining the intense stress that the crucible of the Great War put on the apparatus of colonial masculinity. Radical and moderate nationalists alike proved no different than their European counterparts in imagining that a better world would somehow emerge from the ashes of war, but they also recognized the need to temper their confidence. There existed a clear realization in India that the Raj rested as much on ideas as on guile and military force, and that Britain had, by accident and design, evolved a complex conceptual structure that rested on the assumption that "natives" lacked the masculine qualities for genuine autonomy. The colonial regime, therefore, ultimately stood or fell on its ability to create and sustain the tenets that buttressed British rule. Whether the motive was to demonstrate loyalty and earn autonomy, or alternately to "remasculinize" indigenous manhood in preparation for a post-war anti-colonial revolution, the vision of India as eminently virile, powerful, and rejuvenated linked directly to its role in defending a desperate England. In this milieu, properly directed battlefield violence had become an analog for "manliness" and a panacea for the social and political ills of subjugation.[21] The "new angle of vision" alluded to by Roberts might come to realization, and the "emasculated" Indian male finally stand as a full imperial citizen.

The Great War, Indian Nationalism, and the Regeneration of Masculinity

On July 18, 1914, M. K. Gandhi left South Africa for England. G. K. Gokhale had summoned Gandhi to London after the conclusion of the latter's successful *Satyagraha* campaign to force South Africa's colonial government to remove laws that discriminated against Indians.[22] It was on this voyage that the Mahatma persuaded his friend, the Tolstoyan German architect Hermann Kallenbach, to throw his expensive pair of binoculars into the sea.

They were, in Gandhi's opinion, inappropriate to the idea of Thoreauean simplicity in life that one should seek.[23] This gesture carried with it a certain irony in that the lives of both men were nearing a far more complicated turn. Just as their vessel entered the English Channel they received confirmation that Britain had declared war on Germany in response to the latter's invasion of neutral Belgium. Kallenbach was German by birth, but as a pacifist he had no intention of hastening back to his homeland to join the fight. Rather, he had left South Africa after living in the Transvaal for 18 years, fully intent on accompanying Gandhi to India. British authorities placed him in internment at the end of 1914, despite Gandhi's personal plea to Charles Roberts to allow him passage to India.[24]

The more vexing issue Gandhi had to face was what position to take in regard to India and the war. As the hero of South Africa, he momentarily stood above other leaders. His moral stature, coupled with his championing of non-violence, meant that his decision would carry significant weight in the Indian community. Friends, like the South African novelist Olive Schreiner, expected him to follow precedent and adhere to a policy of non-violence, or at least some form of benevolent neutrality. Cynics saw him as the ultimate effeminate Indian—a rebellious Gujarati *bania*, tantamount to the Bengali revolutionary, and a lawyer and publisher to boot. They feared that he would use the crisis to wring concessions from the Raj, or worse, foment unrest in an empire prostrated by war. Gandhi quickly disabused both his supporters and his detractors of their notions. Speaking at an August 8 reception at London's Cecil Hotel, Gandhi offered this view of the conflict:

> Since we reached England and heard the news, I've been reading, and thinking about it. I think of husbands and sons who have gone to fight, of mothers, wives and sisters left weeping behind. I ask "what is my duty?". . . . I have not yet come to any conclusion, but trust we can do something in concrete shape.[25]

Within days Gandhi's call for "something in concrete shape" took the form of a confidential circular to London's expatriate Indian community. In his leaflet, Gandhi implored all to serve the empire unconditionally regardless of how menial or damaging the task might be to their dignity. This same memorandum served as the basis for an August 14 letter asking Roberts to accept the Indian community's offer of assistance as an earnest expression of "our desire to share the responsibilities of membership of this great Empire, if we would share its privileges."[26] After also corresponding with



Figure 2.1 M. K. Gandhi with the Indian Ambulance Corps during the Boer War, South Africa, 1899. Gandhi is center, 5th from left

Lord Crewe, the Secretary of State for India (1910–1915), Gandhi decided the best course of action would be to organize "native" students living in England into a volunteer Indian Ambulance Corps, precisely as he had done on two previous occasions, the Boer War (1899–1902) and the Zulu Rebellion (1906).[27] It is easy enough to find Boer era photos of Gandhi peering at the camera, clad in army khaki, and surrounded by his comrades. Gandhi and his corps served at the Battle of Spion Kop, along with a journalist attached to the South African Light Horse, Winston S. Churchill; he and Gandhi both received the honor of a Boer War campaign medal.[28]

Gandhi's stance in these earlier clashes is deeply relevant in explaining his position during the Great War and a paradoxical colonial desire wherein the subjugated sought inclusion in the empire before ultimately turning against it. As Sukanya Banerjee's study reminds us, the idiom of a uniquely imperial citizenship frequently appeared in the work of moderate Indian leaders. Surendranath Banerjea, writing in 1893, noted that although Indians were not "men of English race or extraction," they were nonetheless "British subjects, the citizens of a great and free empire" who deserved equal protection under one of the "noblest constitutions the world has ever seen." Just three years before the war, Indian journalists in Canada fought limitations similar to those faced by their countrymen in South

Africa, arguing that "if there is but one recognized definition under the flag which the sun is supposed to never set, then . . . *no injustice shall minimize the rights or privileges of that citizenship, whether the holder is black or white* [italics in original]."[29] Gandhi wrote in more definite terms during the Boer War, arguing that the presence of Indians in the firing line would legitimize their claims to equal imperial citizenship and, at the same time, rebut the masculine "sneer" common among Britons in South Africa that "if danger threatened, the Indians would run away."[30] Gandhi never considered mere vocal or material contributions adequate to the concept of "belonging" to the empire. During the Zulu Rebellion in 1906, he contended that the reconstituted Indian Ambulance Corps, while a "splendid opportunity" to show that South Asians were "capable of appreciating the duties of citizenship," was "nothing to be unduly proud of. Twenty Indians, or even two hundred, going to the front is a flea-bite. The Indian sacrifice will rightly be considered infinitesimal." Instead, a better outcome would be for Indians to become armed combatants as "a permanent part in the Militia." This would undermine the common refrain that Indians should be happy with what rights they already had since they played no part in South Africa's defense.[31]

Clearly Gandhi did not see the empire as in and of itself undesirable in 1899, 1906, or 1914; the faults of British rule lay with "individual British officials," not the imperial system.[32] Nor did chastising the Raj while at the same time supporting it mean a breach of fidelity. It was simply part of a sustained effort to force the government to recognize the inconsistency between Queen Victoria's 1858 promise to treat all members of the empire with equality and the reality of European rule on the ground. Moreover, Gandhi remained a practical politician rather than a dogmatist. He frequently adjusted his course of action to fit the circumstances of particular events and challenges. He likewise took careful note of the empire's willingness to inflict violence on those who resisted it, scathingly referring to the slaughter and floggings of Zulus who had no part in the 1906 uprising as "no war but a manhunt."[33] If it could happen to the Zulus, it could also happen to Indians. Moreover, the empire had amply and repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to inflict disproportionate violence whenever and wherever it deemed it necessary, whether in Africa, India, Ireland, or elsewhere. If a minor affair like the Zulu uprising brought blind reprisal, then just what would a government be willing to inflict if it believed it was locked in a struggle for national and imperial survival?

Gandhi was by no means alone in seeing the war as an opportunity for reviving Indian civilization and reconfiguring the Anglo-Indian

relationship. One of the great ironies of 1914 was the degree of empire-wide euphoria that greeted the declarations of war, not to mention the supposition that the post-war world would somehow be more "pure" once the bloodletting cleansed it of modernity's hyper-materialist ills. One of the most prolific Indian authors of the era, Sant Nihal Singh (sometimes styled as "Saint") provides an intriguing example of this phenomenon.[34] Singh, like many of his moderate colleagues, proved perfectly willing to express his outrage at the more blatant misperceptions of Britons regarding South Asia and its peoples. He found the task particularly frustrating in light of the British public's acceptance of even the most fantastic depictions of the colony. In a 1915 wartime article on the London stage and its portrayal of Indians, he wrote, "At times, I have been so pained to see caricatures of my country and country-people that I could hardly sit through the entire performance." It took all of his strength to "restrain myself from rising from my seat and shouting down the actors and actresses who were perpetrating appalling monstrosities."[35] Nonetheless, Singh's articles generally tended toward subtlety, deftly exhibiting the rhetoric of emasculation just below the surface of his text. The fact that he lived and worked in London is important as well, for Singh provides a striking example of "how colonial power was staged at home and how it was contested by 'natives at the heart of empire itself.'"[36]

Much like Gandhi, Singh adopted a carefully moderate tone once the war came, correctly assuming that a soft word would prove more persuasive than the radical jeremiads published by Besant and Rai. Writing in February 1915, he argued that India "desired no greater autonomy than that already enjoyed by Canada, Australia, & etc. and even that is not asked for immediately in a single installment."[37] Nonetheless, he noted, most "educated Indians felt that the pace of reform is far too slow and that greater speed was needed." More pointedly, though, Singh frowned upon the "misguided Britons [who] have been foolish enough to belittle this action [Indian loyalty], or to ascribe low motives to it." If India had really been disloyal, he averred, even the most legitimate agitation would have prevented the government from denuding the country of thousands of its white troops. Rather, the actions of India's nationalists merely paralleled those of the suffragettes in Britain. In his estimation, India's devotion entitled the colony to "British affection and devotion for years to come."[38]

Another author, using the simple pen name of "An Indian" but bearing the stylistic and the argumentative imprint of the *Hindustan Review*'s editor S. P. Sinha, criticized Valentine Chirol's work and its condemnation of Indian journalists by declaring the presence of Asian soldiers in France,

where they fought beside white troops, to be of special significance: the "last vestige of mistrust, the unfortunate legacy of the 'Indian unrest' is wiped out between the ruler and the ruled. The dispatch of the sepoys to Europe meant that India had now established itself as a partner in the empire; every sepoy on French soil rings out the old and rings in the new."[39] Both Singh and "An Indian" clearly strove to discount the claim that the effeminized and educated Indian was inherently untrustworthy. That the colony's intelligentsia had not fomented a rebellion implied that the supposedly emasculated Indians actually had full control of their "effeminate" natures and thus deserved a measure of power.

The *Modern Review* [*MR*], in an article entitled "Reciprocity with Colonies," extended wartime demands to include better treatment for those Indians living in the dominions. Indeed, as in the case of the Indian indentured servants sent abroad to build railroads and tend plantation fields, the issue of "reciprocity" represented a main plank in the Indian nationalist platform.[40] And even though Gandhi's campaign against the Cape Colony's government had borne fruit, the *Komagata Maru* incident—in which Canadian authorities in Vancouver had turned back a Japanese ship carrying nearly 400 politically active Sikh emigrants—incited a storm of criticism both in India and in the empire's South Asian expatriate communities. Such treatment, in the author's overly optimistic opinion, would end as Indian and dominion soldiers shared the hardships of war:

> One beneficial result of the war will be that the brown or black man who has fought side by side with him and shed his blood without stint does not deserve to be and cannot be despised. The time is coming for the adjustment of differences in a statesman-like spirit . . . which will steer clear not only of all the petty, selfish prejudices, but also all of the narrow, shortsighted and degrading considerations.[41]

No longer, implied the author, would Indians be second-class citizens of the empire—they had to be judged not on color, but on their willingness to sacrifice themselves as imperial citizens of the larger British realm. Fighting in a European war, in and of itself, meant fighting for "civilization," itself a frequently invoked signifier justifying colonial control in the age of "New Imperialism."

Although the major imperial powers commonly agreed that they would never use colonial soldiers in a purely European war due to their lack of "civilized" self-control, an April 1914 issue of the *MR*, with no small degree of perspicacity, had already addressed the possibility of Asian soldiers

fighting on the continent. The failure to seriously consider the use of Indian troops in such an event, implied the *MR*, derived from the belief that non-white soldiers were not only more "savage" than their European counterparts, but also simply inferior. The implication, of course, was that the martial races, though not degenerate enough to forfeit their manliness, *had* suffered from the loss of masculine reserve and restraint. Ramananda Chatterjee, the *MR's* editor, pointed out with some satisfaction that Europeans had easily taken to "savagery" during China's Boxer Rebellion and in the 1911 Italo-Turkish War. Furthermore, the Sikh soldier "was not a whit inferior to the white soldier." The fundamental problem with using Asians, insisted Chatterjee, had less to do with rumors of "savagery" and "inferiority" and far more the "lurking suspicion that if dusky troops were pitted against white ones they might discover their real power."[42]

Gandhi and the Forms of Colonial Violence

One would be mistaken in seeing Gandhi as unambivalent over his support for the war. Witness, for example, his justification for backing the British, in a letter to his brother written in September 1914:

> All of you may want to know why I have undertaken even the nursing of the wounded. . . . One who would not help in a slaughter house should not help in cleaning the butcher's house either. But I found that living in England I was in a way participating in the War. London owes the food it gets in wartime to the protection of the Navy. Thus to take this food was also a wrong thing. There was only one right course left, which was to go away and live in some mountain or cave in England itself and subsist on whatever food or shelter nature might provide. . . . [but] I do not possess the spiritual strength necessary for this. It seemed to me a base thing, therefore, to accept food tainted by war without working for it. When thousands have come forward to lay down their lives only because they thought it their duty to do so, how could I sit still? A rifle this hand will never fire. And so there only remained nursing the wounded and I took it up.[43]

Gandhi's response to his friend Florence Winterbottom in June 1915 proved even more torturous. Even though the Mahatma had intended to "retire from the War" once he made his way to India, he was now "in the thick of it . . . raise[ing] men to fight, to deal death to men, who, for all they know, are as innocent as they. And I fancy that through this sea of blood I shall find my haven." The key problem lay in the fact that "men [who] are incapable through cowardice of killing" could not learn "the virtue of

non-killing" in the first place. Thus the terrible dilemma: "I so want them to learn the art of killing! This is all awful."[44]

Gandhi's later actions suggest a degree of disingenuousness in his protestations to Schreiner and Winterbottom. Writing late in the war, and after receiving a tepid response to his call for Indians to join the army and fight for the empire, a frustrated Gandhi blistered listeners at a speech in Surat:

> We should send our men to France and Mesopotamia. We are not entitled to demand *swaraj* till we come forward to enlist in the army. It is futile to expect any results when we have not done our duty. . . . *Swaraj* is not for lawyers and doctors but only for those who possess strength of arms. . . . When the people become physically fit and strong enough to wield the sword, *swaraj* will be theirs for the asking. How can people who have lost their strength defend their religion? From my experience during the last three months, I know that we are utterly timid. People afraid of even a squirrel had much better think of improving their own condition than of getting *swaraj*. Here we have an invaluable opportunity for getting back the capacity to fight which we have lost and we should not miss it. If a people who do not know in what direction to look for a fort, do not know how to fire a gun, have no knowledge of the state of fortification on the border—if they wish to know all this, they should certainly not miss this supreme opportunity which India has of supplying half a million men.[45]

This is hardly the language of a peace-loving saint immersed in the waters of moral absolutism. The implications were clear. *Swaraj* did not come freely, but demanded sacrifice. The charges of "native cowardliness" and "effeminacy" would remain unless India fought, and fought hard, for the empire. If the country failed in this task, then the Raj would necessarily remain to protect an indigene incapable of defending itself from depredation, whether from internecine self-immolation or invasion from outside the country's borders. ICS administrators, indeed, frequently blunted calls for autonomy by pointing out that they, the outsiders, held the scales level in a land where the extorting moneylender threatened the innocent peasant, where the specter of Muslim and Hindu communalism loomed always, and where the "martial races" would run wild if let off the leash by their British officers.

Gandhi's surprising position points not to an absolute belief in nonviolence, but a personal taxonomy that distinguished between "legitimate" versus "illegitimate" violence. Witness, for example, the dialogue in his famous 1909 pamphlet *Hind Swaraj* (Indian Self-Rule) between the "Reader," cast as a young Indian bent on terror, and himself in the role of the moderating "Editor," or teacher. The discourse is revealing of Gandhi's

nuanced views on violence, and, even though a "fictional" exchange, it went far beyond some airy, abstract debate. Gandhi wrote in the immediate aftermath of two killings that had horrified the imperial public, the 1908 Alipore Bomb Case, which implicated Aurobindo Ghose in the 1909 assassination of the aged Sir Curzon Wyllie by Madan Lal Dhingra, an Indian student at University College London.[46] The first attack missed its intended target, an English judge, but killed the wife and daughter of a colleague whom he had been playing bridge with earlier. The Wyllie murder was equally shocking in that it took place, not in India, but in South Kensington, as Wyllie left a meeting of the National Indian Association, a moderate body with ties to the Tagore family.

The "Reader," quite possibly modeled on Ghose, given the timing of the piece, approved of both acts, expressing disdain for the Editor's claim that it would take India years to defeat the English by armed resistance. He declared "all need not be armed. At first, we shall assassinate a few Englishmen and strike terror; then a few men who have been armed will fight openly." Even though "we may have to lose a quarter of a million men . . . we shall regain our land." The Reader likewise saw the need to strike quickly and forcefully before Indian men became too emasculated to resist at all: "we are day by day becoming weakened [by] the British. Our greatness is gone; our people look like terrified men." Gandhi firmly rejected the Reader's line of reasoning, charging "you want to make the holy land of India unholy. Do you not tremble to think of freeing India by assassination? . . . It is a cowardly thought, that of killing others."[47] Nonetheless, Gandhi's condemnation dealt more with the manner of the violence, not the fact that it had occurred. He submitted that Dhingra was a "patriot" in that his motives were pure, but his act was a "serious mistake" in that "his love was blind." He gave his body in the "*wrong way* [italics mine]."[48] In a similar article on Dhingra for the *Indian Opinion*, Gandhi further argued that misdirected terrorism threatened to ignite internecine violence:

> Even should the British leave in consequence of such murderous acts, who will rule in their place? Is the Englishman bad because he is an Englishman? Is it that everyone with an Indian skin is good? If that is so, there should be [no] angry protest against oppression by Indian princes. India can gain nothing from the rule of murderers—no matter whether they are black or white. Under such a rule, India will be utterly ruined and laid waste.[49]

Gandhi further admonished the Reader by referencing passive resistance as the ultimate weapon. It more accurately reflected manliness than did

terror, for "a man devoid of courage and manhood could never be a passive resistor." Non-violent resistance was moreover a universal and significantly gendered weapon, suitable for "both men and women," the strong as well as "weak in body."[50] It required no "scabbard," whereas terror eroded the possibility of India's millenarian renewal because it was in and of itself culturally impure, a sign that Indians had yielded to a distinctly European form of "wretched modern civilization." Indeed, Gandhi-as-Editor emphasized that India was *more* civilized, not less, because of its "stolid" and unchanging nature, whereas modernity and its attendant materialism brought on a soul-destroying spiritual peril. Furthermore, the colony held moral superiority over Great Britain because of the interchangeable nature of "duty" and "morality" in indigenous culture. "Morality" likewise dovetailed with the "mastery over our mind and our passions," which in turn equated with "truth." Gandhi's meaning was clear: political murder reflected a beastly European colonialism; terror was incongruent with the essential concept of "civilization" as Indians understood it. The physical decay engendered by conquest had fostered a mental weakness as well. Gandhi punctuated his argument by noting that the Gujarati term for "civilization" literally translated as "good conduct." Right behavior dictated the measure of progress, not machines and material goods.[51]

Gandhi reiterated his opposition to revolutionary terror at the February 1916 opening of the Banaras Hindu University, yet this time he abandoned the reference to non-violence and advocated fighting for the empire as a necessary alternative. "I honor the anarchist for his love of country" declared Gandhi, "but I ask him—is killing honorable? Is the dagger of an assassin outfit precursor of an honorable death? I deny it." He instead called for "an empire which is to be based on mutual love and mutual trust." Earning that trust meant fighting and proving India's maturity and boldness in that "if we are to receive self-government, we shall have to take it" since the British nation, freedom-loving though it was, would not "give freedom to a people who will not take it themselves." He continued, chiding the crowd, "learn your lesson if you wish in the Boer War. Those who were enemies of that empire only a few years ago have now become friends. . . ."[52] The ambivalence of his speech, the tacit approval of the motives of the anarchist while disapproving his methods, was not lost on upset British authorities, even though his calls for a mass Indian Army, "an army of Home Rulers crowding the battlefields of France" as he later put it, should have allayed their fear.[53] The meaning was crystal clear: political agitation would arouse opposition from the Raj while fighting effectively and bravely would earn Britain's respect. This tactic however, would

only work if India as a whole sought out the battlefield, even "educated" and "effeminate" Indians.

This begs the key question: if Gandhi spoke so strongly against violence in 1909, then why would he embrace the unprecedented slaughter of World War I just five years later? The subsequent answers may seem too neat, but nevertheless offer the best explanations. For Gandhi, the war represented a duty of the *imperial* citizen and a path forward for national, and hence racial, regeneration. India could prove the country's "fitness for self-rule" if it would merely join the battle in full and meet its obligations as part of an imperial body politic. The country could become autonomous simply by doing its duty, a familiar and important concept in both British and Indian cultures, whatever their individual idiosyncrasies. The essential point to draw here is this: once England went to war Gandhi chose violence as the best instrument for meeting the goals of the nationalist movement. The emphasis on Dhingra giving his life in the "wrong" way likewise implies that there was a "right" way. Given Gandhi's involvement in both the Boer and Zulu wars one might surmise that dying on the battlefield met the requirements of duty.[54] While attacks on the Raj carried no benefit other than to stiffen the English resolve and push autonomy further away, the Great War presented an opportunity. If the Allies were fighting on behalf of the right to "self-determination," then so too was India. If the conflict allowed Britons to surmount the prewar tumult of class, gender, and political unrest, could it not also have the same effect on caste and sect in India if the country simply committed itself massively to the war effort? Who could then deny South Asia's power? Indeed, virtually *every* anti-colonial movement of the early twentieth-century looked to recapture the millenarian glories of an imagined golden age through "manly" effort, if not outright killing. To borrow Benedict Anderson's now overworked phrase, Gandhi had perceived the effect of "empty homogenous time," a collapsing of the temporal space between the ancient past and imagined future sanctified by the blood of a common purpose. The spirit of the *kshatriya*, or ancient warrior caste, would foster the required discipline needed to unite the country and restore Indian virility. Moreover, Gandhi's "everyman a *kshatriya*" mentality spoke powerfully to the millenarian nationalist ideal of a rejuvenated masculinity. Gandhi had effectively turned fighting for the empire into a form or resistance insomuch that it could, after all, potentially erode the power of colonialism's gendered ideologies, freeing not only India, but also England.

The similarity of language, from Besant and Gandhi to Ghose, testifies to the idiomatic power of colonial masculinity throughout imperial

culture, from the higher levels of governance down to the level of the individual colonial body. Indeed, the broad epistemological and institutional violences laid out in previous scholarship speak directly to the personal actions of Gandhi and Ghose, with the Alipore Bomb case spurring the former to write his dialogue in the first place. This should come as no surprise, for the millenarian language of both moderate and radical, so prevalent in early twentieth-century Indian nationalism, by definition admitted a degree of decay that inadvertently affirmed the British mission to "rehabilitate" India. Seen against this backdrop, colonial taxonomies such as "effeminization" meant that national humiliation served as the handmaiden of personal mortification, especially when one's own qualities ostensibly reflected inability of an entire people to care for themselves. In this environment, the physical body of the colonized became a tangible and highly visible place for anti-colonial resistance.

Gandhi's *Autobiography* repeatedly testifies to the importance of power as it pertained to the *individual* colonial body. In one instance, Gandhi recounts his dismay at learning that some of his student cohort in England were secretly eating meat and drinking wine out of the desire to become as physically imposing as the English. One friend in particular badgered him to change his diet, claiming "we are a weak people because we do not eat meat. The English are able to rule over us because they are meat eaters." Doggerel Gujarati verse such as "Behold the mighty Englishman/ He rules the Indian small/Because being a meat eater/He is five cubits tall" was also familiar to Gandhi, and when combined with the pestering of his colleague, temporarily converted the future Mahatma to meat eating.[55] Gandhi's shame at violating his parent's vegetarian ethics led him back to a non-meat diet, but even then he admitted that "at the same time his wished every Indian was a meat-eater."[56] Others sought to overcome personal emasculation by advocating the formation of *gymkhanas* in Indian schools and wrestling, or *akhadas*', for physical activity; Lajpat Rai and a number of other nationalists tried their hand at wrestling—a favorite sport in the Punjab's rural society.[57] Punjabi's especially rejoiced just prior to the war, in 1910, when provincial hero "Gama the Great" traveled to London and defeated all European challengers to win the "John Bull Cup." India's *Modern Review* positively mocked one of Europe's most famous wrestlers, the Polish titan Stanislaus Zbyszko, for failing to show for a scheduled rematch with Gama.

Gandhi's previous war service in South Africa and later reconciliation of *ahimsa* with the bloodshed of the Great War, not to mention his caustic comments regarding the dismal response to his call for volunteers to fight

Germany, directly reflect his own feeling of humiliation at the supposed cowardice and effeminacy of the Hindu male. Analogously, the very presence of the Englishmen as the epitome of manliness, marching off to war in 1899, 1906, and 1914 presented a highly visible countervailing figure, one perfectly suited for confirming English masculinity and underscoring just how enervated the colonized male remained. This was absolutely not lost on Gandhi, who positively reveled in the camaraderie of the Boer War. What makes his position so ironic, however, is just how similar his motives and means were to Ghose and other radicals. All of them saw some efficacy in the ability of violence to offer masculine, and hence national, salvation. Violence had a utility that spoke directly to the intense individual physical and psychological degradation of the colonial experience. The key difference between them lay in their respective views of what path, or *form*, a necessary and rehabilitative masculine violence should take. The devil lay in the details of a legitimate versus non-legitimate, or productive versus counterproductive, violence.

Ashis Nandy has been one of the most astute observer's when it comes to complicating the image of Gandhian non-violence as a stereotypical "one-sided morality play" between the cruel colonizer and the beleaguered victim. Gandhi himself admitted that his credo of non-violence actually came not from Hindu tradition, which contains little evidence of pacifism, but from the biblical Sermon on the Mount. As Nandy further observes, no Indian leader had spoken of non-violence as a foundational principle in the 150 years of British rule up to Gandhi's campaigns. Swami Vivekananda, a Hindu monk who helped popularize Eastern religion during his tours of the United States and England in the 1890s, mockingly noted that the British adhered more closely to classical Indian texts with their "hedonic, manly Pursuits," whereas Indians ironically adopted the "passive, life-denying, feminine" characteristics of European Christianity.[58]

Violence seems to have been as inescapable as the dilemma of colonial hybridity itself, whether for Gandhi or Ghose or for meat-eating or battle. Empire enveloped and partially acculturated those who were trying to escape it, and to a lesser degree those who enforced its power. One could only challenge imperial power by adapting to it and gradually wearing it down ideologically, or by direct confrontation and revolution. Such a position belies much of the literature that speculates as to whether the colonial subject could ever escape the "postcolonial predicament," or in the case of Partha Chatterjee's work, create a truly endogamous nationalist space. Anti-colonial nationalism, like gender itself, is a relational construct, configured in opposition to the scientific, legal, and governmental power

structures of empire. Complete separation and purely autonomous spaces proved elusive because they were always defined by the colonial relationship. This dilemma placed colonial subjects in an uncomfortable position, not unlike Hari Kumar of Paul Scott's fictional series the *Raj Quartet*.[59] In England he is the cricket playing "Harry Coomer," while in India an old friend from the metropole passes him by because he is literally just another Indian, made invisible by his surroundings. Fictional characters like Kumar and real people such as Gandhi and Ghose operated in a mixed cultural environment, part English, part Indian.

This quandary could be especially daunting for those who had studied at metropolitan universities rather than home institutions. Gandhi and Jinnah, like India's future Prime Minister Jawarhalal Nehru, had obtained law degrees in London. Jinnah had left home at 16 to begin reading for the bar.[60] By age 20 he had returned to India, but not before the election of Dadabhai Naoroji to Parliament had instilled in him a strong Liberal bent. Those who met him recalled his very English persona: an impeccable dresser who performed Shakespeare as a student and later accentuated his coolly aloof manner with a cigarette and a monocle. This hybridity proved too firmly entrenched in nationalist thought to be totally eliminated, even among radicals who sought to purge signs of colonial influence from their own efforts. The organizers of the *Melas*, for example, when soliciting for indigenous textiles for display, were mortified to find that the clothes bore a remarkable resemblance to English products, even as British officials were invited to witness the performance of Bengali athletic competitions. Even Ghose, in his hymn to Durga, could not resist using his superb training in Greek to fold Indian and Western mythology together when constructing his rhetoric of revival, calling upon the goddess to give the country's warriors "a Titan's strength and a Titan's energy," while at the same time imploring Durga to "enter our bodies in thy Yogic strength."[61] Such presences indicate the need for a more careful examination of Indian wartime opinion, one that accounts for hybridity and its ancillary implications.

If so much of India's nationalist leadership had absorbed European elements, then why did their efforts to attain full citizenship fail while some "imperial" citizens in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada made significant political gains? India, after all, contributed more troops than all dominions combined. Here, it makes sense to posit an obvious point, namely the role of "whiteness" as an additional and equally essential element of transnational, gendered citizenship. If Victorian democracy (and by way of association, wartime democracy), as Antoinette Burton argues,

was universally understood as "implicitly white, male and middle-class," then one should read the political and social stresses of the Great War within this same context. This cultural lexicon of "whiteness," as Burton's study of Dadabhai Naoroji's election to Parliament in 1892 demonstrates, was an inescapable conclusion not just of metropolitan culture, but also the imperial world. Although Naoroji, a Parsi, ran for Parliament unsuccessfully in 1884, his subsequent victorious campaign benefited from a careless speech by Prime Minister Lord Salisbury in Edinburgh in 1886. Salisbury commented with some sarcasm that Naoroji was "a black man; and however great the progress of mankind has been, and however far we have advanced in overcoming prejudices, I doubt if we have yet to go to that point of view where a British constituency would elect a black man." Salisbury's speech inaugurated a cause célèbre in the British press and allowed Naoroji to eke out a win in 1892. Those who took umbrage to Salisbury's remarks maintained that, as a Parsi, Naoroji was "not at all black. Many an English man is not so fair. He has lived 30 years in England. In speech, costume, and manners he is indistinguishable from a refined, educated and courteous English gentleman; and it requires a quick eye to tell from his colour that he is not English."[62]

The emphasis on Naoroji's "English" physical and personal characteristics is best seen as a strategy of "whitening" that shifted the otherness of the colonial subject toward the ideal of a sexually moral and respectable Victorian middle-class. It would seem that John Bull, the bluff and sensible yeoman farmer of late eighteenth-century caricatures, had become a middle-class urbanite over the course of the nineteenth century. Moreover, rejecting imperial culture and embracing revolutionary violence, *à la* Ghose, was not the only way to challenge colonialism insomuch that revolutionary nationalism was born of frustration. The inability of hybridization to surmount the supposedly "objective" and "scientific" racial and gendered hierarchies of the Raj led Ghose and other revolutionaries to see it as a humiliating loss of "self." Gandhi and more moderate leaders never fully abandoned the notion that one could resist more subtly by working to some degree within the parameters of the Raj's administrative and power structures, whether rhetorically turning British concepts of constitutional liberties against the Raj or fighting for it to gain a broad form of citizenship. It is worth remembering that several generations of Indians had lived and worked with the Raj, albeit in a sometimes uneasy partnership, up to 1914. The fact that opportunity rested in part on the ability of the colonial subject to interact at some level with the colonizer was an inescapable byproduct of imperial relationships. Ultimately, though, imperial

citizenship was tethered to the *sine qua non* of masculinity, whiteness, and middle-class metropolitan norms of sexual propriety. The lack of any one of these characteristics disqualified the colonial subject from self-rule.

Matthew Frye Jacobson's work on European migration to the United States compellingly underscores the slipperiness of "whiteness" in considering how similar issues of citizenship crossed imperial borders into the United States, albeit with the added complexity of a significant African American population as well as a large influx of Eastern Europeans and Asians just prior to and after the war. In a case that Gandhi would have certainly understood, Bhagat Singh Thind, a Sikh student born in Amritsar, sued to gain status as a US citizen on two bases: a shared Caucasian ancestry with Anglo-Saxon Americans and his service in the US Army. Thind had attended University of California at Berkeley and enlisted after the United States joined the Allied effort in 1917. After the war, he successfully filed a suit in Oregon to have himself declared a citizen. The US Supreme Court overturned the decision by claiming that "Hindus" were not white, even though "the blond Scandinavian in the brown Hindu have a common ancestor in the dim reaches of antiquity, . . . the average man knows perfectly well that there are unmistakable and profound differences between them today." The term "Aryan," the court noted:

> . . . has to do with linguistic and not at all with physical characteristics, and it would seem reasonably clear that mere resemblance in language, indicating a common linguistic root buried in remotely ancient soil, is altogether inadequate to prove common racial origin. There is, and can be, no assurance that the so-called Aryan language was not spoken by a variety of races living in proximity to one another. Our own history has witnessed the adoption of the English tongue by millions of Negroes, whose descendants can never be classified racially with the descendants of white persons notwithstanding both may speak a common root language.[63]

The federal government won the case only to have Thind successfully apply for citizenship in New York several years later.[64]

The larger point to draw from the efforts of Gandhi in the imperial sphere and Thind in the United States is the inescapable interconnection between race and gender. Being fully masculine and in control generally meant being white as well. Thind's advantage lay in the fact that a single Indian as a US citizen did not carry the implicit dangers of the 300 million Indians within the British Empire; South Asians simply did not live in the United States in significant enough numbers to pose a threat, nor would recognizing Thind's rights as a citizen mean ceding autonomy of a large

chunk of an American-held colony to indigenous control. Moreover, Thind was a Sikh and a member of the "martial races," a term that American authorities certainly would not extend to the Filipinos who volunteered for service with the American army in France—theirs was an easy claim to deny.

It may be best at this point to let Gandhi have the last word on his support for the war. Writing a decade after the conflict, and in response to a harsh critique from a French journalist who demanded to know why he took part in three wars, the Mahatma defended himself:

> So long as I lived under a system of Government based on force and voluntarily partook of the many facilities and privileges it created for me, I was bound to help that Government to the extent of my ability. . . . Let me take an illustration. I am a member of an institution which holds a few acres of land whose crops are in imminent peril from monkeys. I believe in the sacredness of all life and hence I regard it as a breach of ahimsa to inflict any injury on the monkeys. But I do not hesitate to instigate and direct an attack on the monkeys in order to save the crops. . . . Because I do not expect to be able to find a society where there will be no agriculture and therefore no destruction of some life. In fear and trembling. . . . I therefore participate in the injury inflicted on the monkeys, hoping some day to find a way out.
>
> Even so did I participate in the three acts of war. . . . It would [have been] madness for me to sever my connection with the society to which I belong. . . . But that still does not solve the riddle. If there was a national Government, whilst I should not take any direct part in any war, I can conceive occasions when it would be my duty to vote for the military training of those who wish to take it. For I know that all its members do not believe in non-violence to the extent I do. It is not possible to make a person or a society non-violent by compulsion. Non-violence works in a most mysterious manner. Often a man's actions defy analysis in terms of non-violence; equally often his actions may wear the appearance of violence when he is absolutely non-violent in the highest sense of the term and is subsequently found so to be. All I can then claim for my conduct is that it was, in the instances cited, actuated in the interests of non-violence. There was no thought of national or other interest. I do not believe in the promotion of national or any other interest at the sacrifice of some other interest. I may not carry my argument any further.[65]

Premonitions of the Future: The British Press and Indian Loyalty

Many observers had seen Charles Roberts' parliamentary speech as an indication that the colony would emerge from the war with greater autonomy. Just what form the Anglo-Indian relationship would take after the

war, however, remained an open question. The reaction of pro-Indian Britons was fairly predictable. Former Home Secretary for the Government of India and President of the 1904 INC annual meeting at Bombay, Henry Cotton, noted India's loyalty with mock surprise, especially since "Anglo-Indians" had proclaimed the colony "a smoldering volcano which was restrained from eruption by the incessant vigilance of our officials and the pressure of a powerful British army at its back."[66] Cotton saw the fealty of India's "educated classes" as a matter of practicality and a "reasoned sense of devotion to the British Crown." He flatly rejected the supposition of Lord Crewe, who attributed Indian loyalty to "native" recognition of the "quality and character of the Indian Civil Service." Cotton piercingly observed that the ICS had never been known for its ability to identify itself with the people or "influence their modes of thought." In fact, the main trait of the ICS was "the inability to adapt to a new environment." The true explanation for loyalty lay in a "deep, fervent, and well-grounded hope manifested as a vision of the future rather than satisfaction with the present."[67] Roper Lethbridge, like Cotton, was a retired ICS official with pro-Indian sympathies, and thought India's leap to Britain's defense should encourage citizens in the white settler dominions to see the "monstrous injustice" and "utter absurdity" of viewing Indians as an inferior race. While both the dominions and India had the "right to maintain their own views, and even their own prejudices," this certainly did not preclude the former from abandoning "the old foolish ideas about 'natives.'"[68]

Surprisingly, even some of the more conservative organs of the British press agreed with Cotton and Lethbridge in seeing some merit in the colony's demands for a reassessment of the imperial relationship. London's *Daily Herald*, offering a frank appraisal of the significance that the presence of Indian troops in France would have, argued that "a new burden has been thrown on us. . . . It creates a debt we must repay speedily." India, rather than filling the role of a subject country, must "be set on the Imperial footing of the Great Colonies such as Canada, Australia, and South Africa."[69] A. J. Wilson, editor of London's *Investor's Review*, opined that India was "fighting as much for Home Rule as much as us . . . do not let us ignore the fact, and by our conduct make it harder to satisfy the legitimate demands of the Indian people." Meanwhile, *The Times*, referred to as "the official organ of the Empire" by one Indian journalist, alluded to India gaining an "ample place in the councils of Empire."[70] Even Valentine Chirol, writing to Sir Harcourt Butler in November of 1914, admitted that the Indo-British relationship would be substantially altered when hostilities had ended, though the reckoning might be painful: "Whatever the

outcome of the war may be, it will be a very different India afterwards—perhaps a better one, perhaps a worse. . . . Of course we shall have to pay pretty heavily afterwards from the political point of view, but this is not the moment when we can even think about ulterior consequences."[71] In India too, Lord Hardinge, perhaps the most politically astute of the late nineteenth/early twentieth-century viceroys, expressed the inevitability of change when sharing his private concerns with Butler. The fact that India had remained loyal was, he wrote, "a source of intense satisfaction to me, since it is, what few people ever enjoy during their term in office, a vindication of my policy and administration. There may be troubles and dangers ahead I readily admit, but with the enthusiastic spirit displayed on every side, there is little evidence of them."[72]

Hardinge tempered his optimism, though, with a grave concern over the long-term effects of India's involvement in the war. "I cannot close my eyes to the dangers ahead when the war is over," he wrote eight months into the fighting. "To meet them much clear vision and deep thought will be required, and shall we get them?" And while Hardinge believed that "solutions to such questions as commissions for the army, Indian volunteers, and the Arms Act can, I truly believe, be found" he feared that the "thoughtlessly" given promises of "Asquith, Haldane, and *The Times*" might lead to inevitable disappointment among Indians, who naturally expected a great deal.[73] The fate of the Raj also depended on "the choice of government in the appointment of my successor." As it turned out, he was succeeded by the worst possible choice—Lord Chelmsford.

Butler too had detected a hardening in the attitudes and growing impatience in India's leadership within months of August 1914, particularly given the lack of a clear commitment on reform from Britain. As early as the spring of 1915, he foreshadowed the potential for both rhetorical and real violence from an Anglo-Indian community bent on conserving its power and forestalling the kind of constitutional changes demanded by the various nationalist groupings. His main concerns were that they would fall back on their traditional rallying cries, the danger autonomy posed to business interests, and, more ominously, the threat that the educated babu posed to English womanhood. "The educated classes," noted Butler, "would generally like to see us humbled, but not beaten. I do hope that this class will be more moderate. I fear a reaction. Two things may upset public opinion at home. Fear for the safety of the British capitol [at Delhi] and fear of the safety of British women."[74] Neither Butler nor Hardinge could have envisioned just how prophetic these words would be.

3

Measures of Manliness: The Martial Races and the Wartime Politics of Effeminacy

Writing early in the war and exactly four years before Gurkha soldiers fired on a crowd at Jallianwallah Bagh in Amritsar, the radical journalist B. K. Roy warned that "whenever there is an act of high-handedness that is to be done to suppress the spirit of new nationalism in India, the Gurkha is employed, and he acts like a veritable fanatic in his attacks on men, women, and children." In a voice heavy with sarcasm, Roy further noted that "the educated man of India . . . is not allowed to enlist as a volunteer or a soldier. He is not trusted. A Bengali can never enter the Army as a soldier."[1] Anglo-Indians would have objected to the article's mocking tone, but not its principles; there existed nearly universal agreement regarding the lack of martial qualities in the Bengali, or most Indians for that matter, who dwelled beyond those groups already recruited for the army. Roy had deployed an enormously self-conscious argumentative strategy. He was among the Bengalis who were "not allowed to enlist," who exemplified the radical and effeminate nationalist, and who most needed careful surveillance. Contrarily, the martial races "not only underwrote British power in India," both in 1857 and 1919, but also "marked out those Indians who could be incorporated within the imperial order."[2] It was mainly the "fighting classes," led "properly" by their British officers, who were ultimately charged with defending the Raj and putting down politically dangerous "natives" such as Roy and his ilk.

Roy's article proved tragically prescient in demonstrating just how indispensable the martial races were to the empire's alchemy of violence and gender.[3] As he so trenchantly implied, it was not just the physical threat

of the fanatical Gurkha that reined in the ambitions of the nationalists, but also his ideological presence; the Bengali was "not trusted" and could "never enter the Army," even as a volunteer. The most ardent opponents of greater political "native" autonomy underscored this by pointing out that the intelligentsia did none of the empire's fighting, and thus neither earned nor deserved independence. As for the martial races themselves, they were manly enough to rule, yet lacking in the Englishman's combination of brawn and intellectual self-control. To be sure, Roy's juxtaposition of the masculine/martial and feminine/radical is significant insofar as it suggests how intimately intertwined the protocols of rule and practices of masculinity were within the cultural politics of the Raj. As the following discussion will clearly indicate, the military and civil superstructures of imperial power in South Asia rested on a self-justifying but shaky foundation of colonial gender roles. More specifically, it is useful to remember that virtually every Indian political crisis in a generation before World War I involved the conscious deployment of gendered rhetoric in the service of politic and internal security.

The Punjab stood as the province where the maintenance of masculine hierarchies remained the most essential. The region's Sikh and Muslim tribes supplied the bulk of the Raj's soldiers, and the Punjab's Lieutenant-Governors occupied one of the most crucial positions in the government in guaranteeing the loyalty and stability of the "martial races" along the country's volatile North-Western Frontier with Afghanistan. The Punjabi government had done so successfully since the end of the 1857 Mutiny, but the pressures of the war and the growth of both moderate nationalism and violent millenarian movements upset the ideological balance between the martial and non-martial races. The refusal of British military officials to reach beyond the martial races and take advantage of India's huge population seemed shortsighted and discriminatory to moderates like Gandhi, especially with the empire losing thousands of troops every month on the Western Front, and in the Dardanelles, and Middle East. The exiled radicals of India's diaspora, on the other hand, saw an opportunity to spread disaffection to the army while the country was denuded of many of its white troops, leaving British officials scrambling to quarantine the martial races from radical nationalist ideologies.

Bearing this in mind, the following chapter begins with a brief overview of the genealogy of the martial races theory as a means of foregrounding the overall discussion, followed by a close examination of the increasingly heated political rhetoric surrounding political reform and martiality during the war.[4] In doing so, this chapter chronologically brings forward the work

of Mrinalini Sinha and Heather Streets, both of whom have considered the martial races in the context of late nineteenth-century cultural and political controversies. More than this though, it seeks to broaden the debate and demonstrate more clearly how the rhetoric of the "fighting classes" and effeminacy ultimately contributed to the violence in Amritsar. In the same vein, the chapter will consider how militant nationalists from India's global diasporic communities attempted to co-opt the martial races for their own revolutionary cause. This is an eminently sensible approach for two reasons. First, it reiterates the need to resituate the martial races doctrine within the larger structures of gender and imperial violence and set it apart from its predominantly military historiography. Second, as Maia Ramnath has so cogently argued, it is shortsighted to confine nationalism only to the borders of India when so much of it emanated from the globalized diasporic communities.[5] Meeting these goals may very well reveal how Indian officials such as O'Dwyer moved further down the road to Amritsar.

Our Soldiers, Ourselves: Constructing the Martial Races

The main goal of this section is to reveal how the emergence of the Indian "fighting races" as a species similar to the British helped ensure the maintenance of colonial rule. For the Raj, the masculine Punjabi and the effeminate Bengali worked symbiotically to protect the British position. The Punjabi, and Gurkha, provided not only military muscle, but also ideological sustenance. Prior to the Mutiny of 1857, the East India Company [EIC] stood as the main arbiter of British power on the subcontinent, raising and maintaining the bulk of India's armed forces. Yet the EIC's military structure was by no means uniform. Each of the three presidencies, Bombay and Madras in the south and Bengal in the north, possessed its own distinct army. Bombay and Madras recruited across social and caste lines, while the 120,000 strong Bengal component drew most of its sustenance from the higher castes of Bihar and Awadh (formerly Oudh).[6] The policy of maintaining three separate armies ensured that should one army become disaffected the other two could respond and restore order. This is precisely what happened in the summer of 1857, when the Army of Bengal's Hindu and Muslim troops murdered their officers and began marching on Delhi.

Unfortunately for the British, Hindu and Muslim sepoys had found the rumor that their rifle cartridges were greased respectively with either beef or pork fat deeply offensive to their religious beliefs. Although British

commanders quickly corrected the situation, the damage had been done. Moreover, utilitarian devotees of Bentham and Mill had begun instituting land reform policies with little regard for the religious, economic, and social sensibilities of the sepoys, most of whom also remained heavily dependent on an agrarian lifestyle.[7] The troops from Awadh had a further grievance: after the British annexed the province in 1856, they lost their *batta*, or pay for service abroad, since the region now officially constituted a part of an enlarged EIC sphere. Finally, the sepoys of the Bengal army greatly resented the threat posed to their monopoly on the military labor market by the incorporation of Punjabi Sikhs and Muslims into the Bengal forces, especially since they had recently defeated many of these same Punjabis in the First (1845–1846) and Second Sikh Wars (1848–1849). Taken together, these factors explain why almost a hundred units of the Bengal army rebelled in 1857, as opposed to an insignificant number in Bombay and in Madras.

The Sikh army, which also contained a sizeable number of Punjabi Muslims, had nearly defeated the Company's forces in the 1840s only to help to save the British position just ten years later. This remarkable turn of events reinforced the propensity to see elements of India's northern populace as vaguely analogous to the English, a relationship put forward by Orientalist scholars like Sir William Jones (1746–1794).[8] Jones' study of Sanskritic texts led him to posit of a direct linguistic relationship between the "Aryan" peoples of northwestern India and the Germanic Anglo-Saxon that had swept into medieval England. Jones' philological gymnastics had "provided the linguistic apparatus that underpinned the operation of the colonial state. . . . and confirmed the genetic relationship between Greek, Latin, and Sanskrit," and hence "the commonalties between Europe and Indian history."[9] His grammatical taxonomies corresponded all too neatly with the fetish for classification that marked the Enlightenment's ethnographic efforts. Most crucially for the future, Jones performed a double move that allowed colonial administrators and martial race experts to make a close connection between language, racial affiliation, and levels of manliness.

Yet, there were crosscurrents of colonial ideology in the Punjab that caused disagreement on how best to classify and govern the people of the region. The brothers Sir John and Sir Henry Lawrence, both of whom served as the EIC's Resident at Lahore, differed sharply on how to deal with the Sikh aristocracy that controlled the Punjab's land and peasantry. In the estimation of one chronicler, Sir John's administrative training had led him to rule with a hand that was "iron and never gloved." His strong

utilitarian bent likewise led him to characterize the Sikh landlords as "useless drones" and "lazy bloodsuckers" who preyed on the peasant farmers.[10] Sikh chieftains returned his antipathy. Sir Henry's training as a soldier led him in an opposite direction in that he developed a heavily romanticized, almost medieval, view of the Sikh aristocracy and village life, akin to Anglo-Saxon England. He warned Sir John that "we are doubly bound to treat them [the Sikh chiefs] kindly because they are down, and because they and their hangers on still have influence as affecting peace and contentment."[11] Sir Henry had fought against the tough and determined Sikh troops, yet saw in them a kindred spirit and the basis of an Anglo-Sikh axis that would "at once lean on and [lend] support to our Empire on the side of the North-West." The European administrator's main task then would be to "reconcile it [the Punjab] when hostile, spare it when subdued, and utilize its great military force as a barrier against Afghanistan, and if need be Russia. . . ." It was, as one writer has termed it, the "project of his life."[12] Sir Henry's acumen allowed Sir John, in spite of himself, to replenish the ranks of a mutinous Indian army with a ready supply of Punjabi soldiers. Within a year of the Mutiny's outbreak Sir John had recruited 75,000 Punjabis, including 23,000 Sikhs, to replace soldiers from the refractory Awadh and Bihari populaces that had previously made up the Army of Bengal.[13] This trend continued in the subsequent years after the Mutiny, with the Indian Army gradually weaning itself from the southern presidencies and increasing its recruitment not only in the Punjab, but also in Nepal, where the Gurkhas provided a reliable and loyal source of military power. Indeed, they, like the Sikhs, had played a critical role in helping put down the rebellion.[14] The growing dependence on the Punjabi and the Gurkha did not truly gain official sanction, however, until the tenure of Lord Frederick Sleigh Roberts as Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army (1885–1893). Roberts, more than anyone, formulated most fully the late nineteenth-century belief in the martial races.[15] His tenure as commander of the Army of Madras (1880–1885), in particular, convinced him of the effete and effeminate nature of southern Indians. Looking back on his years in South Asia, Roberts was left with no doubt as to what had debilitated the province's manhood:

> Each cold season I made long tours in order to acquaint myself with the needs and capabilities of the Madras Army. I tried hard to discover in them those fighting qualities which had distinguished their forefathers during the wars of the last and during the beginning of the present century. But long years of peace, and the security and prosperity of attending it, had . . . as they

> always seem to have on Asiatics, a softening and deteriorating effect; and I was forced to the conclusion that the ancient military spirit had died in them, as it had died in the ordinary Hindustani of Bengal and the Mahratta of Bombay, and that they could no longer with safety be pitted against the war-like races or employed outside the limits of southern India.[16]

As a result, argued Roberts, "no comparison can be made between the martial value of a regiment recruited amongst the Gurkhas of Nepal or the warlike races of Northern India, and those recruited from the effeminate races of the south." The only option lay in the substitution of "men of the more warlike and hardy races for Hindustani sepoys of Bengal, the Tamils and Telugus of Madras, and the so-called Mahrattas of Bombay; . . ." Taking the argument a step further, he called attention to the key difference between the non-martial Indian populace and that of Britain, maintaining that the former did not share the "courage and military instinct . . . inherent in English, Scotch, and Irish".[17] Apparently though, the Sikhs shared this same pedigree, so much so that when Roberts designed his crest he decided that two soldiers, Sikh and a Scottish Highlander, should hold up its emblem. Sir O'Moore Creagh, who served as C-in-C of the Indian Army from 1909 to 1914, echoed his predecessor's view that climatic determinism played a critical role in defining masculinity and martiality. "In the hot regions," wrote Creagh, "are found races timid both by religion and habit, servile to their superiors, but tyrannical to their inferiors and quite unwarlike." Yet, "where the winter is temperate they are fairer, of better physique, and more manly." Stating his case more directly, Creagh contended that "it is from the Stony Girdle of the earth that the virile races have long gone forth as conquerors of India," whereas those who had migrated further south had "lost their virility." Indeed, by the time one reached the Ganges valley, thought Creagh, the lack of manliness became near total.[18]

General Sir George MacMunn, considered by his Great War contemporaries to be a longstanding authority on the martial races, readily picked up this thread after arriving in India in the late 1880s. MacMunn habitually contrasted the generally shorter and darker-complexioned southern Indians, who had descended from the aboriginal Dravidians, with the "Aryan" tribes who had conquered northern India. The "high grade Aryan profile of India" as MacMunn put it, shared a considerable resemblance with the "the Aryan beauty and physiognomy of the Greek."[19] Working from this supposition, MacMunn and his contemporaries confidently concluded that the Anglo-Saxon and Aryan of northern India had descended from the same "white races that forced their way through the mountains of

Solomon from the Central Asian Steppes."[20] Of course then, the northern Indian possessed superior masculinity. The martial races, perhaps related "to the men of Kent, [and] the Jutes of Jutland," had wisely forestalled "the devastating effects on moral and ethics of miscegenation with the Dravidian and aboriginal peoples" through the establishment of the caste system.[21] The martial man, like his kin the Englishman, had recognized the perils of mixing with a racially degenerate and unmanly populace and wisely preserved not only his superior physical and racial characteristics, but also his masculinity and political reliability. MacMunn, attuned to amateur anthropological theory and popular Social Darwinism, would later write sarcastically of the "cloven hoof of babu English," and the "fat and 'fearsome' Bengali" in his retrospective on India and the war. He attributed the popularity of Gandhi in the Punjab in 1918–1919 to the simple curiosity of more manly and fairer-complexioned northern Indians to see a "Blackie."[22]

MacMunn's climatic determinism served as a perfect complement to the philological accounts linking the Punjabi and Anglo-Saxon to a common ancestor, not least because it allowed the British to surmount the obvious lack of "Aryan physiognomy" among the Nepalese Gurkhas. The physical differences were so profound (writers often used the term "Mongol") that many Britons felt compelled to offer further justification for their inclusion into the army. Here, anthropologist Lionel Caplan offers a useful critique of the constructed nature of the martial races discourse as it pertains to the Gurkhas, and, hence, a caveat to the latent essentialism of some modern scholarship. As Caplan reminds us, the term "Gurkha" is in itself misleading. Readers of popular accounts, in particular, often assume that the moniker denotes a homogenous tribal group, when it in fact represents a variety of ethnic groupings from Nepal.[23] Moreover, historians of the Gurkhas, despite the overall fiction of the latter's homogeneity, held fast to this discourse because of social and political pressures that threatened the survival of the Nepalese units.[24] After Indian independence in 1947, for example, the British Army absorbed some of the former colony's Gurkha battalions. British officers and supporters, when faced with budgetary cuts, routinely trotted out their favorite anecdotal accounts of Gurkha fortitude and bravery as a means of forestalling a loss of funding. Caplan's main claim, that the Gurkha represented the epitome of the "warrior gentleman" in the Western imagination, finds plenty of backing in archives and memoirs. Britons familiar with the Gurkhas, especially the latter's white officers, believed unequivocally in the inherent martiality of the former. And like the Briton, the Gurkha exhibited great courage

while in battle and gentlemanly self-control outside of it. Indeed, one of the official manuals used by Gurkha recruiters made the connection unquestionably explicit:

> The Gurkhas are essentially a phlegmatic race, lacking in sentiment and emotion. And it is well for them that they are so, as it is perhaps partly because of this that they make such excellent soldiers. [Their] unemotional and practical minds are far more collected in moments of difficulty and danger than those otherwise endowed. . . . All emotional and imaginative peoples-the Italians, Spanish, French, and Greeks for example, however brave and fearless they might be, are peculiarly apt to that excitement in the heat of battle, which is so liable to lead to a loss of mental and volitional power, and hence the loss of intelligent and deliberate methods in war. . . . In this respect the unemotional and unsentimental Gurkha is much like the English; and like them, cool when in battle.[25]

The analog between the "emotional" and "imaginative" Mediterranean-Latin peoples and the non-martial Indians is clear; both suffered from an inability to control the more sensuous aspects of their personalities, a symptom of the ethnological disrepair brought on by exposure to a warm climate.

The Gurkha and Englishman too were similar, with their mutually "phlegmatic," "unemotional," and "unsentimental" dispositions. Indeed, the melding of environmental determinism and the level-headed reserve of the "colder blooded" peoples presumed an intrinsic link that many Britons took to heart. Lord Curzon, speaking in September 1914, powerfully reiterated the notion of the Gurkhas as "warrior gentlemen" by comparing them to the Germans. The former, he insisted, "would not fire on a Red Cross badge; they would not murder innocent women and children; they would not bombard Christian cathedrals. . . . The East is sending out a civilized soldiery to save Europe from a modern Hun."[26] The Gurkha's gentlemanly demeanor and mastery over sensuality underscored an even more important difference between the martial races on the one hand and the overly imaginative and effeminized Indian on the other. The former, because of their manly aplomb, posed far less of a sexual danger to the white woman than the latter. If anything, the Gurkha could be trusted to protect the white woman if asked to do so. One cannot help but wonder what Reginald Dyer said to his Gurkha troopers prior to opening fire at Amritsar.

The writer E. M. Forster observed Anglo-Indian culture directly, making trips to South Asia just prior to the war and again as a secretary to

the Maharaja of Dewas in the early 1920s. His post-war novel, *A Passage to India*, reveals just how far the distinction between the "trustworthy" martial races and "treacherous" educated Indian had penetrated into imperial culture. His female protagonist, the young Englishwoman Adela Quested, makes her first journey to the subcontinent with a total unawareness of the Raj's proprieties.[27] Once she has arrived, Adela presses her hosts to arrange meetings with "natives" so that she might experience the "real India." On a subsequent excursion to the Marabar Caves outside the city of Chandrapore, Quested and one of her Indian escorts, Dr. Aziz, become separated from the rest of their party. While in the caves Quested, perhaps suffering a fit of claustrophobia, believes herself to have been assaulted by the doctor. In the ensuing uproar, Aziz is arrested for an alleged attack. Back in Chandrapore the leaders of the Anglo-Indian community gather at the English club to wait for word on Quested's condition and prepare for the worst—a local uprising with European women as the main targets. There, a drunken army subaltern complains that the stationing of a few Gurkhas at the caves might have provided a sufficient deterrent against any perverse behavior. In a stuporific rage, he neatly sums up the prevailing attitudes and fears of Anglo-India: "Give me the sporting type of native, give me the Gurkhas, give me the Rajputs, give me the Punjabi, give me the Sikh . . . I don't mind if you give me the scums of the bazaars. Properly led mind [you]. I'd lead them anywhere . . . what you've got to stamp on is these educated classes."[28]

This single quote provides as revealing a glimpse into the inner workings of the imperial masculine ethos as any memoir or criminal case file. It demonstrates at once the interlocking notions of masculinity that pervaded British culture on the subcontinent, and to a lesser extent, a metropole fed on "oriental" lowbrow plays and pulp fiction. The simple phrase "properly led," for example, reflects the ingrained belief that only the British officer had all the masculine requisites to lead the Asian soldier. At the same time, it suggests that even the manlier "scums of the bazaars" were more trustworthy than the sexually predatory "educated classes," the latter being the same group that would be blamed for inciting the unrest just prior to the Amritsar Massacre. Indeed, one of Anglo-India's most prolific authors of potboilers, Sir John Travers, used his female memsahib's *nom de plume*, Eva Mary Bell, to contrast the educated Indian official with his martial counterpart: "clever men though they are," as "dreadfully lacking in some quality of character and personality. . . ." "Eva" found the martial races far more admirable, declaring toward the end of her missive, "Give me the Indian solider every time as a man."[29]

Clearly, the British notions of masculinity, for all their emphasis on the perfidiousness of the effeminized "native," placed equal weight on the value of the fighting classes as the closest approximation to the Englishman that the subcontinent had to offer. The "emasculated" Indian's inability to control his sexuality indicated a lack in the emotional discipline necessary for effective governing. As B. K. Roy's epigraph above so tellingly implied, the juxtapositioning of the martial races and the intelligentsia always had powerful political overtones. Roy in fact foreshadowed the work of later historians such as Heather Streets, who carefully tracked the ways that the martial races served as a "discursive tool" and "strategy of domination" that used "racial and gender language for political purposes."[30] As Streets revealed, martial races ideology helped to defeat nationalist advocacy for a "volunteer movement" of "native gentlemen" in the mid-1880s, when a war scare with Russia raised the possibility that Britain might lose control of the subcontinent. During the crisis "educated" Indians came forward to offer their services as soldiers for the Raj. A few British officials initially encouraged the volunteer movement, only to retreat in the face of civilian and military authorities who worried that the unctuous "effeminate" Indian might turn their weapons against the Raj at the first opportunity. If the "educated classes" managed to infect the loyal martial races with their "invidious teaching," argued opponents, it would only compound the disaster. Equally telling was the claim that the effeminate *babu* could not fight simply as a matter of biological impossibility. In effect, the "Native Volunteer Controversy" presaged the objections to more widespread Indian participation in the Great War.

The Wartime Politics of Martiality

As much as nationalists like Gandhi saw a direct connection between the war and self-rule, the guardians of empire saw no correlation between the "educated" classes and the contributions that Indian soldiers had made on the field. In their estimation the educated classes had done little or nothing to help the empire; "not for them the troopship that led the martial men of India westwards."[31] Perhaps the most striking aspect of the passage, however, is its overtly political tone. Certainly martial races "experts" did not shy away from political commentary, yet they usually couched their swipes at the "effeminized babu" in the subtler terms of biological and climatic determinism. As E. M. Forster's fictional Anglo-Indian superintendent of police, Mr. McBryde, put it, "all unfortunate natives are criminals at heart for the simple reason that they live south of latitude 30 . . . we should be like them if we settled here."[32]

As noted above, MacMunn made no such distinctions. His book on the martial races sharply noted that it was not the "hereditary moneylender" who had done the fighting, nor the unmanly merchant who had swung "through Marseilles with half the girls of France on their arms" before going into the line to "fight the war for freedom", but rather the "fighting classes."[33] Nor was Gandhi the Mahatma. He was *Lala* Gandhi, a term that signified his membership in the trading *bania* caste. Lala, like the similar designation of "babu," had shifted in meaning as it moved through variegated colonial discourses. Though long a term of respect among Indians, the Anglo-Indian populace had incorporated it as part of a derisive nomenclature. For MacMunn and others, the word "lala" cast a broad shadow under which the "educated," "effeminized," "weak," and "rapacious moneylender" could all rest. From there, the connection seemed obvious: the educated Indian, whether a Gujarati "lala" or Bengali "babu," somehow lay at the root of most of India's problems, especially those that had befallen the Raj since the initiation of the Montagu-Chelmsford political reforms in 1917.

Sir O'Moore Creagh made much the same point in his *Indian Studies*, an exposition of Indian culture and history that, like many Indologies, carried a significant ideological baggage. The "unwarlike classes," Creagh noted, came from the "*Kayasth*, *Brahmin*, and *Bania* castes" who comprised the bulk of the troublesome Indian National Congress. The handing of power to such a "tyrannical" and "unwarlike majority" would cause intense resentment among the Indian populace. It was not, he continued, "by the opinions of a few selected individuals or small bodies of self-constituted representatives of 'all India' that the views of the masses can be gauged." Worse, there existed the possibility that the intelligentsia, with its penchant for "windy sedition," might cause riots among an "ignorant or innocent people."[34] The best course of action, then, would be for the British to continue their suzerainty. Creagh's work testifies to the pressures that the war had exerted on established tenets of colonial masculinity and the heightened sense of danger felt by an already sensitive Indian government. Authorities, especially in the Punjab—the "sword arm of India" and the main recruiting ground for the martial races—considered it imperative to maintain peace. As it turned out, the worry that the "educated" Indian might somehow poison the recruiting well had some unfortunate consequences. On September 13, 1917, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, the Lieutenant-Governor of the province, rose to address the Viceroy's Legislative Council. O'Dwyer, responding to a resolution by M. M. Shafi that the administration of the Punjab be unified with that of Bihar and Orissa, dropped a

bomb in the council chamber in comparing the martial Punjab's wartime contributions with the lack of military effort in the latter districts.

The "educated classes," he acidly noted, had done nothing to aid the empire in its hour of need; rather, the Punjab, "with only 1/13" of the country's population, had provided 60 percent of the Indian Army recruits. In other words, his province had been doing most of the fighting while the "educated classes" of Bengal and similarly effete Bihar and Orissa did nothing but try to exploit the sacrifices of the martial races.[35] O'Dwyer continued his diatribe, leveling what amounted to a direct insult at the Indian members of the council. "We should be glad," he declared, "if those that base their political claims on the loyalty of India and the sacrifices of the Indian Army, which is mainly a Punjabi Army, would show their loyalty . . . in some practical form." In the midst of these remarks Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya called O'Dwyer to point of order only to be overruled by the council vice-president, who presided in Chelmsford's absence. Malaviya shot back "you are not the viceroy."[36] O'Dwyer then expressed a view inseparable from that of Forster's drunken subaltern. While paying homage to some of Shafi's proposals as "sane and practical" he nonetheless drew a sharp distinction between the purportedly Aryan and non-Aryan Indians. The educated Indian, though often eloquent, lacked the "common sense and sanity of judgment" so characteristic of the Punjabi. Similarly, these attributes constituted "preeminently British qualities and it is possession of those qualities, a common heritage perhaps from the parent Aryan stock that has led ever since the destinies of the two were united in mutual comprehension, mutual confidence, and mutual cooperation . . ."[37] Lord Chelmsford, the viceroy, was livid. He blasted O'Dwyer in a private letter, informing him that he "scarcely realis[ed] the effect produced by your speech yesterday and the position of embarrassment in which you have thereby placed the Government of India." O'Dwyer's "bombshell," dropped in the midst of the Legislative Council, had severely damaged a carefully orchestrated political truce, one that was essential to the success of the recent proposals that Edwin Montagu had introduced to reform the Indian government. His comments "touched many of them [the Indian council members] on the raw, and any attempt to recreate a peaceful atmosphere, which you have destroyed, can now be only made under particularly difficult circumstances. . . ."[38] Chelmsford forced O'Dwyer to apologize at the next meeting, but the damage had been done.

The rest of British India elevated O'Dwyer to hero's status. The anonymous author "Zeres," whom we will examine in some detail later in this

study, praised him as the one person who had the "courage to come forward and boldly denounce the atmosphere of humbug, expediency, and unreality" that characterized "all" Indian political activities. O'Dwyer's denunciation of the reforms had naturally enraged the "monkey men," as Zeres referred to the educated politicians. He considered it a travesty that Chelmsford had forced O'Dwyer to apologize after his speech, for his only crime had been "voicing the sentiments of every true Englishman and Irishman" who objected to the political politeness of Simla and its "vestry meetings of super-gentility that are wire-pulled from Whitehall."[39]

It would be difficult to overestimate the injury that O'Dwyer had inflicted. The Indian members of the Viceroy's council were among the most influential members of the Indian nationalist movement. Shafi, who had provoked O'Dwyer's response in the first place, also served as president of the Muslim League. Malaviya was a powerful INC leader in the United Provinces, a position he augmented with his considerable legal and editorial skills. In short, almost every Indian on the Legislative Council could bring significant pressure to bear on the Government of India by using their influence in the press, the legal profession, the Muslim League, or the INC. Moreover, the announcement by Montagu, the liberally minded Secretary of State, less than a month before—stating that he intended to visit the colony as a prelude to the political reform of the Indian government—generated tremendous fear and anxiety within the Anglo-Indian community. O'Dwyer would respond by doing what his predecessors in the Punjab did: fight to preserve the structures of imperial security in the face of Indian attempts to crack the martial races façade. In retrospect, one should not consider this an overly difficult task given the tenacity of martial races doctrine in late Victorian Indian culture, particularly when the most sincere indigenous supporters of the empire themselves carried the ideological freight of emasculation and the belief that the war might regenerate the nation. Toward the end of the war, even the radical B. G. Tilak echoed the belief that the presence of "non-martial Indians" on the battlefield might help break down the division between "educated Indians" and the "fighting classes." He found it execrable that more Indians had not been allowed to fight, arguing that it represented "a great humiliation for the empire that at this time of crisis it has to appeal to Japan and America, when it could have availed itself to crores of Indian subjects."[40] It is hard to evaluate Tilak's sincerity given his overall stance on the empire, yet it shows the value of approaching the martial races ideology as part of the totality of imperialism's masculine cultures.

The Transnational Politics of the Martial Races

No writer put the case for allowing "educated Indians" onto the battlefield as clearly as Sant Nihal Singh. As an Indian journalist living in London, he had married an Englishwoman, thereby breaking a major social taboo. Singh took note of the changes in class and sexual distinctions that the war had wrought on British society. While he believed that the conflict would allow women to finally gain the right to vote and expand their role in the work force, he was less optimistic regarding class distinctions. The Boer War had supposedly broken down class differences; yet, after the victory, most Britons simply drifted back into their respective social strata. Any change in class structure was thus apt to be temporary at best.[41] In India, too, the war had yielded mixed results, with the "neglect of India's manpower" being one of the great lost opportunities of the imperial relationship. How was it that India's contribution (in terms of her potential strength) had been so small when compared to that of the self-governing dominions and Britain itself? Why did India, with more than 75,000,000 men of military age, according to the guidelines established by the Man-Power Act of 1917, furnish fewer than a million combatant and labor troops as of June 1918?[42] Even Secretary of State Montagu, noted Singh, had lamented the Government of India's failure "to make them (Indians) into a warring nation as they wanted to be."[43] Singh also drew upon a more direct source to make his point—Sir James Willcocks, the ousted commander of the Indian Corps. Two years after the Corps had left France, Willcocks gave an interview in which he anticipated Singh's argument. "There are clans in different parts of India," argued Willcocks, "that are not classified as 'martial' and yet they could supply large numbers of recruits for the army." Similarly, the former Indian Expeditionary Force [IEF] commander implied that the classification of "natives" into martial and non-martial categories amounted to a self-fulfilling prophecy, asserting that if "you say that a certain class is not a fighting class, you depress its spirit and take out of it any fighting qualities that it may have."[44]

Singh, like many an astute proponent of India's cause, turned colonial rhetoric upon itself as a way of furthering his own arguments. As he saw it, the idea that only the martial races had the "right stuff" for soldiering rested on shaky ground. The Garhwalis, for example, a group previously included with the Gurkhas, had recently been constituted as a separate martial race or "class" and proved themselves the best of the Indian units in France. And what of the "effeminate" Bengali, many of whom had left English universities to join an Indian Ambulance Corps organized by

Gandhi? One Bengali medical captain had recently won the Military Cross for treating wounded men under intense fire. Another group of medics had been the last men seen moving about on the field at the Battle of Ctesiphon during the disastrous Mesopotamian campaign, and Bengali sailors frequently faced submarine attack with heroism.[45] Why, wondered Singh, could the empire not rely on the "scores of Indian young men at the British universities and Inns of Court whose fellow students of British extraction, [are] in no better in physical, mental, or moral qualities than they are, are holding the King's Commission." He also anticipated one of the most common knocks against the educated Indian—that their inability to play actual games signaled a similar inability to engage in the metaphorical games of masculinity, especially combat. On the contrary, argued Singh, "Indian students have distinguished themselves on the cricket and football fields, tennis courts, and golf courses," and, if so, they surely possessed the stuff of command.[46]

Singh also took the opportunity to deal with an issue that had long rankled Indian leaders, namely the lack of any real opportunity for the Indian Army's indigenous officers. To briefly inform the reader, Indian officers were commissioned by the viceroy, while their British counterparts received their commands via the courtesy of the king, hence their respective designations Viceroy's Commissioned Officer [VCO] and King's Commissioned Officer [KCO]. Technically, the lowest-ranking white subaltern could refuse the order of the most grizzled and experienced VCO. As a minor concession, Curzon had, during his tenure as Governor-General, established an Indian Cadet Corps in 1902.[47] The only problem, as Singh opined, was that it had graduated only nine Indian KCOs since its founding. Curzon, patrician that he was, also saw to it that only the children of India's princely states and nobility gained entrance to the cadet schools. Moreover, the graduates could not yet command British troops in the field, nor could they ever command above a company level. What Singh could not have known is just how resistant the concept of divergent masculinities, as embodied in the martial races doctrine, would be to the corrosive effects of the Great War. Similarly, Singh, who believed that an enlarged Indian Army might hold the key to freedom and national unity, may have underestimated the effects of the conflict on an Anglo-Indian ethos that in no way admitted that Indians other than the martial races might exercise a salutary role in the war. Rather, Anglo-India worried so much about the possibility that educated Indians might cause disaffection in the army that they overlooked what the intelligentsia could do to aid the war effort.

Herein lies the rub: if, as British authorities insisted, there existed no similarities between the "emasculated" and the martial races, how could the "educated" Indians lay claim to political power? If anything, claimed the Raj's military leaders, the fighting clans would destroy the effeminate "babus" if not kept on the British leash. The very structure of the martial races theory, because it further compartmentalized an Indian populace already split along lines of caste and class, meant that the presence of Indian soldiers in France, Mesopotamia, and elsewhere could not viably counter the use of imperial masculinity as a strategic political formation. Singh and Gandhi alike vainly hoped for a broad-based national army that would encompass previously excluded "non-martial" classes as a means of overcoming the Raj's divisions of Indian manhood. Yet, the strength of the Anglo-Indian ethos, and its ability to mobilize in the face of "crises of masculinity," made this a virtual impossibility. Like its metropolitan counterpart, the imperial gaze relied upon a monopoly of masculinity in which reason and objectivity became the legitimizing agents of control. If colonial masculinity could be so inflexible even when under intense wartime stress then only one option remained open: opposition to the Raj in the form of revolution.

The Martial Races and the Intersection of Global Revolutionary Movements

The thousands of subjects caught up in India's diaspora were not simply agentless migrants spread across remote rail lines, tea plantations, and farm valleys. They were, like their white counterparts, consciously seeking the economic opportunities that the empire presented. While the majority of emigrants were in a sense apolitical, there existed a smaller but still significant number of mainly Bengali student radicals who fled to East Asia, Europe, and North America. Although initially disparate in their backgrounds and goals, these economic and political refugees both felt the sting of racial discrimination abroad, particularly in the white dominions of the empire such as in Canada. The war increased demands for "reciprocity," meaning an end to racial restrictions and equal treatment as imperial citizens. The subsequent denial of civil rights made India's diasporic community especially receptive to anti-British propaganda, which could in any event flow more freely when not under the strict press controls of the Raj. As a result, Indian communities abroad, which might have remained neutral or even ambivalent, became centers of disaffection and revolutionary potential.

One group, in particular, presented the greatest danger to the political integrity of Anglo-Indian rule, namely the Ghadar (translated usually as "mutiny") movement that operated predominantly in Sikh communities on the West Coast of the United States and Canada. The founder and intellectual leader of the movement, Har Dayal (1884–1939), epitomized the radical Indian student that Chirol had warned readers about in his *Indian Unrest*. Dayal in fact withdrew from Oxford in 1907, the same year that Chirol's book appeared. Like Aurobindo Ghose, he thoroughly rejected English culture, adopting the wearing of only a *dhoti* while still at university and advocating redemptive nationalist violence. He returned to India briefly in 1908 before fleeing to the United States in 1911. He made his way to San Francisco by 1913, where he established the *Ghadar* newspaper, published in the Gurumukhi and Urdu languages used so extensively in the Punjab and the Indian Army. The printing offices and quarters in San Francisco, styled as the *Yagantur* ashram (New Era Hermitage), served as a front for the organization. Dayal's efforts to garner support in North America gained impetus from the *Komagatu Maru* case of 1914, when over 300 immigrant Sikhs and 80 Muslims chartered a Japanese vessel and sailed to Vancouver, Canada, to protest that country's restrictions on South Asian migration. The ship was anchored for a month before Canadian officials forced it to return to India. The passengers, many of them politically active, disembarked in Bengal. An armed confrontation with police ensued in which 18 of the refugees were killed and a number of Indian police officers and British officials injured. Police immediately arrested over 200 of the passengers and the Government of India limited the re-entry of Sikh migrants into the Punjab. Most crucially, the incident radicalized many apolitical expatriated Sikhs.[48] British diplomats in the United States immediately brought pressure to bear on their US counterparts to deport Dayal, which led him to flee to Germany at the start of the war. Germany's intelligence services and diplomatic corps were all too glad to fund his propaganda and revolutionary activities.[49]

The Raj saw Dayal as especially dangerous due to the attempts of Ghadar agents to make direct contact with the army and spread armed revolution throughout India, a goal that a number of the *Komagatu Maru* rebels had hoped to fulfill. Many of them had already answered Dayal's call to begin filtering their way back into South Asia, where they hoped to sway Indian garrisons into taking part in an uprising scheduled to take place in Lahore in February 1915. Propaganda pamphlets pointedly asked soldiers why do "you fight for the sake of the whites. You always attack other countries, why do you not take your own country into your charge? . . . Have

you vowed to live as slaves of the English? Are your lives only worth nine rupees?"[50] While the intervention of an informer allowed authorities in India to stop the plan, Ghadarists nonetheless had some success in Singapore, where approximately half of the recently arrived 5th Light Infantry regiment mutinied and killed just over 30 people before the uprising could be suppressed.[51] A post-mutiny investigation found that Turkey's entry into the war on behalf of the Central Powers, along with poor relations with its British officers, played a significant role in alienating the mostly Muslim soldiers, but so too had Ghadarist literature and agents.

The Singapore Mutiny and the 1915 Lahore Conspiracy cases represented the Government of India's single greatest fear: that a large component of Indian troops in the Punjab would stage a second Great Mutiny just as the bulk of British troops were fighting in France. These revolutionary activities, when combined with furnace-like consumption of lives on the Western Front, merged dangerously with the existing perception that Germany posed an existential threat to Great Britain. The fact that Dayal operated out of Berlin with the help of German agents, and that his lieutenants in North America continued to export literature worldwide, only bolstered the belief that Britain faced a double threat from Prussian militarism and globalized anti-colonial revolution. As the semi-official *Pioneer* newspaper lamented, "Hardayal [sic] . . . may preach anarchy as freely as he pleases. That his activities have been in no way curtailed is apparent from the flood of literature from California that still reaches Bombay."[52] O'Dwyer, in his memoirs, ruefully noted "the thousands of Punjabis to whom the Swaraj or Home Rule was preached in America, some hundreds set themselves as early as possible (on a return to the Punjab) to realize that ideal by the sword, the pistol, and the bomb."[53] More ominously, a number of the Sikhs in North America were retired veterans of the Indian Army who possessed both training and familiarity with the colonial state's military.

The British Foreign Office [FO] considered the threat of Indian radicals operating from the United States so dire that they created an interdepartmental intelligence office to specifically deal with the danger. Intelligence branches in India, England, and Canada sent officers to the United States in secret, where they began to track the Ghadarists and develop a network of informers. Britain's ambassador in Washington, armed with confidential information collected in India, Singapore, North America, and Mexico, also began to pressure American officials to take action against "native" radicals. After some initial reluctance, federal officials arrested over 105 American, German, and Indian suspects for conspiring to smuggle

thousands of rifles, purchased with German money, into India. In November 1917, a federal trial for 33 of the defendants in the "Hindu Conspiracy" began in San Francisco. It was one of the most publicized cases in US history up to that point. Public fixation reached a high pitch in April, when a defendant used a smuggled pistol to murder a co-conspirator before a federal marshal returned fire and killed him as courtroom spectators dove for cover. The jury found all but one of the defendants guilty, including the German nationals who had funneled money to the revolutionaries.[54]

The connection between the Ghadar party and German agents, along with the later Irish Easter Uprising in 1916, must be understood as part of a continuum in the colonial imaginary. Just how serious a threat the Ghadarists were to the empire is irrelevant. Far more important is that the fear of the colonial Other merged with the danger posed by Irish radicals and the German Army into a multi-faceted existential threat to England and its empire. Indeed, as Lucian Boia argued in regard to Romanian nationalism, the fear of the "other" is a process of the mind as much as a material reality. Even easily suppressed small-time rebellions became looming threats in the minds of a fearful war leadership. O'Dwyer's memoirs evince this praetorian ethos of empire with regularity. In one instance, he recounted a 1913 meeting with three Sikh delegates from Canada who, unbeknownst to him, already belonged to the Ghadar movement. He described two of the men as "oily and specious," while "the manner of the third seemed to be that of a dangerous revolutionary." O'Dwyer later discovered that all three men were active revolutionaries, though this could have hardly surprised him since he considered virtually every "educated" Indian as an existing or potential conspirator.[55] As he recounted, one became a German agent in Burma before receiving a death sentence in the Lahore Conspiracy case; US authorities arrested the second on an arms smuggling charge in 1914. For O'Dwyer, who took an active role in the intelligence efforts, Ghadar represented "the most serious attempt to subvert British rule in India." He also took ready notice of the role that Sikh emigrants from America had played in organizing radicals in Siam [Thailand] as well as their attempts to disaffect Sikh military police in Burma. The "clever" and "intriguing" Hindu, as he put it, had tricked the "ignorant but sturdy men of the [Sikh] peasant type, many of them old soldiers," into turning on Britain. The old Sikh soldiers had fallen under the spell of the conniving *babus* through no real fault of their own.[56] As O'Dwyer saw it, his duty was to stand guard in the Punjab, a province that served both symbolically and literally as the rampart of British security in

South Asia. The fear of not just the Ghadarists but also a number of failed revolutionary efforts in Bengal and Muslim areas of what is now Pakistan, confirmed the belief that the "educated classes" represented nothing more than a self-serving and feminized radical cadre. Like his nineteenth-century predecessor John Lawrence, O'Dwyer overlaid his deep distrust of the politicized, urban middle classes with a neo-Gothic romanticizing of the Punjab peasantry as a modern counterpart to the sturdy and simple English serf.

In retrospect, O'Dwyer's outburst in the imperial legislative council takes on a more serious meaning in light of his conviction, a correct one, that the Punjab was the essential province for Indian security. His reactionary attitude toward the "educated" Indian helped lay the groundwork for the Amritsar Massacre. His actions alienated even moderate nationalists and led them closer to the conclusion that Britain would never yield power willingly, even though there might be political elements in the metropole amenable to Indian autonomy. Moreover, his persistent opposition to reform made the province he ruled a natural target for agitation. It is indeed curious that so many historians see April 1919 as the alpha of later Indian nationalism and forget just how important a role O'Dwyer played in foregrounding the massacre.

Here we come to a historically crucial point: the wartime fear for imperial survival and the desire to preserve colonial power existed in real time in April 1919, *a priori* to claims by some scholars that gender and race analytics simply impose categories on systems of colonial ideology that could easily be defined in other ways. Indeed, I find such assertions disingenuous in that such categories were established at moments of contact in both "old" mercantile empires and the late nineteenth-century "new" imperialism, or even borrowed and adapted from Mughal sources. To be sure, analyses of race and gender and their intersection with physical colonial violence are no mere abstraction, but a chilling historical reality best viewed across the open terrain of the Jallianwallah Bagh in April of 1919.

4

Frontline Masculinity: The Indian Corps on the Western Front, 1914–1915[1]

India's economic and military contributions to the war effort were immense. During the course of the conflict India expended in the range of £180–220 million, a sum that hit a desperately poor peasantry especially hard. Militarily, more than 1.2 million of the roughly nine million British and imperial troops raised during the conflict came from the subcontinent, with 118,000 South Asian soldiers joining the casualty list. Indian forces also served across every operational theater. By 1918, more than 138,000 labor and combat troops had passed through French ports on their way to the Western Front.[2] Britain conducted the bulk of the Mesopotamian campaign against Ottoman Turkey out of India. South Asia provided the financing and no fewer than 600,000 labor and combat troops. The "Mespot" was also the site of one of the war's great blunders. Poor logistical planning by British Indian Army and ICS officials caused the needless deaths of thousands of British and Asian troops and resulted in the surrender of over 13,000 men, a disaster unrivaled since the Saratoga campaign of the American Revolutionary War.[3]

The ensuing chapter pays particular attention to Indian troops on the Western Front in the winter of 1914–1915, a period when the 26,000-man Indian Corps, or Indian Expeditionary Force [IEF], comprised as much as 30 percent of the British Expeditionary Force [BEF].[4] German forces had nearly destroyed the relatively small BEF during the first weeks of the war, and its numbers dwindled rapidly as it fought alongside a much larger French Army. With the BEF near collapse, military planners decided that they had no recourse but to reinforce it with two Indian infantry divisions, the 3rd Lahore and 7th Meerut, and an accompanying cavalry division.

It is doubtful that the Allied line could have held that winter without the contributions of colonial forces. Tragically, the IEF would suffer the same fate as their British comrades, with the intense combat destroying entire battalions in a matter of days.

In September 1915, British commanders began withdrawing the IEF from the Western Front. They concluded that it had been a failure, and that it would be far better suited for duty in the Middle East, where the climate more closely resembled that of India. In their estimation, the fighting had confirmed the fears many officers had initially expressed over the use of South Asian troops in the West: the sepoy, despite his hardiness, could not match "a European enemy who had brought the highest pitch of sinister perfection to both the science and practice of war"; northwestern Europe's brutal winters had demoralized a force more accustomed to fighting along India's rugged frontier; most importantly, even the manly sepoy could reach his full potential only with the guiding hand of the white officer.[5] In other words, the fighting in France and Belgium had done nothing to discount the martial races doctrine.

The view of the IEF as a tragic failure has had a lasting and problematic effect on present-day histories, most of which follow standard patterns of military and political scholarship. Studies on wartime India are accurate enough in claiming that the IEF had effectively collapsed in the late spring of 1915, though they do note that the colonial forces provided a razor thin margin against Allied defeat during the desperate fighting of the previous autumn. Other works have duly pointed to Indian politicians' use of the war as a political lever for nationalism.[6] Yet, there seems to have been little effort to consider how the Indian Corps fits into the larger framework of gender and imperial violence that underpinned the Anglo-Indian relationship, or how the need to preserve the South Asian soldier's station within the constellation of imperial masculinity influenced contemporary and later-day historiographic depictions of the Indian experience in France. More directly, the IEF story remains significant in revealing just how multi-layered and interdependent the vagaries of masculinity were within the Raj's intellectual structure. As our previous discussion of imperial "manliness" makes clear, the martial races concept underwrote the construction of the "educated" Indian as "effeminate" and thus unsuited for self-rule. Key to understanding the discussion below is the realization that the presence of the manly sepoy, inasmuch as it helped confirm the "babu's" femininity, ideologically and physically validated the Briton's place at the top of India's gendered colonial hierarchy. In between the dichotomy of the manly Englishman and Bengali intellectual lay the "native" soldier,

who, according to prevailing anthropological theory, shared a similar, albeit distant, "Aryan" ancestry with the Anglo-Saxon British "Tommy."

Such "similarity" meant that the relationship between the British officer and the martial Indian took on a different hue than with any other group in South Asia. It dictated that the officer-man relationship be articulated in terms reliant upon paternalism, not effeminacy and masculinity. While this was unquestionably true of the British Army, as Gary Sheffield's important work on battlefield leadership has shown, it resonated to an even greater degree in the Indian Army, where officer/sepoy relations resembled that of father and son.[7] The latter was a *jawan*, or youth, who invariably looked to the former for protection, guidance, and leadership on the field of battle. The locus of masculinity shifted from a contrast between the "educated Indian" and the Briton and/or sepoy to one rooted in a gradation between two subjects of varying civilizational development. The martial "native," though brave and rugged in the estimation of his white commanders, suffered from an infantilization that linked the need for paternal guidance to the differing levels of "polish" between the "wild" martial races of the frontier and their modern counterpart, the refined British officer.

The embedding and naturalization of variegated manliness in colonial military culture raises a number of questions in regard to the Indian soldier on the Western Front and suggests a more direct connection to concepts of gender and violence than revealed in previous studies. For instance, how does one assess the IEF's first two months in the trenches, a period that shattered the Kiplingesque likeness of the stalwart Indian sepoy and replaced it with an unflattering depiction of the Indian troops as panicky and inclined to self-inflicted wounds? How did the Indian Army's reliance on the "martial races" recruiting system affect its ability to recoup it losses? Were the heavy casualties among white officers an essential cause of the IEF's supposedly poor performance, as the British surmised, or did deaths and wounds among junior Indian officers also play a significant role? Last, how did the attitudes of the IEF's contemporaries, who saw the Indian Corps as a misguided failure, affect the historical record? In other words, were colonial attitudes so ingrained that they virtually dictated the historical record?

The First Two Months: Martial Races, British Officers, and Self-Inflicted Wounds

Prior to the Great War, the Raj had sent units west of the Suez Canal only once, when they occupied Malta and Cyprus during the Balkan Crisis of 1878.[8] Not until August 1913 did the Committee of Imperial Defence reconsider

the role the Indian Army would play if England became embroiled in a continental war. The Government of India and the Committee agreed, in principle, to the deploying of Indian troops overseas, but with the caveat that they would only serve as garrisons to release British units for the main fighting.[9] These best-laid plans hardly survived the start of hostilities in 1914. The BEF, consisting of roughly six divisions of 18,000 men each, had to be rushed across the Channel to help the hard-pressed French Army. Their first contact with German forces came on August 22. Within five days, the BEF had fought the battles of Mons and Le Cateau, losing 15,000 men—killed, wounded, or missing. September offered no respite as the BEF lost 3,500 men in just one day along the Aisne, while in October one of the two beleaguered British corps incurred another 14,000 casualties.[10] The war had consumed over a third of the BEF in a few weeks; it would cease to exist unless it received immediate reinforcement.

The white dominions of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand did not yet have any trained soldiers to offer, but, somewhat unsettlingly for a desperate empire, India did. Army high command accordingly scuttled their plan to use Indian soldiers only as garrison troops and decided that they would proceed directly to France. By late September a large portion of the unit had arrived at the Marseilles docks to crowds of thrilled and curious French citizens. Individual battalions and companies entered action on October 23 as reinforcements for General Edmund Allenby's Cavalry Corps. At month's end the IEF took over its own eight-mile stretch of the British front, an area that the unit's commander aptly described as "a dismal dead plain" in full view of German artillery.[11] J. W. B. Merewether, a staff "recording" officer attached to the IEF, noted that many of his fellow officers believed they were "taking part in a very hazardous experiment" by sending Indian troops to the Western Front. They agreed that the intensity of the fighting would severely test even the best European soldier, let alone his Indian counterpart. As Merewether saw it, the "flinging [of] Oriental troops into these horrible scenes, in a pitiless climate, to lose life and limb in a quarrel remote from their own experiences" would inevitably reveal their shortcomings.[12]

Merewether's fears reflected a number of interrelated concerns. Broadly speaking, colonial authorities worried that the colony's "educated" radicals would encourage sedition with so many indigenous troops abroad. If something like a second Great Mutiny broke out, or nationalist agitation became too pronounced, the Raj might not be able to maintain control over the country. The IEF's presence in France also violated a tacit agreement among the European powers forbidding the use of colonial troops

against white units in a European war. To do so implied a degree of parity between metropole and colony, while the very presence of "colored" soldiers in Europe raised the specter of miscegenation between "natives" and white women attracted to the exotic, if not erotic, "dripping tigers" of India.[13] France's decision to deploy West and North African troops removed some of the uneasiness the British felt regarding the use of Asian soldiers, but military authorities remained vigilant in regard to contact between Englishwomen and Indian soldiers, so much so that army authorities strictly segregated wounded sepoys who had arrived in England for convalescence.[14]

In terms of combat effectiveness, British anxiety turned on the sepoy's purported dependency upon the fatherly Anglo officer who, "however young he may be look[ed] upon his men as his children." As a consequence, the Indian soldiers would "feel their bereavement as orphans, old enough to realize their sorrow" once the brutal fighting on the Western Front scythed its way through ranks of the IEF's white officers.[15] Conventional wisdom of the time predicted that these casualties would deteriorate the fighting spirit of the sepoys, who would cease to function effectively once the war had robbed them of their "fathers." British officers unanimously agreed with Lord Roberts, the former C-in-C of the Indian Army, who had initially set down the martial races theory. A frail Roberts, inspecting Indian troops in France in November of 1914 and just three days before his death, warned IEF commander Sir James Willcocks: "No one," said Roberts, "has a higher regard for them [the sepoys] than I have; but they have their limits. . . . With British officers they fight splendidly; without them they cannot do much."[16] Simply put, the supposedly inferior sepoy, deprived of his white sahib, stood little chance against the superb German troops.[17]

The tragic winter of 1914 confirmed the doubts of those who believed that the Indian Corps could not succeed without its white officers. On three separate occasions from late October to mid-December, IEF battalions that had lost a high number of British officers either retreated without orders in the face of powerful German attacks or hesitated to attack when ordered to do so. On the night of October 29, for instance, a battalion of Gurkhas fell under concentrated fire from German howitzers and heavy guns. The men ran short of ammunition as their trenches became a veritable swamp. The Gurkhas repulsed repeated German attacks the next day before panicking and retreating without orders after most of their British officers had been killed or wounded.[18] A more serious incident took place on December 20, when the Germans exploded a mine under the Indian trenches and entombed a half company of the Highland Light Infantry

and a double-sized company of Gurkhas. The Germans pressed home their attack, putting the entire Indian front under extremely heavy artillery and machine-gun fire before routing an already depleted 129th Baluchi Battalion. In a subsequent inquiry, one officer reported encountering "about 300 men of different regiments, mostly 129th Baluchis . . . had thrown away their rifles and said that all their officers had been killed."[19] The IEF experience mirrored that of the BEF in regard to the losses it incurred. As early as November 3, the Corps had sustained roughly 2,000 casualties out of its 26,000-man contingent. The units that "broke" had suffered especially severe losses. The 129th Baluchis, for example, had lost 579 men up to November 3, a number made more significant when one considers that each Indian battalion consisted of only 764 men as compared to the 1,000 strong complement of those in British divisions. By December 31, roughly two months of fighting, the IEF had suffered 9,579 casualties, or over 40 percent of its original complement.[20] It is in fact difficult to understand how any unit could hold out after suffering so heavily. Willcocks, realizing his entire front might collapse, immediately requested that Sir Douglas Haig's I Corps relieve his outgunned and exhausted men.

Critics of the IEF seized upon the events of November and December as proof of the sepoy's dependence on the paternal white officer. A more careful consideration, however, suggests a more nuanced view and reveals that the IEF could also exhibit bravery on a personal and unit level that belies claims of paternalistic masculinity's indispensability. In the fighting of October 31, during the First Battle of Ypres, Havildar (sergeant) Gagna Singh held his position against overwhelming odds, killing five Germans with his bayonet before collapsing from wounds. Shellfire wounded Sepoy Usman Khan three times before he agreed to be evacuated. Jemadar (lieutenant) Kapur Singh shot himself with his last cartridge to avoid capture. In the same action, Khudadad Khan of the 129th Baluchis won the first Victoria Cross [VC] awarded to an Indian in France, manning his machine-gun until his crew had been killed and he seriously wounded.[21] Three weeks later, Naik (corporal) Darwan Sing Negi earned the VC for his role in clearing German trenches, refusing evacuation for his wounds until his men had finished their task.

The 129th Baluchis, maligned for panicking on December 20, provide yet another example. Between October 23 and November 3, a mere 12 days of fighting, the regiment had lost 50 percent of its British officers, 30 percent of its Indian officers, and 33 percent of its men. The 129th had endured four miserable days before December 20, supporting a French attack so "hopeless in its conception" that it resulted in "a useless slaughter at a time when

economy in both men and materials was of paramount importance."[22] The night before the December crisis, torrential rains had washed away the fire-steps and begun collapsing the walls of the trenches, creating a mire of icy water and knee- and waist-deep mud that jammed well over half the rifles. The following morning a German mine wiped out the units on the Baluchi left flank, leaving it exposed. The constant German artillery fire had also destroyed communication lines, affording the IEF no way to summon artillery support as enemy shells crashed uninterrupted into their front.[23] It is small wonder that the 129th, and indeed the entire Corps, had reached a crisis point. Indeed, it can hardly be said that the 129th and other units "cracked" given that they no longer resembled organized units so much as a shattered remnant of "battalions," numbering between two and three hundred utterly exhausted and freezing men.

Here, we come to the crux of the matter, discernible only if one is prepared to contemplate how dominant conceptions of masculinity guided wartime evaluations of the IEF. Indeed, the Indian soldier's innate and lesser "manliness," a product of his childlike nature, would have precluded contemporary observers from considering that they might fight well without their white commanders, or that the loss of senior Indian officers might also limit their effectiveness. To be sure, there existed little restriction against criticizing the Indian Corps, yet wartime censors would suppress any public reproof directed at the BEF as defeatist if not helpful to the enemy. It is the pinnacle of historical conceit to suppose that BEF, even though one of the best armies of the twentieth century, never came apart under the intense violence of the Western Front. General Henry Rawlinson, the 4th Army Corps commander, wrote that the 28th Division "had to be broken up and distributed among the 3rd and 5th Divisions" as a result of their poor performance.[24] General Douglas Haig confidentially told a shocked King of the "crowds of fugitives who came down the Menin Road from time to time during the Ypres battle having thrown away everything they could, including their rifles and their packs. . . ."[25] In his autobiography, Robert Graves recalled the frank discussions that he and other instructors had at the "Bull Ring," the training ground for new drafts at Harfleur:

> It seemed to be agreed that about a third of the troops in the British Expeditionary Force were dependable on all occasions: those always called on for important tasks. About a third were variable . . . The remainder were more or less untrustworthy: being put in places of comparative safety, they lost about a quarter of the men that the best troops did.[26]

Haig and Graves both understood that one could only make such comments quietly and under certain circumstances—in a private audience with His Majesty or in the company of a few infantry instructors. Graves unwittingly revealed some important shared characteristics between the IEF and BEF. First, both had battalions of varying quality. Moreover, the immense losses of the war's first winter seriously eroded the power of what were in reality small, highly professionalized armies dedicated to "small-scale colonial fighting, not the terrifying combat against well-equipped conscript forces which it encountered in 1914."[27] They derived their cohesion through appeals to regimental *esprit de corps* and often augmented it with a tradition of family or village military service. While this trait made the units very skilled initially, it also had an opposite effect in that mounting losses hampered their potency. By way of comparison, even the relatively homogenous "New Armies" of the BEF were so minimally trained in mid-1916 that their commanders had them attack at the Somme under the assumption that massive artillery fire would allow them to cross no-man's-land despite their inexperience. The result was a criminally bloody fiasco, with 20,000 men killed in one day.

Yet, even here one has to tread carefully. While Paddy Griffith and Peter Simkins have correctly noted that the "New Army" units lacked adequate training and weaponry as late as 1917, this does not necessarily mean that they had a lower morale than the BEF's legendary "Old Contemptibles" who were slaughtered in 1914.[28] Indeed, the presumption that the original BEF was innately more resilient and professional than the later citizen army derives in no small part from Sir James Edmonds and his official history of the war, *Military Operations in France and Belgium*. As Alexander Watson's study on wartime morale in the British and German armies has revealed, self-inflicted wounds and desertion actually peaked in the winter of 1914, when much of the professional BEF remained in the field. The rate of desertion remained very small at .044 percent, but this was still triple the rate of later periods in the war. The first terrible winter of fighting also marked "the highest proportion of men surrendering rather than fighting to the death of any war year." The 1st Gordon Highlanders, 2nd Royal Scots, and 2nd Royal Irish, for example, surrendered over 500 men on the night of August 26–27, 1914, after some of their officers literally fled across open fields to escape the horror. Moreover, just as in the case of the Indian Army, the desperate BEF took in significant numbers of reserves that were physically unfit, or in some cases mentally handicapped or insane.[29] The BEF and IEF of 1914 bore more similarities than one might suppose, and they suffered accordingly.

Even with the commonalities of the initial BEF and IEF experiences, it is important to realize that the latter's adherence to the martial races doctrine, along with the affiliated cult of the white *sahib* officer, placed it at a distinct disadvantage when compared to the BEF. The latter could at least muddle through by drawing on the Indian forces until aid arrived from the Dominions and newly raised home formations. The ingrained ideology of the martial Indian, however, restricted the structure and recruiting of new soldiers to a very narrow base. Each regiment and battalion selected its own men, usually sending out an officer and a few members of the other ranks to obtain a predetermined number of men from particular villages, clans, and families. Recruiters kept an *Umdewar* book, a list of "hopefuls" who received special consideration as kinsmen of men already in the regiment.[30] Moreover, new recruits had to serve in companies or battalions that reflected shared ties of kinship, religion, or caste. Sikhs and Gurkhas, for example, could not be mingled due to ethnic, cultural, and linguistic differences. While the Indian Army may have been comparable in size to the British Army at the start of the war, such specialization meant that it could under no circumstances keep pace with the Western Front's furnace-like consumption of men.

An Indian Army military commission had warned as early as 1892 that the recruiting system might collapse in a "major conflict," at that time understood to mean a war against Russian forces in Afghanistan.[31] Just five years later, the *Journal of the United Service Institution in India* [*JUSII*], in its annual essay competition, asked that the participants address the following theme: "The best method of recruiting the Indian Army's resources not hitherto used, on the assumption that enlistment amongst the recognized martial races of the Indian Empire at its frontiers has been pushed very nearly to its utmost limits." The journal eventually published the three highest rated essays, all of which assumed the impossibility of recruiting outside of the martial races. Captain C. P. Ranking (quite possibly a pseudonym?) noted that "it is an unquestionable fact that the first line of our native Army is now listed exclusively from the Punjab, the tribes beyond the North-West Frontier, and from Nepal, and undoubtedly more southern and eastern reaches of India . . . have lost their martial instincts."[32] Like Francis Younghusband, Ranking argued that the ascent of British power had emasculated the colony's population and caused a loss of "pride of race" characteristic of more belligerent peoples. While British arms provided India with stability, it also rendered its people "more dependent, more helpless and less self-reliant" than Europeans.[33] As we have seen, British military officials and Indian nationalist leaders alike accepted this

assessment, albeit with highly divergent opinions on how to remedy it. The essayists agreed that the Indian Army's only viable option was to recruit from the fringes of empire, just beyond the country's borders, or perhaps, as one officer suggested, even in the Sudan, the Horn of Africa, or among the "wild independent and generally dirty" tribes in Afghanistan, who would in any event need to be commanded with looser "reigns of discipline."[34] Captain G. S. F. Napier dissented somewhat in his first prize essay, suggesting that there were groups within India that could qualify for military service, although he too remained open to recruiting outside of the borders proper.[35]

The essays are deeply revealing of an imperial paradox made more acute by the war: how does one maintain a powerful empire using indigenous forces while ensuring that those same forces do not later defect and become the basis for challenging colonial rule? Lieutenant W. K. Scharlieb's *JUSII* article, for instance, confirmed the necessity of maintaining a heterogeneous Indian Army in that "history has shown us that in a mercenary army homogeneity is a danger." Recruiting from a uniform population within Indian society, or mingling soldiers in a way that might foster unity among divergent groups, raised the specter of collusion and rebellion like that which had occurred during the Mutiny of 1857, when Hindu and Muslim troops showed signs of cooperation. Every officer on the Indian Army knew the history of the Mutiny, Scharlieb included. In his opinion, "the greater number of races employed . . . the greater the spread of ideas which will support subordination and discipline"[36] Also, he and his brother officers would have seen the periodic demands of "Indian gentlemen," read "educated" Indians, to form militias in the event of a war against Russia in Central Asia as equally dangerous, since they were the classes most likely to spread sedition and nationalist ideology. Scharlieb and other "experts" had unwittingly, if not wisely in terms of imperial power, forestalled Gandhi's desire to create a unified and masculine Indian national identity through the crucible of war. The Mahatma's call for redemptive and rehabilitative violence could never overcome the deeply entrenched notion that long-term imperial security rested on a compartmentalized Indian Army and a division of masculine labor.

The enduring purchase of the martial races' ethos goes far in explaining why the Indian Army decided to recall its most decrepit reservists to duty instead of recruiting more broadly.[37] In the first weeks of the war the Indian Corps took on 5,250 replacements from its reserves. Of this number, 876 were deemed unfit for duty. Staff officers for the Corps opined that the replacements as a whole were "a source of actual danger to

themselves" that "tended to lower the efficiency of those with whom they were placed in combat."[38] MacMunn recalled that "the first parties of reservists . . . were the laughing stock of the depot, feeble old men who were of no use and of whom a large number were rejected."[39] The Indian Army's high command eventually remedied the situation by exempting reservists with more than 15 years of service from European duty. Also, the fear of internal unrest had temporarily subsided, allowing the British to begin tentatively detaching men from more established units for service in France.

There remained an even greater challenge, however, in that the martial races idea circumscribed British officers just as much as the ordinary Indian sepoys. Many officers had served with particular groups, such as Sikhs or Gurkhas, most of their military lives. They possessed unique language and cultural skills that made them difficult to replace. Moreover, the logic of the British officer as the indispensable spear-tip of the martial races meant that any alteration in the structure of officer corps necessarily entailed amending colonial masculinity itself. On the other hand, refusing to raise long-serving Indian non-commissioned officers to a higher rank, as some political reformers had suggested, spelled disaster on the Western Front. At the start of the war the Indian army had over 2,500 officers, 257 of whom were on leave in England. Kitchener ordered these officers to remain in place so that they could help in the training of the New Armies. The IEF battalions serving in France had only 12 white officers each, and only 99 replacements and reserve.[40] Already by mid-November, General Willcocks had warned Kitchener's aide-de-camp that "if the Corps is to be maintained as such, we shall need all the officers we can [get]." Willcocks' fears came to fruition all too quickly. By December 31 the Indian Corps had lost 292 British officers—killed, wounded, or missing.[41] British commanders drew the inescapable conclusion that not just any British officer could step into the simulacrum of the father/son since only a limited number of Indian Army officers had the necessary language and cultural skills for each particular unit.[42]

As the fighting raged, Indians like London-based journalist Sant Nihal Singh saw a possible solution in giving officer commissions to "native" university students, an idea seen as pure folly by martial races experts. General Sir George MacMunn, writing after the war, reflected a longstanding and universal belief among Anglo-Indian Army officers that the inevitably radical Indian student would either spread sedition in the army and disaffect the troops, or so offend the barely controllable martial races that the latter would delight in killing the effeminate "babu" officer. Just as the white ICS

officer balanced the scales between Hindu and Muslim, landlord and peasant, and among various castes and ethnicities, so too did the white commander control the savage child that lurked in every sepoy. Let off of their leash, the "martial races" would fall upon the rest of India in a frenzy of pillaging and murder, as was their nature. Their violence had to be properly directed and guided by the warlike, yet eminently civilized, white officer. The degree to which the fighting on the Western Front only confirmed the inviolability of the "martial races" and the expectation that the IEF would break down with the loss of its Anglo officers is striking, if not historically problematic. If one accepts the masculine assumptions that guided the father-son relationship between officer and sepoy, as historians such as Jeffery Greenhut have done, then the claim for the essentiality of the white officer naturally follows. This assertion in no way accounts for the ideological predispositions of colonial authorities, or their unswerving belief in their own superiority. Furthermore, one has to consider that the ethos of the white administrator and soldier's innate manliness permeated all of the primary evidence with rather predictable results. This is not to say that there was not a close bond between the sepoy and British subaltern. There was, and it provided the Indian Corps with a strong cohesive element. Nonetheless, one can reasonably argue that IEF contemporaries, and by implication later scholars, have overemphasized the essentiality of the British officer without due consideration for his Indian counterpart, the VCO.

To briefly reiterate, British officers received their commission from the king, while "native" officers served courtesy of the viceroy. The VCO commanded only at the platoon or company level and could not rise above a junior grade. Moreover, his authority extended only to Indian soldiers, and even the lowest-ranking white subaltern could technically refuse the order of a higher-ranking Indian commander. In short, the losses among the VCO's offer an equally viable and neglected explanation for the IEF's collapse in December. The Indian officer brought valuable experience to the regiment and acted as a role model for the young sepoy. The highest-ranking VCO, the formidable subedar-major, served as an in-house village elder and acted as an advisor to the British commander on unit matters.[43] His lower-ranking counterpart, the subadar, acted as the company commander in the field. Indian units lost a vital element of morale and control once either one of these trusted subordinates joined the casualty list, as did virtually every army on the Western Front when large numbers of other non-commissioned officers were killed or wounded. Obviously, the fact that Indian officers obtained a modicum of command in itself suggests

that they possessed leadership skills, a contradiction not lost on British commanders. Willcocks surmounted the discrepancy by explaining that the VCO, though "well fitted to fill *temporarily* [italics mine] the place of the British officer in the field," could by no means replace him; the VCO, though "gallant and staunch" was "feeble without the unlimited initiative and fearlessness" of the white commander.[44]

Arguably, the ideal of the "officer and gentleman," articulated as a form of class superiority within the British Army, had found a more idiomatic expression in India, one reflective of a broader late nineteenth-century colonial ideology. Only with the aid of the British, many believed, could decadent India recapture its past grandeur. The English had both a right and a duty to remain on the subcontinent until they had completed this task. Likewise, the indigenous officer, even though a product of the martial races, had also degenerated, though much less so than the masses of Indians who "once were white," but who had suffered too long from the "deteriorating effects of aeons of tropical sun."[45] While the climate had supposedly debilitated both the physical *and* mental vigor of Indians from south, the martial races' loss of masculinity had not been so complete. The Indian soldier possessed many of the characteristics of the "noble savage." Within this framework, instances where the VCO seized the initiative took on an anomalous quality, a fleeting moment in which he touched ancient Aryan glory and achieved par with his English superior. Command fell upon the Indian officer by chance, not design, a de facto result of the Western Front's voracious appetite for men and material.

Even so, few authors have made a serious effort to find out what occurred in cases where the VCO obtained this "temporary" status. In fact, the leadership and bravery of the VCO stands out on these occasions. An example of an officer who won the Military Cross effectively makes the point:

> *2nd Lt. Rána Jodha Jang Bahádur (a), 1st Battalion, France (4.11.15)*
>
> During a feint attack made by the Indian Corps to the north of La Bassée Canal on October 13, 1915, this officer commanded a double company with great ability and conspicuous gallantry in the face of fierce fire from rifles, machine guns, grenades, and bombs, and was severely wounded in the neck. On the previous evening this very gallant officer was wounded in the arm by a rifle bullet but . . . returned to the firing line to see his company through the engagement which was due to commence the next day. . . . The bravery of Rána Jodha Jang Bahádur was previously observed on September 25th last, when he led his company right up to the German wire under heavy rifle and machine gun fire.[46]

Official regimental histories are so replete with similar accounts that one reaches the natural conclusion that the Indian VCO's fulfilled a vital role in the functioning of the IEF, acting as an essential intermediary between officers and enlisted men. It stretches credulity to suppose that the loss of a subadar-major, who had often served with the same unit for years, had little or no effect on morale while casualties among British officer virtually paralyzed the Indian troops. The maligned 129th Baluchi Battalion, for instance, lost six of its twelve British officers and four of its Indian subadars in its first ten days of battle. By December 20 the battalion had none of its original British officers, three Indian officers, and only 214 enlisted men.[47] Once a significant number of Indian officers had joined the ranks of the dead or disabled, unit cohesion suffered, just as in the case of the British officer. Nevertheless, British officers saw only their own loss as critical. The VCO, however manly and experienced, seems to have somehow fallen between the cracks of wartime memory.

There remains one very difficult issue to examine before moving forward. After the first weeks of combat, the Corps' own medical officer issued a study confirming that some sepoys had engaged in self-maiming to avoid the trenches. According to the report, of the 1,848 Indian soldiers who had been admitted for treatment up to November 3, 57 percent, or 1,049, had hand wounds. By contrast, the British units that had come from India as part of the Corps, about one-third of the IEF, had only 140 wounds to the hand.[48] Willcocks, hoping to "put a stop to this idiotic and dangerous thing," had two men shot. "I ask what it means," he continued, "to be owing hundreds of men who cannot be replaced for weeks and even months while their comrades . . . do double duty in those horrible trenches."[49]

While some elements of the Corps unquestionably had a problem with self-inflicted wounds [SIW], it is not at all clear just how prevalent the practice really was. According to the statistics compiled by the IEF's medical officers, over one half of the hand injuries suffered by Indian troops in France came within the first two weeks of battle.[50] If one accepts that most of the hand wounds up to November 3 were self-inflicted, it would mean that on average nearly *100 men a day* either shot themselves or simply raised their hand over the parapet of their trench and let German snipers do the job for them. The conclusion that Indian troops engaged in a sudden and massive outbreak of self-maiming does not seem fully credible, for it presumes that the war dealt them such profound psychological shock that they immediately cast aside deeply held convictions of personal and unit integrity. Nor were these troops the reservists that British officers would complain so bitterly about later in the winter. The sepoys at that time would have been regular troops concerned with maintaining both

[*Daily Mirror*.

SEPOY KHUDADAD KHAN, V.C., 129TH BALUCHIS.

Figure 4.1 Illustration of left-hand wound on Indian VC Recipient Khudadad Khan

personal and unit honor, or *Izzat*. Moreover, it appears that the British battalions had not yet been as heavily engaged as the Indian units, and had had fewer total casualties for the time period covered in the medical officer's report. Other evidence strongly suggests that British military authorities underreported cases of self-maiming or malingering among white soldiers so as to not appear defeatist or be detrimental to morale. These same strictures, however, would have in no way applied to Indian troops, from whom authorities expected an average or mediocre performance.

Joanna Bourke's study of Great War masculinity, *Dismembering the Male*, has explored the problems of discipline, particularly "malingering," in some detail.[51] British forces carried out 3,080 death sentences during the war for a variety of offenses, including murder, cowardice, quitting post, and most commonly, desertion.[52] As Bourke further points out, War Office statistics indicate that military authorities brought over 300,000 charges of "shirking" or malingering, with a 90 percent conviction rate. Shirking constituted a less serious offense and represented the bulk of the cases, while self-inflicted wounds comprised a statistically insignificant portion of occurrences. Bourke alleges that military authorities underestimated the numbers for both malingering and self-mutilation. This seems plausible, given the way that military authorities accounted for self-maiming cases. As Helen McCartney noted in her study of the Liverpool Territorial Battalions, the Judge Advocate General's Office classified wound cases under the "miscellaneous" category in the official court-martial ledgers since they were defined by Section 40 of the Army Act, a catch all statute that "could encompass almost any misdemeanor." In other words, if one is looking for hard-and-fast numbers on SIWs in the official records, they are unlikely to find them.[53]

By way of further example, Alan Sichel, an examiner at the army's Ophthalmic Centre Military Hospital, estimated that 11 percent of the 2,000 cases he handled had feigned eye problems to avoid returning to the trenches.[54] The 55th West Lancashire Division, meanwhile, had a nearly 26 percent rate of self-inflicted wounds for a six month period in 1916. The 11th Border Regiment, citing shell-shock and combat fatigue, refused to carry out raids on enemy positions. A medical officer agreed with this diagnosis, adding that the men had incurred additional psychological stress after spending their "rest period" burying dead comrades and sorting out their personal effects. A court of inquiry reprimanded the doctor for his undue sympathy.[55]

Sir Walter Lawrence, charged with overseeing the hospitals for injured Indian soldiers established in England, took an abiding interest in the subject of self-inflicted wounds. Writing to Viceroy Hardinge in May 1915, he opined that the "rumors of self-inflicted wounds, rumors that have never been proved, [and] did a great deal of harm" to the reputation of the Indian soldier, so much so that he thought it necessary to conduct an investigation of his own.[56] Within two months, Colonel Bruce Seton, at Lawrence's behest, had submitted a statistical analysis of the number of wounded Indian soldiers that he believed refuted the charges of self-maiming. Using a card system he had devised to keep track of the injured, Seton noted that

the hospital had to that point discharged 667 wounded. Of that number 576, or 85 percent, had returned to duty. While Seton found the number of wounds to the upper extremity remarkable, some 43 percent of the total cases, he nevertheless saw no correlation between the upper body injuries and self-maiming.[57] Noting that "the accusations that have been made of wholesale self-inflicted wounds in the hand has led me to analyze these 297 [upper body] wounds . . . very carefully," Seton found that just over half of these injuries involved the hand, with "87 affect[ing] the right hand and 64 the left." In his opinion the significance of the results lay in the fact that "a self-inflicted injury is nearly always to the *left* hand [*emphasis Seton's*]; and yet we have more right hand gunshot cases than left." Furthermore, he asserted, doctors often could not determine if gunshot or artillery had wounded their patients, although the 13 of the 64 sepoys who had been hit in the left hand had multiple wounds, a clear indicator of shrapnel as the culprit. For Seton, the answer was clear: one could say that 6.1 percent of the patients he documented *might* have injured themselves. "I send you these figures," he declared to Lawrence, so that "they may help you to answer the people who affect to believe that self-mutilation is the common form of injury in the Indian Army."[58] A convinced Lawrence forwarded Seton's report to Hardinge, adding that the charges against the sepoys sprang from the "calumny" and "constant libel fostered by one or two Anglo-Indians of an atrabilious disposition. . . ."[59]

The question as to whether demoralized sepoys engaged in wholesale self-mutilation will remain a puzzle unless more evidence comes to light. It seems likely that two things occurred. First, two or three battalions of the demoralized IEF appear to have had a problem with self-inflicted wounds. Second, and more importantly though, Seton's statistics strongly suggest that IEF officers and British authorities alike, convinced that the sepoys had become demoralized by the loss of their father-figures, failed to properly corroborate the evidence and counted nearly every injury to the hand as a self-inflicted gunshot wound, even when the soldier had multiple injuries from shrapnel. Lawrence's assertion that the Anglo-Indian community spread the rumors of self-maiming remains problematic, though, for he offers no direct evidence to support his claim and names no one in particular as a culprit.

Lawrence's letter also took the opportunity to blast Anglo-Indians for spreading rumors that "the Indians misbehave themselves at Brighton [hospital] and elsewhere"—that is to say that they posed a sexual threat to Englishwomen. He made clear his belief that the Anglo-Indian community simply could not admit any degree of equality between themselves and

their colonial subjects, despite India's huge contributions to the war effort. While Seton's report, he forcefully insisted, blew the Anglo-Indian "calumny" regarding self-inflicted wounds "out of the water," the implication of a "scandal" at Brighton were "an absolute lie." Indeed, the work of Philippa Levine has amply revealed the overlapping race, class, and gender anxieties among military authorities in England who worried that lower-class women, in particular, would be irresistibly attracted to the masculine Indian soldiers hospitalized at Brighton and elsewhere. The possibility of miscegenation, argues Levine, endangered not only the "health and moral of soldiers," but also "the edifice of whiteness." Lawrence's commentary is relevant to the complexities that these overlapping wartime anxieties present to scholars. He in fact blamed lower-class Englishwomen rather than the colonial troops for moral lapses, lamenting "the perverted behavior of Englishwomen" during the coronation of George V in 1910, when Indian Army units took part in the celebration. Indeed, contemporary commentators often paralleled the lack of "civilized" behavior among the poor with that of the "ignorant native."[60] Left to their own devices, the wanton East End maid might not be able to resist the brawny and tawny sepoy. He had effectively seconded the fears of the War Office and its decision to confine recovering colonial soldiers to their respective hospital grounds. Although some of the troops there were allowed to visit London in small groups, this was only under proper escort. Similarly, the War Office considered presence of white nurses in the colonial hospitals a minor scandal.

As for SIW, there is one common thread that offers a feasible explanation for those incidents that did occur, namely, that affected units tended to originate from areas on the fringes of British power where ties to the Raj and its associated traditions of military service were tenuous. The 129th Baluchis, 57th and 59th Rifles, for example, recruited heavily from the Pathan tribes that dwelled along the border regions between British India and Afghanistan.[61] By way of further contrast we can note that the only case of mass desertion on the Western Front came in March 1915, when 24 Pathans of the 58th Rifles crossed over to German lines, while the statistics for hand wounds among the more closely aligned Gurkhas hardly differed from that of British battalions.[62] Letters translated by the Indian Censor of Mails seem to confirm this view, as many of the soldiers warned friends and relatives in their home villages to avoid enlistment at all costs. In the end, it may be safest to conclude that the Indian Corps had a moderate problem with the self-inflicted wounds, confined to units with weaker traditions of service. Similarly, a significant amount of evidence suggests that the same problem occurred in British units as well.[63]

The first two months of fighting had tarnished the reputation of the IEF and confirmed the suspicions of its detractors. British observers explained any and all shortcomings of the Corps in terms consistent with their belief in the exemplary masculinity of the white officer and the sepoy's need for paternal guidance. They deemed the loss of the British officer as paramount to any other consideration, including the crying lack of trench weaponry, too many days under shellfire, and the casualties among Indian VCO's. Yet, if one wants to truly gain a more accurate account of the Indian experience in France they must compare the IEF's first tour of the trenches with that of its later efforts, particularly in March 1915 when it took part in one of the more successful offenses of the war, the attack on Neuve Chapelle, a fairly successful attack given the repeated and dismal failures of most Great War offensives. The sepoys there, when given a level playing field in the form of the right equipment, training, and tactics, performed accordingly and in direct contrast to the winter of 1914.

Neuve Chapelle and the Official History of the War

After enduring a horrendous winter, the IEF finally gained time to recover from its losses and train in the nascent art of trench warfare. In their next major action, the March 1915 Neuve Chapelle offensive, the Indian Corps met all of its first day objectives and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. Despite its early success, the assault stalled in the face of German machine-gun and artillery fire, largely because of inadequate counter-fire from British guns, an all too common occurrence on the Western Front. IEF and BEF commanders quickly blamed one another for the failure, igniting a debate that has a continuing resonance for interpreting the Indian part in the overall Great War narrative. For Indian Corps officers, the lack of recognition merely confirmed what they already believed—that their men were not getting the credit they deserved. Furthermore, the Neuve Chapelle operation presents critical issues regarding the historiography of the IEF and the writing of the official history of the war, *Military Operations in France and Belgium*. As we shall see, colonial ideology once again shaped the depiction of the sepoy as manly, yet flawed.

The Neuve Chapelle operation reiterates just how critical Indian troops were to the early war effort. Indeed, the circumstances that had compelled the War Council to dispatch the IEF to France still applied. Britain had already combed out its remaining regular troops, forming the 27th, 28th,

and 29th Divisions from its overseas garrisons. The 29th went to the Dardanelles, while the Germans incapacitated the other two as soon as they came to the line. As for the Territorial divisions that had begun to appear in France, even the 46th (North Midland), "the best Territorial division then available," would require "some weeks training in trench warfare before it could be asked to take over a section of the battle front."[64] Thus, as late as eight months after the war began, the BEF still had no choice but to utilize the Indian Corps.

The offensive, though small when compared to later endeavors, arguably stands as the most important engagement of the war for Indian forces, demonstrating rather clearly what the IEF could and could not do. Given the right training and weaponry, the Indian soldiers did as well as their British counterparts. Nonetheless, it also showed that the IEF could not consistently sustain heavy losses, even with an amended recruiting policy in place. As the day for the assault approached, IEF commanders carried with them an awareness that both their reputations and the reputations of their men hung in the balance. General Willcocks thought Neuve Chapelle represented "an experiment which might have momentous consequences, comparable to that faced by Japanese commanders in the Russo-Japanese War" where Asian soldiers inflicted a humiliating defeat on a European enemy. "It was," said Willcocks, "a matter of East versus West."[65] Willcocks' comments are telling. Once again, the notion of the IEF as something unprecedented in the empire comes into play, an "experiment" that reflected the ambivalence of using Indian soldiers against a white continental enemy.

Major-General H. D'U. Keary, head of the Lahore Division, exhibited a similarly cautious attitude, one indicative of the heavy losses his unit had incurred in the winter. "How the Indian troops will do, I don't know," he wrote, "most of my div[ision] got very severely handled in the early part of the war and consist of a good deal of new drafts."[66] Keary had good reason for concern, for planners had slated his old unit, the Garhwal Brigade, along with Rawlinson's IV Corps, to lead the attack. British planners made painstaking preparations that boded well for the assault. They had gained air superiority, and amassed an impressive amount of artillery. The attack began on March 10 as the Garhwal Brigade and General Sir Henry Rawlinson's 23rd and 25th Brigades moved up quietly to the front line trenches. At 7.30 am, the BEF artillery began pounding the German lines. Twenty minutes later the four battalions of the Garhwal Brigade left the positions on their 600-yard front. Three of the Indian Corps battalions, the 2/39th Garhwal, 2/3rd Gurkha, and the 2nd Leicester easily met their first

objectives. All along the German line artillery fire had succeeded in cutting the wire. The enemy soldiers that had survived the bombardment emerged stunned and incapable of offering significant resistance. Yet, German opposition stiffened as the assault carried into successive defensive lines. The performance of the 2nd Garhwal Battalion in these early stages was especially notable, and the Indian troops once again rose to the occasion. A Garhwal rifleman, Gobar Sing Negi, took over his platoon after German fire killed its commander. Again, an Indian soldier had assumed a leadership position after the white officer had been incapacitated. In the subsequent trench-clearing operation, Gobar Sing was the first man around each traverse, bayoneting and shooting enemy soldiers along the way and in the process earning a posthumous Victoria Cross. In addition, two other Garhwal officers won the Military Cross, another the Order of British India, and two the Indian Order of Merit.

The 2/39th Garhwal's companion unit, the 1/39th battalion, met with misfortune immediately after they drifted right and struck an undamaged portion of the German line at the Port Arthur salient, where the artillery had missed its targets. Tragically, the enemy machine-gunned the two lead companies in front of the uncut wire. The survivors desperately tore at the entanglements with their hands and forced their way into the German position. Although they had fought gallantly and achieved a measure of success, a 200-yard section of enemy-occupied trenches separated two companies of the 1/39th from the remainder of their unit. On the left of the Garhwals, the British 25th Brigade of Rawlinson's IV Corps had also captured its objectives. Rawlinson's 23rd Brigade, however, met the same fate as the 1/39th Garhwals, with far higher casualties. One of the regiments of the 23rd came out of action under the command of a second lieutenant and down to 150 men.[67] Despite the heavy casualties in the errant British and Indian units, the assault had met all of its initial objectives by 10.00 am

According to official history, the Dehra Dun Brigade of the Meerut Division and the 24th Brigade of Rawlinson's 8th Division were to move up and implement the next phase of the British attack. The 24th Brigade planned to pass through the newly captured German lines and seize Aubers Ridge, while the Dehra Dun brigade drew the task of capturing the Bois de Biez, an overgrown wooded area to the southeast of Neuve Chapelle. Sir James Edmonds, author of *Military Operations in France and Belgium*, the official history, states that the offensive then faced two critical delays: heavy German fire that slowed the Dehra Dun Brigade's advance across no-man's-land, and the excessive caution of the Meerut Division commander

in dealing with the uncaptured portion of the German trench. The attack stalled for five precious hours, allowing the Germans to establish a strong secondary line of defense with interlocking fields of machine-gun fire.

Edmonds further claimed that Rawlinson could not renew his assault until the Indian Corps had cleared the Port Arthur position, a task the IEF troops accomplished at 5.00 pm. Not until nightfall, however, did lead elements of the Dehra Dun Brigade move into the edge of the Bois de Biez, the flames of a burning farmhouse lighting the way.[68] The Dehra Dun Commander, Brigadier-General C. W. Jacob, faced a difficult decision. The brigade was now in a position to capture the wood, but both flanks were "in the air," since the remainder of the Indian and the IV Corps were on the opposite side of the Layes River. It was doubtful that they could hold the position against a concerted German attack. Jacob expected help from two of Rawlinson's brigades, but both were stopped at the river's edge by strong German resistance. Jacob's after-action report for March 10 confirms that "if the Eighth division had been able to cooperate with me I would have been able to maintain myself on the edge of the wood."[69] In a move that enraged General Douglas Haig, the 1st Army commander, Jacob decided to withdraw his men back across the Layes River.

The delay of the 1/39th Garhwals and Rawlinson's 23rd Brigade is important for three reasons. First, it reveals the tendency of the *Military Operations* author to exonerate some commanders at the expense of others.[70] Second, Edmonds places the blame for the delay primarily on the shoulders of the Indian troops, specifically the 1/39th Garhwal battalion and their unfortunate drift into the undamaged German trenches. Third, Edmonds overlooks the fact that IEF commanders built a solid case against Rawlinson for his failure to move up the supporting brigades in a timely manner. Edmonds plainly felt comfortable in shifting blame to purportedly inferior colonial soldiers. Indeed, a more careful consideration of Neuve Chapelle suggests that the fault lay in Rawlinson's own corps and that the Indian Corps was delayed because of events in Rawlinson's sector. Rawlinson could not have advanced, even if the Indians had cleared the Port Arthur position earlier. He had already cast three of his five reserve battalions into the fray, while the remainder were employed in carrying stores or simply had been placed too far in the rear to be of assistance.[71] In short, this meant that the troops intended for the second phase of the attack were already engaged in other endeavors.

The IEF, though, provided a convenient scapegoat. No one, save the Indian Corps' own officers, questioned Edmonds' account. This was in spite of Sir John French's acknowledgment that the "difficulties . . . might have

been overcome if the General Officer commanding the IV Corps had been able to bring his reserve brigade more speedily into action." IEF staff officers likewise determined that "the check sustained by the 23rd brigade had thrown the machinery out of gear," thereby necessitating a reorganization of the attack.[72] Further evidence in favor of the Indian Corps comes from an examination of Rawlinson's actions after the fighting had ended. Rawlinson tried to sack his 8th Division commander, General Joey Davies, for his supposed dereliction in bringing up his reserve brigades. Davies countered by gathering evidence on his own behalf, saving his job in the process. More importantly, he identified Rawlinson's handling of the reserves as the real cause of the lag, as well as the subsequent stall in the Indian Corps' advance.[73] The bid to remove Davies demonstrates that Rawlinson had attempted to shift responsibility for the crucial delay from himself to a subordinate, and to the Indian Corps. *Military Operations in France and Belgium* similarly tended to place the preponderance of blame on the IEF.

The real significance of Edmonds' account of the Neuve Chapelle fighting lies not only in the short shrift given to the Indian soldiers, but also in revealing how this narrative made its way into later historiographic accounts. Indeed, the colonial ideologies that guided the deployment and use of Indian soldiers so permeated the mindset of those who recounted the IEF experience that it naturally led later scholars to reach similar conclusions.[74] One of the clearest examples connecting the Great War martial races doctrine and later scholarship comes from Jeffrey Greenhut's ubiquitously cited 1983 article "The Imperial Reserve: The Indian Corps on the Western Front 1914–1915," and his less often quoted "Sahib and Sepoy: An Inquiry into the Relationship between the British Officers and the Native Soldiers of the British Indian Army."[75] Greenhut correctly judges the difficulties that the Indian Corps experienced, but he accepts the claims of SIWs at face value rather than questioning how imperial perceptions and protocols might have influenced the IEF's contemporaries. Similarly, Greenhut agrees with past martial races authors in asserting that only the white officer had the qualities to command the sepoy.[76] Byron Farwell's popular *Armies of the Raj* relies on Greenhut to explain the Indian experience on the Western Front, noting that the latter's "brilliant essay" reveals the sepoy's "excessive dependence on their British officers." The aptly named Charles Cheverix Trench also cites Greenhut, though his experience as an Indian Army officer naturally led him to conclude that "the high rate of attrition among British officers represented the loss of the only men who could command the sepoy."[77] Contrarily, Philip Mason's classic study of the Indian Army recalled that some of the colony's most effective units

were the irregular troops of the pre-Mutiny era. John Jacob's Scinde Irregular Horse regiment had only five British officers for 1600 troops. The remaining officers were in fact Hindustanis who exercised a great degree of responsibility, who did not "naturally look to the white officer in times of trouble," who did not collapse without the white leader, and who proved themselves as fully capable as their European counterparts.[78] As David Omissi has perceptively observed, the "cult of the British officer," continues to exert an influence over modern scholarship, and thus it "must be tested."[79] Indeed, far too many works tacitly accept imperialism's paternalistic and infantilizing streak, in which the white officer acts as a father figure to the child-like sepoy, and without whom the latter becomes lost and bewildered.

The extant scholarship on the Indian Corps would have benefited from some soundings on how IEF officers themselves railed at the tendency of their counterparts in the BEF to blame the sepoy when things went wrong. In a private letter to his brother, Lahore Division commander H. D'U. Keary thundered against the highest echelons of the BEF: "the truth is that [Field Marshal] French and [General] Haig hate the Indian Corps and want to get rid of the whole thing." Keary continued his diatribe, angrily noting that "no one in the Indian Corps feels either safe or induced to do his best, there has been so much injustice done and said."[80] Willcocks joined the fray as well, noting that his only fault had been to fall "under command of a man [Haig], with whom, notwithstanding every possible endeavor I could not hit it off."[81] The stridency of both Keary and Willcocks is telling, for it demonstrates that both men saw Neuve Chapelle as expiating the Indian Corps supposed sins of the previous winter. Keary expressed pride in his men: "[The] Indian Corp's operation was completely successful with my old brigade . . . forming the front line of our attack and carrying everything before them."[82]

While the IEF had undoubtedly enjoyed success at Neuve Chapelle, its remaining six months in France unfortunately proved as severe, if not worse, than the winter of 1914. In April and May of 1915, the Corps took part in the Second Battle of Ypres, which marked the first use of poison gas in the war. The French front collapsed as chlorine fumes asphyxiated men in their trenches. Once again, British commanders summoned the Indian soldiers to try to salvage the situation. Keary's Lahore Division, after a three-day forced march, met immediate destruction, losing 3,889 men, or nearly 30 percent of its ranks against a dug in enemy.[83] Keary saw the episode as a "slaughter," even as he acknowledged "something had to be done, and done quickly" to maintain the front; it was "the very devil of a fight much worse than Neuve Chapelle."[84] The remainder of the Meerut Division

met an identical fate on May 9, losing 2,629 men in one day during the Battle of Festubert, a subsidiary action in the Second Ypres engagement. Indian and British troops met machine-gun and heavy artillery fire as soon as they left their positions. Men tumbled back into the trenches, hit before they had stepped off the scaling ladders, or dropped dead on the parapet. Whole lines of soldiers, Highlanders and Gurkhas in one case, fell as machine-guns traversed their ranks.[85] The Meerut Division, like the Lahore, suffered devastating losses. Individual battalions emerged with 50 to 80 percent casualties. The 41st Dogras lost 401 out of 645 men, and the British 2nd Black Watch 270 of 450, while the 58th lost another 252 men from its already depleted companies.[86] When the fighting at Second Ypres finally ground to a halt on May 25, British commanders recognized that the IEF could no longer remain on the Western Front. The balance of its time in France passed quietly, with the exception of some diversionary attacks as part of the Loos offensive in September. By nightfall of November 10, the IEF completed its withdrawal from the British line and began making preparations to leave France so that it could be refitted and retrained.

As bad as the IEF's tenure on the Western Front had been, it was rivaled by the disaster of the Mesopotamian campaign, where, as noted above, an army of more than 13,000 men surrendered to the Turks at Kut in April of 1916. Mesopotamia was close to being an entirely Indian theatre. Eight of the nine divisions of "IEF Force D" came from South Asia, including the rebuilt 3rd Lahore and 7th Meerut Divisions. Conditions in Mesopotamia were hellish. Daytime temperatures reached up to 120 degrees Fahrenheit, a blisteringly hot and ironic counterpoint to the artic-like European winter of 1914. Flies, rats, mosquitoes, and pestilence stalked the soldiers, over 12,000 of whom died of disease largely due to the Government of India's criminally ill-conceived logistical and medical preparations. Painfully wounded men lay on improvised hospital boats or barges for up two weeks, often covered in their own feces, before doctors treated them. The parliamentary commission established to investigate the calamity found that the British officers in charge offered "not a hint of this regrettable breakdown" in the official reports they sent to England.[87] The final report was so damning it forced the resignation of Montagu's predecessor, Sir Austen Chamberlain, as Secretary of State. The Mesopotamian tragedy resonated beyond the battlefield and informed the ensuing debate over the Montagu Reforms. It provided yet another opening for the Raj's critics to attack imperial masculinity, and at a crucial time on the Western Front. Moreover, the most piercing censure came just ahead of Edwin Montagu's fact-finding junket to India, where he planned to study constitutional reform.

Lajpat Rai wrote from his temporary American exile during the war, but had already built a reputation in India by brilliantly attacking the logical inconsistencies of a kingdom that preached democracy while at the same time practicing an explicitly hegemonic imperialist policy.[88] Like many of his colleagues, Rai used the very skills that he learned in English-based schools to punch holes through the ideological firmament of the Raj. He frequently hammered on what he saw as the "political, physical, and economic emasculation" engendered by foreign rule, yet his wartime missives, appearing when the debate over the Montagu Reforms was at a crescendo, are especially revealing.[89] Administrators such as Michael O'Dwyer considered Lajpat Rai to be especially dangerous since he was a native Punjabi and a key leader in the Hindu reformist *Arya Samaj*.[90] The *Samajists* were highly critical of "orthodox" practices such as the caste system, child marriage, and idolatry, yet they spurned Western modernization as the path to national redemption, instead advocating a return to the *Vedas* as the true source of not only religious authority, but also as a path for Indian nationalism. O'Dwyer watched the *Samaj* movement closely and noted its role in trying to alienate Sikh soldiers both in the Punjab and abroad, particularly in California where Rai made contact with the Ghadar movement in 1917.[91]

Rai's main target in his "Open Letter to Edwin Montagu" was the highly masculinized concept of colonial "efficiency," a strikingly familiar term in prewar literature, particularly among intellectuals and literati such as George Bernard Shaw and H. G. Wells, who favored using state power to re-engineer British society. The war had only amplified the focus on "efficiency" in terms of industrial production, augmenting previous Edwardian era arguments that the best government would essentially be a socialist imperialist one, run in a scientific manner by technocrats for the greater good of the realm. The built-in presumption of the domestic efficiency movement was that only a select few Britons could see the way forward into a brighter New World, whereas colonial "efficiency" implied that any proper middle-class Briton was preferable to the "educated" Indian, whose penchant for languid, dreamy abstractions would make him no more than a pale imitation of the "imperial man on the spot."[92] Only the Briton could really rule India in a safe and sane manner—read masculine—and maintain "fairness" among South Asia's diverse populace.[93] Colonial autonomy meant chaos, not freedom: courts would become hotbeds of corruption and bribery; municipal services would deteriorate; trains would cease to run on time. Chaos would reign the moment the educated Indian replaced the "efficient" British official, and all the hard work of the ICS would be undone. Indeed, every demand for greater autonomy in India invariably

met with explanations as to its impossibility. In 1906 for instance, *Blackwood's Magazine*, with its close ties to the Indian civil and military apparatuses, evoked the theme of "efficiency" and "impartiality" in terms remarkably similar to those used during the Montagu debate.

While Rai had also penned an initial "Open Letter to Lloyd George" that ranged fire against the notion of the Raj as a beneficent force, it was his "Open Letter to Edwin Montagu" that caused the most consternation, for it directly attacked the gnostic claims of the Indo-British Association [IBA] in London (a political pressure group of retired India "hands" who opposed reform) and the ICS to "understanding" the country and its needs. The dispatch began by bluntly claiming that the greatest danger to British rule came not from the possibility of greater Indian autonomy, but from an ICS that had no oversight and that thus abused its power. In a variation of the "drain theory" put forward by R. C. Dutt just a few years before the war, Rai charged that the sole purpose of the ICS was to "safeguard and protect the interests of the British capitalist and British manufacturer." More gallingly for officials like O'Dwyer, he noted that although Great Britain claimed to be fighting against "Prussian autocracy, Prussian bureaucracy, Prussian militarism, and Prussian Junkerism," these same "monstrosities exist in an extraordinary degree [in India] and every effort to dethrone them is vehemently opposed by persons who want the world to believe that they are fighting to establish democracy. . . ."[94]

The disaster at Kut, railed Rai, had revealed "the fundamental weakness of the Government of India—its irresponsibility." The ICS had no accountability to the people and thus it felt no compulsion to rule in a truly competent manner. He acidly noted that even some British newspapers had criticized the "autocratic" nature of the Raj as a prime cause of the Mesopotamian failure.[95] Rai furthermore rejected the superiority of the imperial "man on the spot" and blasted the charge often leveled by diehard imperialists that India's problems resulted from parliamentarians "meddling" in ICS affairs, about which the average MP knew nothing. The real problem, Rai argued, lay in the lack of parliamentary control over civil and military servants "who had in the last sixty years developed an ethical code of their own, which brooks no interference or control from without." The European civil servants were no more than "so many gods, with their goddesses at their side, who form an oligarchy whose interests and comforts and prestige dominate all activities of Government in India."[96] Given this defect, Rai wondered aloud why "must the [provincial] governors always be Englishmen? Do you [Montagu] really think sir, that men like Sir Michael O'Dwyer . . . are such superior beings that no Indians

of that calibre could be found the length and breadth of India?"[97] Rai's "Open Letters" found their way into the list of literature banned by the Government of India, as did his 1916 book *Young India*, despite the fact that it was mainly a pedestrian account of the development of the Indian nationalist movement and its various cliques. Rai found it especially reprehensible that the Raj would sacrifice Indian soldiers needlessly while so many Anglo-Indians were falling back on the old tropes to thwart Montagu and his impending reform.

It is indeed pitiable that the wartime sacrifices of the Indian soldiers in France and the Middle East have never been adequately appreciated. This is due in large part to the tendency to see the Indian contribution as a failure of sorts, and to not lay too much blame on the shortcomings of colonial rule. In France, in particular, the term "failure" could apply to all the Western armies for the majority of the war. Rather, a fairer picture should take shorter historical view and not let the eventual scale of the conflict cast the Indian Corps into insignificance. During the first ten months of the war the IEF constituted an absolutely indispensable part of the BEF. It forestalled disaster for British arms on more than one occasion and bought time for the first of the Territorial Armies to fill the void left by the demise of the original BEF. It is difficult indeed to disagree with the assertion of one staff officer, that the Empire was saved "first by the Expeditionary Force, secondly by the Indian Corps, thirdly by the Territorial Divisions, and fourthly by the Overseas and Kitchener Armies."[98]

Clearly, the doctrines of colonial masculinity within colonial military culture decisively shaped not only how Indian soldiers were used on the Western Front, but also how they were remembered. All of the IEF's successes and failures ostensibly derived from the respective presence or absence of the white officer. The British officer's leadership allowed the "native" soldier to meet and engage the enemy on fairly equal terms. If the sepoy "cracked" under intensely violent combat, it was certainly because he did not have the paternal guidance of his dead or wounded commander. The structures and apparatuses of military masculinity proved strikingly resistant to change. Indeed, the most serious challenges posed to the imperial "man on the spot" did not come from within the army since most sepoys did not question the tenets of the martial races or the leadership of the British officer. And for colonial authorities, the martial Indian was the trustworthy "sword-arm" of the Raj. The sepoy did, after all, possess many desirable manly traits. The real threat, in the eyes of the Raj's officials came not from the masculine sepoy, but from the "effeminate," "emasculated," and "educated" intelligentsia.

5

The Road to Amritsar

Writing early in the war, the English poet Rupert Brooke romanticized battle as a purifying force, a catalyst for a British youth who lacked higher purpose:

> Now, God be thanked Who has matched us with His hour,
> And caught our youth, and wakened us from sleeping,
> With hand made sure, clear eye, and sharpened power,
> To turn, as swimmers into cleanness leaping. . . .[1]

Writing five years later, Ezra Pound framed the *danse macabre* on the Western Front far more accurately and with blistering cynicism: "There died a myriad/And of the best, among them/For an old bitch gone in the teeth/For a botched civilization." Pound's comments were not without irony. Just six weeks before the fighting began he and the painter Wyndam Lewis published the first issue of *Blast*, a journal devoted to the "vorticist" movement and its glorification of machine-driven modernity, violence, and artistic avant-gardism.[2] Vorticists, like their Italian analog, the Futurists, welcomed the war only to have it shatter whatever momentum their "violently adversarial" anti-traditionalism might have had. English propagandists attacked the movement as too akin to nihilistic German modernism. More practically, the war either killed or disillusioned some of its most influential figures.[3] Vorticism died in the trenches, as did Brooke's atavistic dream of a "purified" Europe and "cleansed" English youth. If anything, the tide of grief lapping at England's shores carried with it uncertainty as to the future of the country and its empire. Trade unions and the Labour Party drew strength from the unprecedented increase in weapons manufacturing. British women too stood to gain once peace returned and the bill came due for their wartime contributions. Ireland appeared as dangerous

as at any time in its history, despite the failure of the 1916 Easter Rebellion. In the crown jewel of India, the question as to the political costs of its loyalty loomed larger with each year that the fighting dragged on.

To be sure, Charles Roberts' allusion in 1914 to South Asia as a partner in the defense of the empire and a new era in the Anglo-Indian relationship no longer sufficed politically for a country wracked by spiraling grain prices, higher taxes, and coercive recruiting practices in Michael O'Dwyer's Punjab Province.[4] These economic pressures made it more difficult to sustain India's stability and more imperative that the metropole define what the post-war world might hold for the colony. Toward this end, the recently appointed Secretary of State for India, Sir Edwin Montagu, announced in Parliament in August 1917 that England sought an "increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government . . . as an integral part of the British Empire."[5] The "Montagu Declaration" was a necessary and overdue recognition of India's fealty and its more than one million troops in the field. The word "gradual," inserted at the insistence of former viceroy, George Curzon, suggested only some local self-governance, not full independence. Nationalists nevertheless seized upon the statement as a sign of imminent autonomy; Anglo-Indians saw even minor changes in colonial power structures as an existential threat. While "official" British India had not always looked kindly upon the racially reactionary civilian European population, the two tended to draw closer when they perceived a crisis. Montagu's plan to reform the Indian government proved to be one of these moments.

The so-called Montagu Reforms seem modest in retrospect. The Secretary's *Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms* came out shortly after a remarkable November 1917 to May 1918 junket to India. The measures gained Parliamentary assent in December 1919 as the latest in a line of Government of India Acts dating back to the eighteenth century. The new statute established bicameral provincial legislatures and a modest electorate embracing perhaps ten percent of the male population; individual provinces decided women's suffrage. It also established the principle of dual government, or "dyarchy," whereby Indians gained provincial-level control over domestic areas such as indigenous education, agriculture, and public works. Even with those concessions, ICS officials retained veto power over all provincial legislation as well as imperial control over the "reserved" areas of internal security, defense, the budget, and land revenue.[6]

Figure 5.1 Massacre off Cawnpore, from "The History of the Indian Mutiny"

These prosaic constitutional points tell us nothing about the role that anti-reformist rhetoric and gender played in preparing ideological ground for the Amritsar massacre.[7] Indeed, one of the more striking aspects of the anti-reformist literature of 1917–1919 is the persistence of the tropes that marked previous controversies, including the Ilbert Bill row of the 1880s.[8] Defenders of the imperial mission reiterated the claim that only the white ICS official, the iconic "man on the spot," truly understood South Asia and its people, and that India's diversity belied any attempt to define it as a nation state. Most ominously, die-hards argued that political concessions would only encourage a rebellion along the lines of the 1857 Mutiny. Montagu's opponents avoided the incendiary trope of the threat to white women posed by the overly sensualized and effeminate "native," but only under pressure from a Home government worried that it would alienate Indian support for the war. Notwithstanding this restraint, the memory of the Mutiny and its rape narratives remained vivid in Anglo-Indian culture. History moved linearly for Anglo-Indians, from 1857 to 1919. During the Ilbert firestorm, for instance, one particularly inflammatory article noted:

> Would you like to live in a country where at any moment your wife would be liable to be sentenced on a false charge of slapping an *Azaz* [judge] to three

> days imprisonment, the magistrate being a copper-coloured Pagan who probably worships the *Linga* [a phallic symbol], and certainly exults in any opportunity of showing that he can insult a white person with impunity?[9]

Even 30 years later, in March of 1915, as Indian troops fought and died around Neuve Chapelle, Calcutta's white community boycotted the unveiling of a statue dedicated to Lord Ripon, the Liberal viceroy (1880–1884) during the Ilbert debacle.[10] Calcutta's indigenous political and business leaders pointedly financed the memorial and attended the ceremony in significant numbers. Two years later, government meeting rooms and the exclusively white clubs of India undoubtedly echoed Montagu as a latter-day Ripon, a bumbling Liberal bureaucrat whose naiveté about the "real India" might bring down the Raj.

The Montagu Reforms spilled over the periphery's borders, as did so many colonial controversies. A host of retired Anglo-Indian civilian and military officials in the metropole rallied political opposition to the reforms, just as they had in the 1880s. One can partly explain this as a by-product of an active imperial press, but the fact that higher-ranking officials generally returned home to a peerage and a seat in the House of Lords also played a role. This was an advantage for much of the nineteenth century, when the conservative Lords could block most legislation relating to the empire, as in the case of the Irish Home Rule Bills of 1886 and 1893. The passage of the Parliament Act of 1911 by Lloyd George, however, severely curtailed the ability of Lords to halt legislation they disliked. They could no longer veto any budget measures, and they could delay public bills no more than two years—once legislation passed Commons a third time, it became law. This prewar loss of power is significant in that it contributed to the sense among conservatives that "tradition" and empire were slipping away. Just prior to the war, for instance, Unionist members of Lords violently opposed the third Irish Home Rule Bill working its way through Commons. These most ardently imperialist members of the Lords were the die-hards, the "Ditchers" that George Dangerfield had spoken of in the opening passages of his *Strange Death of Liberal England*. This same coterie, led former Bombay Governor Lord Sydenham, would go on to head the anti-reformist Indo-British Association [IBA] in London.

The fact that history was trending against the Lords and Unionist conservatism in Britain raises an important and strikingly overlooked question: if they were largely a spent political force at Home, and if there was in fact little that Sydenham and his cohort could do to stop changes in

India, then why do they matter? Were they not merely "old duffers" whiling away their remaining time? The answer would be "yes" if one were to maintain the obdurate and historically myopic view that divides the metropole and periphery into hermetically sealed zones. Yet, if the last generation of scholarship tells us anything, especially the work of Antoinette Burton and Tony Ballantyne, the empire was eminently permeable, both physically and ideologically.[11] It is true that long-serving officials often returned to an England that seemed alien and irrevocably changed since they had taken the voyage "out" many years prior. Returning "home" stretched their pensions and reminded them that metropolitan culture had outpaced them; many were humbled. Sydenham went from governing a province of 27 million people to issuing Cassandra-like warnings in Lords, linking the perils of Ireland, India, and Bolshevism to the disintegration of the empire. Weakened and disoriented though these aging centurions might have been, they still kept correspondence with friends and family abroad and maintained what Ballantyne has called the "webs of empire" from the Cape to Cairo and Honduras to Hong Kong. Most critically, their ties ran back to nearly every highly placed person in the various colonial governments and security structures. They were diminished, but important to the ideological work of imperialism. Make no mistake, once the opposition to the Montagu Reforms coalesced, these ideological wirepullers could have been among the most dangerous people in the empire, especially given the heightened emotive power of women as the literal bearers of nation and race in wartime England. To a significant degree, imperial survival meant protecting traditions and the British woman from the depredations of the empire's enemies, both external and internal.

"Tophat Or Turban": Reform Opposition in the Imperial Press

The issues raised thus far suggest the need for a careful examination of the rhetorical tactics and modes of masculine identity deployed by pro-imperial groups to halt political reform. Similarly, I want to consider how the Montagu debate manifested itself across colonial boundaries by scrutinizing the actions of the IBA in London as well as their allies in India. This study concentrates upon three personalities in particular: Lord Sydenham; W. C. Madge, a Government of India member who acted as a mouthpiece for Calcutta's civilian Anglo-Indian commercial sector; and "Zeres," an anonymous member of the Indian Army later identified as Major Walter Lowry-Corry.[12] Retirees like Lord Sydenham were ideologically formidable

foes since they could freely criticize Montagu's plan without fear of reprimand while drawing on the authority of their Indian "expertise." Still, the views of the IBA and ICS virtually stood as synonyms insomuch that the ICS used Sydenham and other retired personnel as vehicles for their lobbying and pamphleteering efforts. Although more moderate in tone than the race-baiting civilian Anglo-Indians, the ICS proved to be aggressive and politically well-connected. Lowry-Corry is especially notable in having provided the most elaborate, if not sarcastic, defense against reform. Like other active members of the Raj who wished to attack or promote a policy without causing a personal rift, he found it safer to use a pseudonym. Still, he left plenty of clues for the reader as to his likely position before he eventually revealed himself in print. He praised Michael O'Dwyer effusively, referenced himself as "Captain Sahib," and demonstrated a direct knowledge of the Punjab's unique military and social fabric. Given these factors, a discerning reader could easily single him out as a member of the Raj's military wing. Moreover, he frequently published in the ultra-conservative *Blackwood's Magazine*, which, as Heather Streets so astutely pointed out, maintained close ties with the Indian Army.

W. C. Madge, however, provided the first significant Anglo-Indian response to the impending reform. In December 1916, he contributed an article to the *Calcutta Review* as a retort to non-voting Indian members of the Viceroy's Legislative Council who sought a veto right over the latter's executive powers.[13] Even though the piece predated the Montagu Declaration by eight months, he intended it to preempt the anticipated reform scheme. Most importantly, though, Madge's essay set the tone for later attacks by bringing forward extant notions of colonial masculinity and wrapping them neatly into a single ideological package based on the idea of "imagination," and its opposite, manly self-control. The concept of "imagination" is historically compelling, for it reflected the anxieties of many Edwardian-era Britons. Those who encountered it at the time would have readily understood its rhetorical alchemy and encoded meanings via opposition to the suffragist movement and Home Rule in Ireland or India.[14] The adversaries of suffrage and indigenous rule, often one and the same, ultimately argued on the same basis—that physiology determined the contours of citizenship. Only the "proper sort" of British man could surmount the limitations of gender, race, and class that nature had placed on the realm's various subjects. Any upset in the masculine symmetry of imperial society would invite disaster, whether in the resurgence of prewar militant suffrage or in the chaos that would certainly ensue in an independent Ireland or India.[15] Seen from this perspective, "imagination" delineated a

relatively uniform set of overlapping domestic and imperial meanings. Anglo-Indians universally surmised that the educated Indian's decadence, when not leading him to fantasize about white women, diverted him to a speculative world of religion or literature rather than to action: he did not ride like a man, hunt like a man, or look manly. As Aurobindo Ghose discovered, the ICS had gone so far as to codify this belief by adding a horse-riding component to the exam. This effeminacy became more distinct when juxtaposed with the martial races and the English. Unlike the frail Bengali, the physically bigger and fairer complexioned Sikhs and Muslims of the Punjab would rather be riding-down a boar than reading an abstract philosophical text. Naturally, only the unimaginative and phlegmatic British administrator could fully discipline his passions.

Against this backdrop, Madge made the case that the key differences between Indians and Britons lay in the former's inability to control his penchant for "imagination." In his opinion, the recent attempts by the Indian members of the Viceroy's council to gain power were nothing more than a "wild dream" that had predictably produced an "amateur scheme of administration."[16] Madge and his colleagues plainly understood the concept to be more than a figure of speech. Rather, they viewed one recent suggestion, that "Indians would be none the worse for a little less, and the Englishman much better for somewhat more, of that function of the intellect known as imagination" as contradictory to the instincts of ruler and ruled. The two operated in the distinctly separate spheres of intellect and emotion. Even though these domains might be linked by subtle "psychic currents," they contained no "temperate zones between them to moderate the extravagances of the unrestrained imagination."[17] This insurmountable division of sexual mental labor, charged Madge, had led Indian legislators to the wrongheaded belief that they could govern on the same level as the Englishman; political power and masculine power were in fact indivisible.

The notion that Indians relied too heavily on the senses and on emotion found its way into the work of Lord Sydenham as well, though he would make the point in a subtly different way. In a feature for the popular journal *The Nineteenth Century* that appeared simultaneously with Madge's essay, Sydenham argued that India could not possibly run its own affairs because it had no politically viable indigenous leadership. In this case, political ability had nothing to do with education and everything to do with the inherent defects of "Indian mentality." Even the best prepared "native," in Sydenham's opinion, suffered from a "taste for the metaphysical" and a correlating inability to "observe and appreciate facts."[18] More tellingly,

Sydenham would later connect the concept of heightened sensibility directly to femininity in his memoirs, blaming the punishment meted out to Reginald Dyer, the British commander at the Amritsar Massacre, on newly enfranchised women voters who were more "likely to be swayed by sentiment."[19] While Madge and Sydenham used faintly different terminology, their readers would have easily discerned a shared subtext: neither decadent Indians nor misguided women understood the hard-edged necessities of maintaining proper social order.

The Englishman evinced an apparent masculine genius for rule. Sydenham recalled "he had studied India on paper" before assuming the governorship of Bombay and its 27 million persons.[20] His main handbooks, Alfred Lyall's *British Dominion in India* and John Strachey's *India Administration*, drew heavily on James Mill's unflattering *History of India*. One could hardly find a more conspicuous example of imperial texts as building blocks for colonial power. The imperial gaze need not come from first-hand encounters; rather one could arrogate power simply by *reading* about India and following the disinterested observations of the preceding imperial "man on the spot." The durability of India and its people as a decadent and uncivilized ontological space obviously owed much to the circular logic of colonial masculinity. Put another way, imperial *ur*-texts like those promulgated by Dow, Orme, and Mill were by definition "authoritative," since nature had provided the Englishman with an inborn masculine objectivity.

The reliance upon the overly imaginative "effeminate Bengali" as the most frequent foil to indigenous political claims thus made a great deal of sense. Yet, as Lowry-Corry, aka "Zeres," keenly perceived, the effeminate and educated Indian represented only one component in the overall construction of colonial manhood. He realized that the most potent response to demands for greater autonomy would combine the three most-common depictions of the Indian male: the decadent westernized prince, who had accompanied a unit of Imperial Service Troops to the Western Front; the educated Indian in the thinly veiled guise of a "Deccani" journalist modeled after the radical Maharashtran nationalist B. G. Tilak; and the manly "martial races" in the form of a Pathan tribesman recovering from wounds received in France.[21] The fact that Zeres would portray the three as wildly incompatible was exactly the point: all of them lacked at least one essential component necessary for self-rule, any of which the Englishman possessed in abundance. It is suggestive that Zeres published his work at a time when it would have maximum political effect. His first essay, "India Revisited," came in direct response to the Montagu Declaration and

coincided with the Secretary of State's fact-finding junket to India. Zeres' second composition, "Tophat or Turban," served as a rejoinder to Montagu's meeting with British and Indian representatives in Delhi, but he did not publish the piece until June 1918, when Montagu presented his final report to Parliament.[22]

Zeres turned directly to the comedic mode of troping, imbuing his fictional Indian prince with an English public school education and mannerisms. Replying to the question of "what he thought of the war," the young prince laughingly noted that he "was rushed out to the IEF in France" where he was:

> wet-nursed by an elderly old duffer of a general, who being in the guides thought it his polite yet painful duty to try and talk Hindustani to me. I couldn't well explain that being a _____ the ruddy lingo was as foreign to me as it was to himself. . . . When he wasn't teaching me Hindustani his A.D.C. for whom, funnily enough, I had fagged at Eton, was stopping me from going to the trenches, because they thought my important life too bally valuable to be risked, d___n 'em! . . . They made me spend all my time writing patriotic sentiments for the Indian Cavalry Corps, who used to shriek with laughter at my unwonted industry. If Bobs Bahadur had still been alive I'd have written to him about it, because he used to be a great pal of my grand-uncle, the old bloke who looked after those Englishwomen durin' the Mutiny.[23]

The prince, as invented by Zeres, had a far greater interest in recounting his leave in London, where he had seen two of the war's most popular reviews, "Zig Zag" and "Bing Girls," "both ripping" in his opinion. Pressed by Zeres to express his views on the war "and the passionate feelings of emotional devotion to the Empire that the Press informs us are surging in your dignified and Oriental bosom," the prince hurled his cigarette out of the motel window and asks that the "Captain Sahib," stop "pulling his leg." Rather, "grinning like the English schoolboy that he is" the prince avoided the question and instead suggested that they all explore the local French version of the Strand—which they jolly well did.

Zeres' journalist took on the physical and sartorial characteristics of the frequently parodied educated Indian—an "obese pork-pie hatted journalistic figure in a Decanni cut frock-coat." Anglo-Indian literary humor often punctuated these corporeal traits by emphasizing the mangled English of the educated Indian. Note how the journalist expresses his views on the war:

> Firstly and foremostly, let me confess that every auricle and ventricle of my heart bleed with pity and palpitation at the dreadful spectacle of Civilisation

> struggling against its better self and better half upon a lachrymose ocean of gory gunpowder.[24]

Like the Indian prince, the journalist could have really cared less about the war, confessing that the "greatest catastrophe of this sanguinary conflict . . . is the awful financial stringency in Provincial budgets. No longer is any expenditure available for national educations, sociable reforms, or engineering projectures."[25] Using the voice of the journalist as his own, Zeres alluded to the same charge that O'Dwyer had made when he created a scene in the viceroy's council, namely that educated Indians sought to take advantage of the political capital created by the thousands of Indian troops who fought for the empire:

> After the war, Sir, all will be doubtless different in our politics, because the warm-hearted Breetish Public being much moved by the heroism of romantic fighting races of ignorant Punjaub will doubtless give Home Rule to those of us of the South, who possess superior education to illiterate peasant-soldier and have not fought in the cause of freedom at all. Sir, you may think me most cynical gentleman, but all politicians are opportunists even in England. . . .[26]

Soldier that he was, Lowry-Corry saved his most sympathetic depiction for the wounded Pathan sepoy, though he still made it clear that the martial races possessed neither the intellect nor the self-control to take the reins of power. Zeres again drew the reader's attention to the bodily characteristics of the colonial subject, in this instance the "Aryan" traits of the Pathan. Entering the hospital for wounded Indian soldiers, Zeres spied a "pale Afridi (a Pathan tribe) face . . . with a merry smile" and "frosty blue Afridi eyes." In the ensuing exchange, Zeres and the wounded Pathan reflected upon their friendship, one that went back to the days when they had campaigned together on the Frontier. The old Pathan reminisced on the first time he and the Sahib had met at Peshawar before recalling another time at Amritsar "when the scum of Sikhdom stoned us," and again at Kurram, "near mine own people," and finally at the Cavalry School where "we were disciples together."[27] When pressed to talk about the war, the Pathan soldier avoided the subject, not because it was too painful, but because he did not really see it as a personal concern. It stood as a European affair that he had fought in simply because it was his job. Turning the table, the soldier asks Sahib Zeres what "did you and yours teach me and mine in the old days?" Zeres, replying "incautiously [and] recalling the glorious Frontier

days of our happy-go-lucky youth," answers, "not to murder your fathers unnecessarily, and to refrain from raid and rape when possible." The Pathan, gesturing ironically to a map of "mutilated Europe" pinned to the wall, replies, "and yet now you and yours."[28]

Zeres had emphasized two salient facts. The first was that no one indigenous group had all of the qualifications for assuming more than a modicum of political power. Second, the presence of such contradictory masculinities reminded the reader that the colony was too diverse, "a pear-shaped puzzle inhabited by an ethnological nightmare," to constitute a single entity. The very question of "What India Thinks of the War," in fact, was a myth, since India itself was "purely the invention of the English mind and the English language."[29] At the same time, Zeres' view of the prince, the educated Indian, and the martial Pathan can best be described as too rich to care, too effeminate to care, and ironically, too manly to care. The Indian prince, possibly modeled on the young Maharaja of Jodhpur, would rather party like the wealthy public schoolboy that he was than do anything else. The educated "babu" so lacked good judgment that he could not see beyond the boundaries of his own interests. Meanwhile, the illiterate and hardly tamed Pathan, like the medieval Anglo-Saxon tribesman, would rather stalk his neighbors than the halls of governance. This fragmentation of Indian manhood into mutually incompatible parts went far in explaining the need for a continued British presence. Madge, Sydenham, and Zeres all agreed that British civil and military servants acted as the keystone for India's uniquely segmented social, political, and military structure. In fact, insisted Zeres, the only thing that kept the educated Bengali from deserting the British entirely was the fear that "his still primitive fellow-countryman [the Pathan or other martial race] would cut his clerkly throat the moment we left the country."[30] Furthermore, just as the imperial "man on the spot" protected the "babu" from the hyper-masculine martial races, so too did the Raj shield the country's lower caste from domination by the primarily *brahmin* intelligentsia. It would be a mistake, Zeres suggested, to precipitously accept reform and substitute "the tophat for the turban," meaning western methods could not be substituted for a benevolent despotism.

It was easy, as we have seen, for Anglo-Indians to discount indigenous demands for expanded military service. Training an innately effeminate "native" for combat was foolhardy—they would inevitably perform poorly, or, worse, let their imaginative nature get out of hand and turn their weapons on the British rather than the Germans. What was more challenging was the need to counter pro-Indian members of the Liberal and nascent Labour parties in Parliament. Home conservatives and Anglo-Indians

could adopt a tack that suggested that differences in class and political philosophy had led left-leaning politicians to fundamentally misapprehend the nature of the subcontinent. Moreover, anti-reformists attempted to hang the tag of effeminacy on Montagu and others whom they deemed dangerous to the imperial cause. Zeres disingenuously agreed with a Montagu speech claiming that the issue of "Indian unrest" was a bogeyman, yet he qualified this by blaming the strife that had occurred at the end of 1917 on the Secretary of State's announcement that he planned to visit the colony. Montagu's misplaced intentions, argued Zeres, had created unrealistic expectations among India's impulsive educated elite and only increased the likelihood of violence. This proved to be a deft rhetorical move, for when violence did occur Anglo-Indians could, and did, single out the reforms as the cause of agitation, not their own recalcitrance or the economic stresses of the war.

Zeres saw the main problem as London's lack of practical knowledge regarding India and its people. Educated India, to whom "our own radical emasculates are always so irresistibly attracted," had duped Montagu—"the British M.P. shod in the elastic sided-boot of awful seriousness, and bearing salvation in a Gladstone bag. . . ."[31] Furthermore, Zeres argued, "India will never listen to the blandishments of the 'good, kind Liberal Reformer, for she has known hotter kisses from the firmer lips of stronger men. Our . . . Montagus will never blot out her passionate memories of three thousand years of blood lust, with their catchword phraseology of 'dyarchy' or 'devolution.'"[32] Madge too voiced a clear disdain for "politicians at home . . . who find skimming over the surface of Indian problems, and even writing books about them, easier tasks than sojourning long among Indian villages and diving into the depths of Indian life."[33]

What is most striking about the attacks on Montagu, however, is the manner in which it reveals imperial culture's mutually reinforcing delineation of gendered racial, religious, and class differences. It was not simply Montagu's pro-Indian tendencies that troubled his opponents, but also his self-declared "orientalist" legacy. As a Jew, Montagu recalled that he too had felt the sting of "race snobbery." Moreover, he exhibited a life-long paranoia that he dwelt on the edge of mainstream British society in spite of his political position.[34] Isaiah Berlin recalled that Montagu "buttonholed his friends in the various drawing rooms of London, and asked vehemently whether they regarded him as an oriental alien and wanted to see him 'repatriated' to the eastern Mediterranean."[35] Even Montagu's friends linked his "oriental" heritage to the analogously "Eastern" Indian intelligentsia. John Maynard Keynes' eulogy of Montagu made the comparison

matter-of-factly: "That he was an Oriental," noted Keynes, "equipped . . . with the intellectual technique and atmosphere of the West, drew him naturally to the political problems of India, and allowed an instinctual, mutual sympathy between him and its peoples." On the other hand, this also led to emotional swings and "violent fluctuations of mood" that overrode good English commonsense; he was "one moment the Emperor of the East riding on a elephant . . . and the next a beggar in the dust."[36] Keynes harbored no enmity for Montagu, yet the secretary's adversaries found his "oriental" nature an irresistible target when attacking his colonial policies. The Secretary's detractors could make a direct association by latching on to the well-established figure of the "educated Indian": like his Indian counterparts he possessed the accoutrements of western education but not the full armament of Reason common to the well-bred Englishman—hence his feminine reliance on emotion and imagination.

Zeres, seeking to juxtapose Montagu's defective nature, declared that the only men who truly understood India had been Pierre Loti, John Nicholson, and Robert Clive.[37] They were men of action—not unlike the British subalterns of the Indian Army. The Raj and its entire governing apparatus might disappear, but so long as the British subaltern remained to protect the "prestige" of the Raj it would matter not if every provincial government disappeared. It was in fact up to the young officers, the "unhappy masculine Cinderellas" disappointed at having to remain in India while fighting raged in Mesopotamia and France, to lessen "the pride of the Bengali editor by ordering [him] . . . to lower his umbrella when passing a *pukka* professional sahib."[38] Only Englishmen of spine could impose control on a country so filled with "blood lust." The British Liberals, the "radical emasculates" of the metropole, failed to grasp this essential fact. They were mere theorists who wrote from the safety of Britain, not the Frontier officers or the ICS officials who traveled from village to village dispensing evenhanded imperial justice.

Part and parcel to the belief that British reformers fundamentally misunderstood India was the assertion that the colony itself represented an organic being, one that precluded the importation of Western democratic ideals. As in England, personal qualities lent themselves to the personification of the state and the paralleling of individual characteristics with national character. Just as the educated Indian would always be a poor imitation of the Englishman, so too would the imposition of a Parliamentary system upon India's fragmented society yield poor results. As Madge put it, one could no more force English institutions of government on India than one could clothe "children in adult garments in hope of ensuring the

transformations into mature manhood without the help of the intervening years needed to secure the successive stratifications . . . [that] constitute the natural conditions of growth." Not content with the paternal metaphor, Madge further argued that any attempt to transfer the fixtures of British rule to India faced certain failure, just as "the importation of foreign flowers in the expectation of producing trees and fruit from those flowers" without the benefit of the "vitalising sap" of home would fail. Madge, however, saved his best, or rather worst, for last. It was wrong to suppose, he claimed, that:

> . . . as the disease of dysentery revolts against crude uses of Ipecacuanha [a treatment for diarrhea] but yields to its essential principle, emetic, without the loss of blood, so the political dysentery of India, excreting discontent and even dangerous seditious movements, may be cured by the essential principles of British freedom and justice applied under less crude forms than those imported, duty free, from Britain into India under the pretenses of Scientific Government, whose honesty need not disinfect it of its danger.[39]

Political reform provided neither a cure nor a palliative for Indian ills. Contrarily, it encouraged an "excretion" of sedition by irresponsible and rebellious "natives."

At the same time, Zeres displayed no small degree of disingenuousness in claiming that India's political elites, the princes, the intelligentsia, and the martial races took no notice of the war while in fact the financial demands of the conflict had exercised an increasingly deleterious effect on Indian economic life. By the beginning of 1918, food prices had exceeded their prewar level by 31 percent. Supplies of crucial commodities such as fuel oil and salt ran short, and the diversion of rail traffic for military purposes compounded the problem by inflating the cost of shipping.[40] In short, the rise in food and staple prices had the potential to affect the subcontinent's domestic tranquility. These threats to Indian prosperity did nothing to alter the established pattern of Anglo resistance to reform. "Experts," bolstered by conservative press alliances in the metropole, would publish "authoritative" stories that related the utter impossibility or outright danger of allowing anyone but the British male to exercise substantive power. Most assuredly, this meant using the print media to reinforce existing notions of the effeminate Indian and the masculine European whenever possible. The most rancorous imperial debates, however, entailed another mode of attack, namely the forming of pro-imperialist "associations" in India and at Home. These "protective" groups relied on a highly

paternalistic language to put forth the utter impossibility of granting autonomy to politically immature "natives." One such group would be the IBA in London.

The Sinews of Empire: The Indo-British Association in London

One of the underlying goals of this study has been to demonstrate that "colonial" issues were transnational in nature. One can reveal this phenomenon in a number of ways. Zeres, for example, wrote for audiences in India and in the metropole, while British serials sympathetic to India often reprinted articles from South Asian periodicals such as the *Hindustan Review*. To this flow of ideas we should add a human component—the return of retired ICS and military personnel to Britain. Many of these repatriated Britons had lived in India for a majority of their lives. The Punjab's Lieutenant-Governor, Michael O'Dwyer, spent 40 years in India; Field Marshall Frederick Sleigh Roberts, 41. General Dyer, of Amritsar infamy, was born in the colony and spent his early childhood there before his parents shipped him and his brother to an Irish boarding school. Not unlike the "natives" who had made their way to England to study and work, Britons who returned "Home" often found their initial encounters with England bewildering.[41] The climate differed radically, metropolitans looked at them as curiosities, and their pensions did not stretch as far as in India.

Nevertheless, the presence of returned Anglo-Indians in London brought the debate over wartime reform far closer to the surface of metropolitan culture. Indeed, the IBA's pamphlets, published in 1917 and 1918, emphasized their quasi-Indian identity as well as their intimate knowledge of the subcontinent. As such, the Anglo-Indian official and soldier saw themselves as the most qualified arbiters of the colony's future, as against the self-deluded and dangerous "Liberal reformer" or the "imaginative" effeminized Indian. Even more critically, the former ICS and Indian Army "men on the spot" could cloak every utterance with a self-evident mantle of masculine legitimacy. Nowhere was this truer than in the efforts of the IBA to defeat the Montagu reforms. As noted earlier, the IBA represented a quasi-governmental organization of former civil and military officials established to combat the Montagu proposals. The IBA had as its model the European Defense Association, a group formed by the "non-official" Anglo-Indian community in response to the Ilbert Bill crisis of the 1880s. In the intervening years, the latter association's prestige and membership had dropped precipitously only to be revived by the Montagu Declaration.

Now simply renamed the "European Association," this new faction increased its participatory base from seven or eight hundred to between seven and eight thousand, thereby embracing a significant portion of India's white leadership.[42] Operating primarily out of Calcutta, the European Association served as companion organization to the IBA. It also enjoyed the support of most of the Anglo-Indian press and the enmity of influential nationalist papers such as the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* and Surendranath Banerjea's *Bengalee*.

Just days after Montagu's August 20 Commons speech, Sir John Hewett, an ICS retiree and former provincial Lieutenant-Governor, asked Lord Sydenham to lead the IBA's fight against the reform proposals. Sydenham had already weighed in on Indian reform in his aforementioned article, and he still sat in Lords, where conservatives hoped he could use his considerable influence to sway government opinion. Sydenham and the other IBA leaders wasted little time, holding the first organizational meeting at London's Canon Street Hotel on October 30, 1917. The more than 230 guests included an impressive array of former officials and military officers. No fewer than four retired provincial Lieutenant-Governors and Commissioners participated, as did the former Indian Army C-in-C Sir O'Moore Creagh, and Cornelia Sorabji, India's first woman barrister and a proponent of modernization. The next day, *The Times* laconically reported the group's stated goal as "the promotion and protection of the true interests of the people of India."[43] Indian leaders naturally remained skeptical of this claim, and even *The Times* worried that the IBA might estrange moderate nationalists at a critical time in the war. Just one week later, an editorial warned that it was imperative for the organization to keep "clear of the spirit of race antagonism and recognize that British rule in India must be developed on progressive and sympathetic lines."[44] In the same breath, *The Times* admonished the Anglo-Indian community for shunning involvement in government affairs and "opportunities for public service." This apathy, the paper implied, had in the past undermined the "non-official" community's ability to express its interests in terms other than race-baiting. The message was clear—Anglo-Indians had to abandon their previous practice of violent opposition and find a more suitable way to put forward their views. Similarly, *The Times* repeated its message of caution to the IBA, suggesting that it should conduct itself in a "wise and prudent" manner that avoided the language of the European Association.[45]

The fears of *The Times* proved well-founded. Sydenham's opening remarks amounted to a blunt personal attack on Montagu. The new Secretary of State, he complained, had undermined the authority of the

governors of Bombay, Madras, and Bengal by ordering the release of Annie Besant, the Englishwoman who headed the Theosophical Movement in India and who had been incarcerated for violating wartime press restrictions. As a result, "more than 100 million of the most credulous and excitable people in the world" would be emboldened to challenge British rule. Besant's release amounted to prevarication and ran counter to the need for despotic rule "in an Eastern country," where "any government which showed want of courage, or which gave way to noisy faction" courted a disaster like that which had occurred in Ireland over the past ten years.[46] Sydenham further charged that autonomy would result in caste domination by the INC. In his estimation, the INC amounted to nothing more than "a small section of English speaking Indians who work up violent agitation for the purpose of obtaining political power for themselves. . . . Many of you who have lived in India know perfectly well that the so-called National Congress is a self-constituted . . . body which does not represent real Indian interests in any way whatever."[47] India's real problem, he opined, derived from the inability of administrators in London to realize the underlying bankruptcy of Indian nationalist claims. While every Anglo-Indian "carried India upon his heart," the misinformed Liberals were "like surgeons who wished to operate without an X-ray to go by." J. C. Shorrock, another former Lieutenant-Governor, seconded this view in condemning Montagu's effort as the culmination of the more limited governmental reforms of eight years before. It was then, argued Shorrock, that "the supreme executive of the Government of India, isolated in its own official atmosphere, would in course of time become the prey of professional political agitators in India and faddists and theoretical politicians at home, few possessing any direct . . . interests in India."[48]

Of all the objections raised by the IBA, the only charge that carries real historical weight is that southern India's lower-caste organizations feared caste dominance. The IBA moved quickly to incorporate viewpoints of this uniquely Indian opposition into pamphlets such as "Do the Indian Masses want 'Home Rule?'" The tract, drawing on a speech by Raja Sobhanadri Appa Rao Bahadur at a non-Brahmin conference, iterated what had been one of the main IBA points—that British rule held "the balance even between warring creeds and castes." Rao implored his audience "not to stupefy yourselves with catchwords about self-government . . . Look at the few plain truths of the matter, and leave political speculation to the Brahmin constitution mongers." Perhaps, Rao added, it "will be realised by Mr. Montagu before he leaves India that it is hopeless to concede political self-government to a conglomeration of isolated leaders."[49]

A sizeable number of ICS officials had a traditional loathing for the upper castes as predatory moneylenders that juxtaposed neatly with their self-image of the ICS man as the benevolent defender of the "real India" and the romanticized space of the simple and sturdy peasant. Shorrock went so far as to assert that there existed "somewhere at the backs of the minds of these dumb millions a sure instinct that justice as between all classes, creeds, and communities will be . . . more evenly meted out under British administration." The educated classes, meanwhile, had no experience in "the matter of democratic self-government" and were "as children leading strings; they have no tradition of their own, their ideals are borrowed entirely from the West. The group of political agitators clamoring for some form of Home Rule have no stake in the country and are numerically of less importance than the Anglo-Indian community—whilst in brains and common sense they are much inferior to it."[50] Most Indians, reasoned Shorrock, would instinctively want British rule to continue rather than face domination from a tiny and viciously exploitative moneylending elite.

There is more than enough archival evidence to confirm the reality of anti-*brahmin* sentiment within the ICS, particularly in the Punjab's administration where it was a veritable tradition. Nonetheless, the easy ability of Indian politicians to depict the country's social and economic problems as the fault of the Raj and its immense war effort trumped fears of *brahmin* domination. At the same time, the IBA was itself an elite that saw autonomy as a danger not only to an empire that they truly believed in, but also to their profession. More problematically, while many IBA officials clearly sympathized with India's vast peasantry, they labored under the deep biases of their own racial and class restrictions. Like civilian Anglo-Indians, they avoided contact with any "natives," save those of the highest order, whom they could not spurn without risking political consequences. Some had gone so far as to inform Montagu that even acknowledging Indian servants was "poor form." As a result, Anglo-Indians and their Home allies remained dangerously out of touch with the groundswell of Indian public opinion in claiming that the bulk of the population dreaded Home Rule.

Here, one comes to the crux of the problem: the stark difference between the paternalistic, protective *language* of empire, expressed in terms of countervailing masculinities, and the *actuality* of colonialism's intense physical violence. Even a stalwart imperialist like Viceroy Lord Curzon (1899–1903) privately expressed his loathing for the open disdain Anglos

expressed for India.[51] He in fact kept a private list detailing the numerous assaults and murders committed against Indians by British soldiers and civilians. Zeres had inadvertently hinted at this phenomenon in referencing the chastisement of the "Bengali editor" by the "unhappy masculine Cinderellas" who had been forced to forego service in the trenches of France. Following this line of reasoning, paternalism's rhetorical ability to infantilize the "dumb masses," to ridicule the "educated" nationalist, and to uncivilize the martial races via the wounded Pathan was but one aspect in the overall process of forceful counter-reaction. Authorities could not punish the recalcitrant children of empire unless the anticipated violence received sanction, ostensibly in the form of the "natives" being a danger to themselves (violence for their own good), to the empire (violence for the good of England), or to Englishwomen (violence for the good of nature's hierarchy and civilization itself). To be sure, one should *begin* from the assumption that violence is an organic, epiphenomenal feature of empire. In the words of Partha Chatterjee, the Raj operated through a "pedagogy of violence" in which force was perceived as necessary and legitimate when used to quell the uncivilized peasant or effeminate nationalist.[52] Tragically, the anxieties of war and a rebellious Ireland and India so racked the imperial elite that blindly directed killing became all too likely.

It is tempting to see this analysis as so much historiographic retrofitting—the empire's new clothes as it were. Yet, even contemporary observers such as Stanley Reed, the editor of the *Times of India*, saw the IBS/ICS attacks as a portent of violence. Writing to Claude Hill (the Revenue and Agriculture Member of the GI) in June 1917, Reed related how a "Parsi friend" told him that anti-British opinion exceeded that of any period in his lifetime. In addition, one of the colony's most prominent industrialists, Sir Ratan Tata, had cautioned the editor that the ICS's blatant antagonism to reform could critically undermine Indian support for the war effort.[53] To make matters worse, Sydenham's successor as Governor of Bombay, Lord Pentland, had bluntly rejected the possibility of post-war autonomy in a speech before Indian leaders, thereby convincing many nationalists that the government, after "exploiting them during the war, would sell them after the war."[54] More ominously, Reed added:

> I am told that Simla [the Viceroy's summer quarters] rejoiced that Pentland "had larned them toads"; I can hear the Protopopoffs saying that we control the machine-guns. I cannot plunge into that atmosphere. I have said that all the errors committed are irreparable; so they are. . . .[55]

Reed's comments are remarkably salient, for they act as a barometer of the deteriorating state of Indo-British relations and a correspondingly high probability for violence by state authorities who considered themselves to be under political siege. It similarly reminds the reader that, ultimately, what historians refer to as the "Raj" was at the higher levels no more than a few dozen people with a monopoly on state force.

While there were undoubtedly officials such as Sir Henry Cotton, who shunned the racist overtones of the Raj, they tended to be the exception rather than the rule. Even ardent defenders of the empire such as Lord Curzon exhibited a frankness in their private correspondence that shows a significant gap between the reality of the Raj and a carefully constructed ICS image of benevolent disinterest. Curzon's superior, Secretary of State for India Lord George Hamilton, bluntly opined that he could not help feeling "that India is exploited for the benefit of the Civil Service, and that the statutory rights which they have obtained from long possession of a monopoly of government in India, and the increasing difficulty of . . . ousting them from their position . . . is an increasing danger."[56] Curzon's reply reflected the same concern and the increasing tendency of Anglo-Indians to express their distaste for the population openly. The ICS, as he saw it, contained too many officials who were "indifferent," "incompetent," [and] who "dislike the country and the people," and who had "no taste for their work." The decline among officials of "interest in India as Indian and in Indian people as our fellow subjects whom we are called upon to rule" posed the greatest threat to the empire. "In the long run," he concluded, "unless we can arrest this inclination, it must be most injurious, and one day may be fatal, to our dominion in this country." This contrasts sharply with Curzon's public memoirs, in which he claimed: "In India I was magnificently served. The whole spirit of the service there was different. Everyone was out to do something."[57]

The reform debates provide a counterpoise to the iconographic imperial man as the impartial agent of justice and acts of imperial violence as isolated. It would be more accurate to see overt colonial aggression as a means of preserving British "prestige," which, like "efficiency," was a term with distinct meaning in the Anglo-Indian vernacular. Britons and "educated" Indians universally understood "prestige" as the awe and respect afforded the Raj by potentially unruly "natives." Rai's attack in his "Open Letters" may have directly made "efficiency" its main target, but it also sought to undermine prestige by way of implication, for it was "prestige" that allowed the relatively tiny ICS to maintain "Order"—and hence the empire as it existed in South Asia. Indeed, Orwell's 1934 novel *Burmese Days* invokes "prestige"

at least a dozen times within this context. As Orwell's rabid Anglo-Indian timber officer, Mr. Ellis, puts it:

> The country's only rotten with sedition because we've been too soft with them. The only possible policy is to treat 'em like the dirt they are. This is a critical moment, and we want every bit of *prestige* [italics mine] we can get. We've got to . . . say, "WE ARE THE MASTERS, and you beggars—"Ellis pressed his small thumb down as though flattening a grub—"you beggars keep your place!"[58]

Orwell's service in the Burma police force gave him a direct view of imperial power and its operation at the level of the village and at the bastion of the all-white club. It was, he wrote, a "job where you see the dirty work of empire up close." But he was not without ambivalence. He simultaneously loathed imperialism and the colonial subjects, whose subtle forms of resistance infuriated him. Reflecting on his time in Burma, he thought of the Raj as "an unbreakable tyranny, as something . . . clamped down upon a prostrate people. With another part I thought that the greatest joy in the world would be to drive a bayonet into a Buddhist priest's guts. Feelings like these are the normal byproducts of imperialism; ask any Anglo-Indian official, if you can catch him off duty."[59] The stark realities of colonialism and its potential for violence served as Orwell's muse, not only for "Burmese Days," but also for his equally disturbing "Shooting an Elephant" essay. Orwell would little lament the end of Anglo rule in South Asia, but for too many imperial foot-soldiers, the "Ellises" of the empire, the reforms looked like a first vesper in the twilight of the Raj, not a reasonable effort to reconcile indigenous political opinion. As Orwell himself attests, the deeply ingrained ethos of colonial paternalism and patriarchy, when combined with the monopoly of "legitimate" physical violence by the bureaucratic modern state, could have tragic consequences.[60]

Reform, Rape, and the Amritsar Massacre

In December 1917, one month after Montagu arrived in Bombay, the GI appointed a committee headed by Sidney Rowlatt, a high court judge on the King's Bench, to investigate revolutionary activity in the colony from 1898 to 1916. The "Rowlatt Committee" explored the links between German intelligence efforts, "Bolshevism," and Indian radicalism. The panel's final report noted India's wartime loyalty with satisfaction, yet it also warned that the danger of political "outrage," or terrorism, persisted. The committee

consequently recommended a continuation of the suppressive measures embodied in the Defence of India Act [DIA], an analogue to the metropole's Defence of the Realm Act [DORA]. Both statutes had greatly expanded governmental powers of arrest and censorship, but only for the duration of the war. The Rowlatt report, however, extended this authority in India so long as the threat of revolution remained. The armistice of November 1918 reanimated the issue of internal security at a time of severe Anglo-Indian backlash. The Punjab's Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, claimed that the Rowlatt plan was necessary to prevent a total rebellion in India. He further argued that Montagu Reform proposal, not the economic pressure placed on the Punjab by the war, had increased the political temperature.[61] Viceroy Chelmsford concurred, and introduced a Coercion Bill in February of 1919. It passed the following month as the Rowlatt Act, over the nearly unanimous opposition (22 out of 23) from the non-voting Indian members of the Legislative Council. The measure extended the DIA's powers to arrest and hold suspects for up to one year without a warrant. A three-judge panel would try cases *in camera* with greatly relaxed evidentiary rules. Suspected agitators, particularly newspaper publishers, faced heavy security bond demands to ensure their good behavior. More tellingly, the laws extended the viceregal privilege of arbitrary arrest to provincial governors like O'Dwyer.[62]

The Rowlatt Act caused tremendous resentment among Indian leaders. V. J. Patel, the future president, argued that the act would effectively "put an end to all constitutional agitation" and negatively "effect reception of proposed reforms." Other opponents characterized the Rowlatt Act as "*na dalil, na dakil, na appeal*," no argument, no lawyer, and no appeal.[63] Gandhi, who had actively recruited for the Indian Army just months before, called for a *hartal*, or nationwide strike, on March 30 and April 6, and announced his intention to travel to the Punjab to organize passive resistance there. The first *hartal* coincided with riots in Delhi, where soldiers shot at least eight civilians dead and wounded many more. On April 9, O'Dwyer ordered police to detain Gandhi at the Punjab frontier and transport him to Bombay. While Gandhi's arrest was bound to cause provocation, O'Dwyer believed that he had no choice—only decisive action could save the Punjab, and hence India, since it was from that province that the Indian Army recruited the bulk of its forces.[64]

On the following day, April 10, O'Dwyer had two other prominent leaders detained, Drs. Satyapal and Kitchlew, in the Punjabi city of Amritsar. When word of the arrests spread across the city, a crowd of approximately 50,000 gathered and began marching toward the British

"civil lines" to demand their release. As Nigel Colette's compelling study relates, British and Indian troops shot several protestors after the latter tried to force their way across the rail bridges leading into the British section of the city. The now angry crowd began a rampage, attacking British owned banks and government buildings and assaulting any Europeans they encountered. Two bank managers were dragged into the street and set on fire; others were saved when their Indian assistants hid them. In another instance, club-wielding demonstrators beat a British railwayman to death.[65] As disturbing as these events had been, it was the threat to white women and children that caused the greatest anxiety. Rioters accosted Marcella Sherwood, a teacher at a local missionary school, knocking her off her bicycle and beating her with near fatal results. Another woman, Mrs. Easdon, hid in the local *Zenana* hospital, where she worked, as a mob searched the building for her.[66] By the evening, rattled civil authorities had evacuated Anglo women and children to the local fort, temporarily conceded control of the city to the mob, and handed over their power to the military.[67]

Reinforcements from nearby garrisons began to arrive late on the tenth, and by the following day General Reginald Dyer had assumed command of soldiers in and around the city. The next two days remained tense, but relatively uneventful excepting for burials by both sides. On the morning of the thirteenth, Dyer led a contingent of troops through the town, summoning the locals by drumbeat. At each point, they read a proclamation announcing an 8.00 pm curfew and forbidding public meetings and processions. He reserved the right to open fire on any persons who disobeyed the order. Nonetheless, Dyer received word at 4.00 pm that a crowd had gathered at Jallianwallah Bagh, a popular public space of approximately six or seven barren acres. High walls and the backs of neighboring houses enclosed the area. It had only five narrow exits, although more than one of these was often gated and shut. Estimates vary, but it seems that between ten and twenty thousand people had gathered in the Bagh that day, many for *Baisakhi*, the Sikh New Year's Day. Still others came with their children, as the space provided a frequent area for socializing.[68] The crowd itself did not seem particularly unruly, and the subsequent investigation found that many of them had not heard the proclamation. To Dyer, however, the gathering seemed to be a blatant insult in light of the attack on Ms Sherwood. Incensed, he proceeded to the Bagh with approximately 50 troops and ordered his men to fire on the crowd without warning. They expended 1,650 rounds of ammunition, killing a minimum of 379 persons and wounding over three times that number.[69]

British commentators, and later historians for that matter, have expended no small amount of energy explaining the shootings at Amritsar. The consensus in 1919, as Derek Sayer's widely cited article notes, was that the massacre represented a tragic miscalculation by one individual; Dyer did not typify the general ethos of the Raj. Churchill called it "an extraordinary event, a monstrous event, an event which stands in singular and sinister isolation."[70] Gandhi, whose arrest had triggered the protests, declared that it made no sense to take revenge on Dyer. Rather, it would be better to "change the system that produced Dyer."[71] Gandhi's viewpoint is the most telling, for it suggests that he saw colonial violence as an innate structural/functional characteristic of imperial mentality rather than an isolated occurrence (it is disturbing as well, for it foreshadowed similar interpretations of Holocaust perpetrators as "desk-killers"). In addition, it contrasts sharply with the imperial apologists, who, at any rate, had no choice but to depict Dyer as a singular case since they could not otherwise sustain the ideological justification for empire as a "civilizing" force. Conservatives like Churchill recoiled not only from the horrendous nature of the event, but also from a real fear that it could undermine British rule itself. Curzon's old saw that violence against "natives" would unalterably alienate metropole from colony had found expression on an unimaginable scale.

It is here, at the tragic nexus of 1914–1919, that one can explain Amritsar as reliant upon gender, colonial mentality, and the heightened tensions brought about by the reform debate. The greatest fear for colonial authorities, one frequently expressed since the massacre of Anglo civilians during the Mutiny of 1857, was for the safety of white women and children. As Nancy Paxton has shown, the narrative of 1857 had gained an enduring purchase in the Anglo-Indian imagination via imperial "adventure" stories. No fewer than 80 novels appeared on the rebellion between the end of the Mutiny in 1858 and Indian independence in 1947, nearly all of them luridly painted tales of Englishwomen facing sexual threat from an ungentlemanly and uncivilized indigene.[72] Paxton rightly notes that Anglo-Indians had toned down the sexually incendiary rhetoric of past crises, arguing that the war had "altered the meaning and credibility of the favorite post-mutiny rape script of the white woman threatened with rape by an Indian man." Yet, this holds true only insomuch that more staid conservative organs like *The Times* had forewarned the IBA against language that might alienate Indian leaders while Britain devoted its resources to fighting in France. On the contrary, the rape narrative had by no means evaporated from Anglo-Indian consciousness by 1919, even though it was politically convenient to make it less manifest. It was simply too durable as a cultural

artifact—recollecting the Mutiny had become something of a cottage industry in late Victorian India.[73] As late as the 1920s and 1930s respectively, both E. M. Forster and George Orwell would deploy the "danger to white women" trope in their fiction. Within this context, the assault on Ms Sherwood carried enormous symbolic power. It did not need to recreate an imagined past or establish a new danger; it stood on its own, an eroding but still visible temple-rubbing of 1857. It afforded Anglo-Indians like O'Dwyer the chance to deploy the intense violence that they favored all along and reassert their endangered masculine power. The more generalized paternal rhetoric demanded by the war, and the need to not alienate Indian leaders, could be cast aside in favor of more familiar narratives. Indeed, Dyer's supporters repeatedly invoked the Mutiny when donating to the relief fund established for him after the Indian Army cashiered him. One contributor listed herself as "a widow who remembers reading, when a child, of the horrors of 1857." Over 6,000 British women signed a petition denouncing Montagu for sacrificing Dyer, the "Savior of the Punjab." If Montagu's misguided scheme had not incited irresponsible babus, they charged, Dyer would have never been forced to fire. Montagu and his reforms, not the pressures of the war, served as the catalyst for the Punjab disturbances.[74] Amritsar let the proverbial genie of sexual danger out of the bottle—there was no sense of regret from O'Dwyer, who was assassinated on a London street in 1940 by an Indian radical seeking revenge for the massacre.

Dyer's testimony before the Hunter Commission, the parliamentary committee established to investigate the shooting, neatly encapsulates the power of gender to drive violence in the colonial setting. While Dyer expressed misgivings, calling the shooting his "horrible, dirty duty," he believed he "was bound to do what I did, not only with a view of saving the military situation and the women and children, but with a view to saving life generally."[75] As he further testified, "it was no longer a matter of dispersing the crowd, but one of producing a sufficient moral effect throughout the Punjab."[76] Adding to this utilitarian explanation was the emotional power of a visit he and his wife made to Ms. Sherwood in the hospital, an event that "deeply moved" them.[77] This most likely spurred his infamous "crawling order," in which his troops blocked off the lane where Ms Sherwood had fallen and forced any Indians wishing to access the lane to crawl on all fours as a sign of penance, despite the fact that the street's inhabitants apparently had nothing to do with the actual attack. He also ordered flogging triangles erected on the exact spot where Ms Sherwood lay wounded. As Dyer expressed it, that plot of earth had become "sacred."

"The street," he continued, "should be regarded as holy ground . . . no one was to traverse it except in a manner in which a place of special sanctity might naturally in the East be traversed." It was "intolerable that some suitable punishment could not be meted out."[78]

Dyer and O'Dwyer, along with most colonial civilian and military officials, believed that maintaining "Order" meant showing force. As Sayer notes, this applied to any part of the empire, whether India, Ireland, or Africa. Dyer had heard stories of the Mutiny from an early age; his family had taken terrified refugees into their home in Simla in 1857. He and O'Dwyer had both experienced encounters with unrest in Ireland. Dyer's battalion had rendered military "aid to the civil [government]" in Belfast in 1886, when the introduction of Gladstone's First Home Rule Bill resulted in rioting.[79] O'Dwyer too glanced back to Ireland when deciding how best to deal with rabble-rousers. His family's substantial land holdings made them natural targets in 1882, when a series of agrarian disturbances swept the countryside around the ancestral home near Tipperary. Looking back on his career, O'Dwyer wondered "if any statesmen have ever realized how great an influence the growth and success of the separatist movement in Ireland has exerted on similar movements in India and Egypt."[80] In theory, the two men would have been aware of the concept of using "minimum force" to restore order, but once they apprehended the danger in the Punjab as akin to a second Mutiny, with all its attendant horrors and assaults on women and children, there was no such thing as minimum force. As Vinay Lal cogently suggested, "the outrage of an English woman's modesty and dignity was nowhere to be tolerated, but in the nonwhite Empire such perceived acts of outrage met with brutal and swift, but hardly (as some suggested) unthinking retribution."[81]

From this perspective, the need for empires to underscore their masculine power, constantly and in a visible if not pornographic manner, defies any suggestion of violence as exceptional. Note, for example, that the Hunter Committee deplored not only the crawling order, but also other "extraordinary" punishments. In Gujranwala district, the local army officer noted the lack of respect shown to civil and military officials. As a result, all "native" inhabitants would *salaam*, lower their umbrellas, and/or dismount from carts and horses when they encountered British officials.[82] Zeres had in fact applauded the practice in one of his articles when invoking the journalist to lower his umbrella before the "pukka sahib." So-called "fancy punishments" entered the equation as well. Officials forced one accused radical of a "poetical disposition" to compose a poem "in praise of martial law, which he read in the marketplace." In another



THE ILLUSTRATED LONDON NEWS, JULY 17, 1920.—101

SAVIOUR OF INDIA, OR GUILTY OF AN "ERROR OF JUDGMENT"?

PHOTOGRAPH BY VANDYK.

EXTRACT FROM MR. CHURCHILL'S SPEECH.
("Times" Report.)

"AT the Jallianwalla Bagh the crowd was not armed, except with bludgeons, and it was not attacking anybody or anything. It was penned up in a space smaller than Trafalgar Square. The people ran madly this way and that, and the firing was only stopped when the ammunition was on the point of exhaustion. When 379 persons had been killed, the troops, at whom not even a stone had been thrown, marched away. He did not think it was in the interests of the British Empire or Army for us to take a load of that sort for all time upon our back. We had to make it absolutely clear that that was not the British way of doing things. . . . His personal opinion was that the conduct of General Dyer deserved to be marked by a definite disciplinary act. It was quite true that his conduct had been approved by superiors and that events had taken place which amounted to virtual condonation. General Dyer might have done wrong, but he had his rights, and he did not see how, in face of such virtual condonation, it would have been possible or right to take disciplinary action against him."

EXTRACT FROM GEN. DYER'S STATEMENT
("Times" Report.)

"I TOOK the small force at my disposal . . . and . . . arrived about 5 p.m. in the Jallianwalla Bagh. . . . I found a large meeting, afterwards ascertained to be from 15,000 to 20,000 in number, being addressed by a speaker engaged in violent exhortations . . . There were no women and children. . . . Hesitation I felt would be dangerous and futile, and as soon as my fifty riflemen had deployed I ordered fire to be opened. . . . When 1650 rounds or thereabouts had been fired . . . the whole crowd had dispersed. . . . I cannot understand how it can be suggested that the objects of crushing the rebellion, of diminishing the dangers in Lahore by 60 per cent., were not proper objects upon which to employ a military force. . . . I knew that, if I should . . . there would inevitably follow a general mob movement which would have destroyed all the European population. . . . I knew that I could produce no sufficient effect except by continuous firing."

EXTRACT FROM SIR W. JOYNSON-HICKS' SPEECH
("Times" Report.)

"HE (Sir W. Joynson-Hicks) had just returned from a visit to India and to Amritsar, and the opinions he was expressing were held by at least 80 per cent. of the Indian Civil Service throughout India and by 90 per cent. of the European people. . . . The General in charge at Lahore considered the quieting of Lahore was due as to 60 per cent. to the action of General Dyer at Amritsar. . . . General Dyer was faced with a rebellion. . . . He had talked to men on the spot, both native and English, and native officials supported General Dyer to the utmost, and they all testified that the inhabitants knew of the proclamations and the danger they would incur if they did not heed them. . . . When it was all over, was General Dyer assailed by the people? Not at all; they came in their thousands and thanked him. He was made a Sikh, and was employed to march round the whole district, and to pacify it. this bloodthirsty man! And let there be no mistake about it.—General Dyer was beloved by the whole of the Sikh nation. . . . He (the speaker) insisted that the right thing to do was to treat the men on the spot"

BRIG.-GENERAL R.E.H. DYER, WHOSE ACTION AT AMRITSAR WAS DEBATED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON JULY 8.

Brigadier-General Dyer's action in firing on the mob at Amritsar, in April 1919, is said to be considered by the majority of Anglo-Indians to have prevented a rebellion, and to have saved all the European women in India from horrors equal to those of the Mutiny. One of the most acrimonious debates ever held in the House of Commons took place on July 8, following the announcement (made there on the previous day) that the Army Council had approved the decision that General Dyer should be removed from his employment, passed over for promotion, and placed on half-pay. The question was debated in committee by the House of Commons on the Vote for contributions towards the cost of the India Office. General Dyer was present in the gallery. Notable speeches were made both for and against him. His supporters included Sir Edward Carson, General Hunter-Weston, and Sir W. Joynson-Hicks. Against him were Mr. Montagu, Mr. Churchill, and Mr. Asquith. A Labour amendment to reduce the Vote by £100 was rejected by 247 votes to 37, and a similar amendment moved by Sir Edward Carson was rejected by 230 votes to 129.

Figure 5.2 Saviour of India, or Guilty of an "Error of Judgment," Brigadier General R. E. H. Dyer, 1920

case, a *sadhu*, or holy man, was compelled to shovel lime at a railroad siding, covering him in the irritant and giving rise to the rumor that he had been whitewashed. The committee portrayed the incident as a mini-Amritsar, a unique event carried out by one Captain Doveton. The committee then limply concluded that the "impression made upon our mind . . . is that there were too many sentences of flogging" for minor offenses such as "failure to salaam a commissioned officer," and "disrespect of a European."[83] The investigation further recommended that "it would be advisable that some restriction should be imposed on the direction of area officers in giving sentences of whipping."[84] Rogue action by officers like Dyer and Doveton seems to have abounded; so much for the "exceptionality" of colonial violence and humiliation.

One can perhaps look outside of the archives, to literature, to underscore the emotional power of inter-colonial violence and gender further. E. M. Forster's novel *A Passage to India*, completed five years after the Amritsar Massacre and just after he returned from serving in the court of the Maharaja of Dewas, reflects the author's observations on an Anglo-Indian culture in crisis. After the supposed assault on Adela Quested, the *memsahib* Mrs. Turton rages against the sexually predatory native, declaring they "ought to crawl . . . on their hands and knees whenever an Englishwoman's in sight, they oughtn't be spoken to, they ought to be spat at and ground into the dust."[85] Forster's Major Callendar expressed the same sentiment, declaring "there's not such a thing as cruelty after this." As European women and children take shelter in a local club, a "young mother—a brainless but most beautiful girl," takes refuge in the smoking room with her infant, refusing to return to her bungalow in case the "niggers attacked." Although often "snubbed" socially, she now "symbolized all that is worth fighting and dying for." Forster's Mr. McBryde, the local superintendent of police, though friendlier with most "natives" than his fellow Anglo-Indians, expressed the "problem" as scientific fact in the subsequent trial of Dr. Aziz, the supposed attacker: "darker races are physically attracted by the fair, but not vice-versa."[86]

Burmese Days shares a nearly identical plot line and clearly owes a debt to Forster. In both cases, the rallying point for the community is the local club. There is also a victim, a forestry service officer named Maxwell, murdered by locals, and a protagonist, John Flory, a timber worker. Flory is an outcast, shunned for his "Bolshi" ideas and his overly friendly attitude with Dr. Veraswami, the local Indian doctor. When Mr. Flory proposes allowing Veraswami to join the all-white club, the aforementioned Mr. Ellis launches a furious verbal assault:

> He's asking us to break all our rules and take a dear little nigger-boy into this Club. . . . That would be a treat, wouldn't it? Little pot-bellied niggers breathing garlic in your face over the bridge-table. Christ, to think of it! We've got to hang together and put our foot down on this at once. . . . I'll die in the ditch before I'll see a nigger in here.

Ellis' fury only intensifies after the body of Maxwell is unexpectedly brought to the lawn of the club, just as he and Flory are engaged in one of a number of heated rows. Orwell writes: "Ellis's rage was 'stewing in his body like a bitter juice. . . . They had killed a white man, killed A WHITE MAN, the bloody sods, the sneaking, cowardly hounds! Oh the swine, the swine, how they ought to be made to suffer for it! . . . Just suppose this had happened in a German colony, before the War! The good old Germans! They knew how to treat the niggers. Reprisals! Rhinoceros hide whips! Raid their villages, kill their cattle, burn their crops, decimate them, blow them from the guns.'" As the crisis builds and unrest spreads, Orwell's female analogue to Ellis, Mrs. Lackersteen, imagines a community on the verge of destruction. For her, the "words 'sedition', 'Nationalism', 'rebellion', 'Home Rule' conveyed one thing and one only, and that was a picture of herself being raped by a procession of jet-black coolies with rolling white eyeballs. It was a thought that kept her awake at night sometimes."[87] And so it was for Dyer as well. The rape narrative remained alive and well, and the potential for colonial violence lingered as a result.

Too often "violence" defies ready attribution, especially when carried out by nebulously defined institutions and governments. There is a tendency to see violence simply as the human stain. Yet, when one surveys the collective history of modern empires, it is hard not to conclude that coercion was colonialism's most enduring feature. This was certainly the case in Great War India. Madge, Sydenham, and Zeres desperately depicted national desire as a product of a delusional, and certainly feminine, flight of fancy. The uttering of long-held colonial stereotypes assumed an increasingly shrill tone among Britons who could not bring themselves to accept an India free of imperial rule. In part, this came from the realization that the constant alliterative of the male colonial body—"emasculated," "educated," and "effeminate"—so effective in the past, might not be enough to defeat Indian claims to post-war autonomy. Small wonder then that the Anglo-Indians and their conservative allies, aware that political change was an impending reality rather than the usual bromide, would react so violently.

6

Epilogue: The Historical Stakes of New Imperial History

The unpacking of gender, violence, and empire has arguably taken on a new relevance since 2001 and the advent of the Anglo-American partnership in the "Global War on Terrorism". This new age, as Arun Khadnani noted, announced an "end of tolerance" and a resurgence of the dangerous post-colonial "Other" in British popular imagination.[1] More broadly, the 9/11 and subsequent 7/7 attacks in London allowed the idea of empire as a beneficial and stabilizing force to regain some of the purchase that it had lost in the post-Thatcher era.[2] At the other end of the spectrum, Muslim fundamentalists use a language redolent of earlier anti-colonialist movements, urging young men to redress their masculine "humiliation" through pointless murder. Their ostensible goal, the creation of a millenarian pan-Islamic empire, has little basis in historical reality; the caliphate they hope to restore was decidedly more tolerant than the one they envision. To be sure, the rhetoric of violence and masculinity is no artifact of bygone empires, but a revivified and catalytic agent in what Samuel P. Huntington called a "clash of civilizations." The stakes in doing "New Imperial History" are higher than ever; we are not practicing history so much as reliving the imperial past.

It seems appropriate here to make two significant moves. First, it is essential that historians find common ground as to the terminologies and definitions they use with regard to "New Imperial History." Second, it is imperative to speak to the continued use and importance of the field's methodologies in an increasingly complex and globalized environment, both in terms of economies and cultures. One can argue that scholars have sometimes asked the wrong questions about empire, or thrashed about over matters that are not as perplexing as they might appear. It is difficult,

for instance, not to be peevish with historians who disdain the term "civilizing mission" as being too sweeping and too general for Britain's large and varied empire. They mystify the concept by pointing to particular events and practices on the ground rather than locating within the much broader and overarching context of imperial rhetoric. "Civilizing mission," as it was understood by those directly involved in the business and governance of foreign territory, meant bringing European (and later American) "order" and material "progress" to colonial geographic and intellectual terrains. Those who did the day-to-day ruling in Ireland, Africa, and Asia in fact understood perfectly what the expression "civilizing" meant in the context of their work. They often spoke in precisely those terms, and had full awareness of where they lay in the imperial constellation. The colonized themselves used the term "civilizing" and "civilization" frequently as well, either as a self-reflexive lament over their under-development or as a sarcastic retort to European brutality. During the Great War anti-colonial writers tended toward irony, pointing out that Europe's self-immolation belied their claims to material superiority. In contemporary academic works, the "civilizing mission" is nothing more than shorthand for a complex phenomenon (careworn terms like "industrial revolution" also come to mind). In this last sense, one should not read it as indicating a uniformity of policy and governing styles across the empire, as some critics have implied, but simply as an appropriation of imperialism's own meta-narratives. Seeing and reading the "civilizing mission" within its differing contexts is highly useful for another reason as well: it has clearly reemerged as part of a contemporary language of democracy, development, and progress.

Another common claim in regard to empire pertains to its level of impact on metropolitan culture. In other words, were ordinary Britons, especially the working class, really that engaged in, or influenced by, the empire beyond everyday consumption of imperial goods and the presence of colonial ephemera?[3] This claim is not totally without merit. Working-class Britons generally would have been more concerned with scratching out a living than with the empire. Yet the assertion is also problematic. It conflates the level of importance that the average citizen placed on empire with a clearly articulated public consciousness, itself a notoriously slippery phenomenon resistant to quantitative analysis. In the same vein, it subtly reiterates the notion of the metropole as hermetically sealed and outwardly radiating, which seems rather old fashioned given the enormous flows of goods, peoples, and ideologies between Great Britain and North

America, Africa, Asia, and the South Pacific. More tellingly, does empire only matter in terms of its effects on those living at the center of power? What about its effects on the hundreds of millions of royal subjects? Should the Indians, Africans, Irish, and white colonial settlers who vastly outnumbered the citizens of the metropole fade into the past, back to where they were when whiggish historical interpretations reigned supreme? Does empire only matter if it fully registers in metropolitan culture? If this is true, then the empire becomes not a complex system of transnational economic, political, and cultural exchanges, but a side note to modern British history.

To be sure, one does not even need post-colonial methodologies to prove just how much the "periphery" influenced the "center." Rather, even "traditional" approaches such as economics and foreign policy testify to the same point. Capital arguably served as the motor for imperialism. The triangular trade of the Atlantic world, for instance, linked western Africa, North America, the Caribbean, and England into a system of commerce with sugar as its main nexus—certainly an appropriate reference as we sit astride the bicentennials of the abolition of the slave trade and slavery itself. The economic relationships of empire, moreover, could have a profound effect even on those who had only a vague notion of its existence. The *laissez-faire* doctrines of free trade indeed played a disastrous role in late nineteenth-century famine policy in India. Between 1875 and 1877, a time of intense drought in areas of South Asia, Indian exports of wheat to the United Kingdom rose from 308,000 to 1,409,000 hundredweight.[4] This coincided with a disastrous Russian wheat crop and a precipitous decline in Russian wheat exports to Britain.[5] Because of this chain of events, famine deaths in India for the years 1876–1878 exceeded seven million, more than the entire population of Ireland at that time.[6]

India provides a fitting example in foreign policy as well. As Sneh Mahajan's study of India's role in Anglo foreign affairs aptly notes, historians have treated the subcontinent as a postscript, when it in fact decisively influenced how England interacted abroad. The "Eastern Question," for instance, often portrayed as a part of late nineteenth-century continental Anglo-Russian rivalry and the former's desire to prop-up the ramshackle Ottoman Empire, was driven mainly by a concern for the security of India. And as a 1901 defense memorandum argued, "The loss of India by conquest would be a death blow to our prosperity, our prestige, and power. . . . India," the report continued, was "second only to the security of the United Kingdom itself."[7]

I think it is crucial then to reassert the value of foreign affairs to the study of empire from a more contemporary perspective as well. There has emerged in American policy circles an enthusiasm for "soft imperialism" that draws on a distinctly skewed sense of British history. Max Boot opined in one column that "Afghanistan and other troubled lands cry out for the sort of enlightened administration once provided by Englishmen in Jodhpurs and pith helmets."[8] Stanley Kurtz, in a 2003 edition of the *Policy Review*, argued for a long tutelage of Iraq that mirrored that of India. In this case, Kurtz looked to John Stuart Mill's *Representative Government* as a "surprisingly modern and relevant" model for how to lead an illiberal country along the path to democratic liberalism.[9] Conservative American policy makers likewise continue to call for intervention in the Middle East and South Asia, albeit often as a means to score political points. This misuse of memory overlooks the enormous cost of empires, that they often went hand in glove with violence, and that they tend to look oppressive, not democratic, to those on its receiving end. A bit of homework by American policy makers after 9/11 would have revealed that Britain had its own pains fighting an insurgency in early 1920s Iraq. Winston Churchill found the country so troublesome that he likened England's role there to that of serving as "a mid-wife to an ungrateful volcano."[10] The fact that the Indian Army bore the costs, and the casualties, undoubtedly minimized the backlash at home.

The suggestion that "New Imperial" scholars address topics such as economics and foreign policy is admittedly disingenuous and deliberately provocative. It shows that ideology and practice are really opposite sides of the same coin. One cannot "do" imperialism without a philosophical foundation from which to operate. This emphasis on ideology, however, speaks to the value of a combined pedagogical approach to empire, one that reinforces a working knowledge of event-driven history with the analytical power of New Imperial Studies. It suggests the need to more explicitly understand moments of aggression as a part of a holistic process, one in which we more closely link what I call "rhetorical violence"—the dehumanizing aspects of colonial subjectivity created by imperial culture—to the physical coercion embedded in the building and maintenance of empire. Helen Fein's overlooked sociological work on imperial violence makes an eminently salient point, namely that the colonized are often placed "outside the universe of moral obligation" by the colonizers.[11] This is not to say that empire is uniformly aggressive at all times, or necessarily more violent than some of the societies it encounters. Rather, it could also

appear progressive, as in the case of English protests against Belgian rule in the Congo. Yet, empire, because it involves the creation of ruling bureaucracies and state apparatuses, possesses what Max Weber referred to as a monopoly on legitimate physical violence.[12] The ideological environment of empire is thus more than adequate to sanction violence, particularly at times of crisis, whether in the not-too-distant past or in the contemporary world.

Notes

1 Resituating Gender and Violence during the Great War

1. John Keay, *India: A History* (New York: Grove Press, 2000), 475–77. The soldiers fired 1,650 rounds. They killed or wounded an almost equal number. The number of dead varies, yet just fewer than 380 seems to be the most accurate count.
2. George Dangerfield's *The Strange Death of Liberal England* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997) and Ronald Hyam's *The Edwardian Turn of Mind* (London: Pimlico, 1997) remain useful studies for the period. Hyam in particular points out prewar examples of literary and artistic post-modernism in much the same way as Paul Fussell's later work *The Great War and Modern Memory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977).
3. The literature on India and the war is thin and dated. For primary sources consult Sir James Willcocks, *With the Indians in France* (London: Constable, 1920) and Lt.-Col. J. W. B. Merewether and Sir Frederick Smith, *The Indian Army Corps in France* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1918). A number of useful secondary sources emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. See Dewitt C. Ellinwood and S. D. Pradhan, eds, *India and World War I* (Columbia, MO: South Asia Books, 1978); Jeffery Greenhut, "The Imperial Reserve: The Indian Corps on the Western Front, 1914–1915," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 12 (October 1983): 54–73, and "Sahib and Sepoy: An Inquiry into the Relationship between the British Officers and the Native Soldiers of the British Indian Army," *Military Affairs* 48 (January 1984): 15–18, and Gregory Martin, "The Influence of Racial Attitudes on British Policy Towards India," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 14 (January 1986): 91–116. For a "high" political perspective see Algernon Rumbold, *Watershed in India, 1914–1922* (London: Athlone, 1979). More generalized works that touch the war include Rozina Visram, *Ayahs, Lascars and Princes: Indians in Britain, 1900–1947*, and *Asians in Britain: 400 Years of History* (London: Pluto, 1986 and 2002 respectively), and Laura Tabili's, *We Ask for British Justice: Workers and Racial Difference in Late Imperial Britain* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). Philippa Levine's *Prostitution, Race and Politics: Policing Venereal Disease in the British Empire* (New York: Routledge, 2003) is one of the few recent works to examine the roles of gender and race in the war.

4. Barbara Ramusack, *The Princes of India in the Twilight of Empire: Dissolution of a Patron–Client System 1914–1939* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1979), 10, 13.
5. As early as 1813 William Wilberforce contrasted Indian domesticity and its "family, fireside evils" with the respect allotted to Englishwomen. James Mill's six-volume *History of India* (London: James Madden, 1848) likewise argued that women were "exalted" among "civilized people" and "degraded" among the "uncivilized." Cited in Martin Weiner, *Men of Blood: Violence, Manliness, and Criminal Justice in Victorian England* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 31.
6. This brings to mind James Scott's work on peasant resistance, *Weapons of the Weak* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), in which he explores subtle forms of resistance. What one may call Gandhi's resistance" from 1914 to 1918 is even more unique in that it redirected extreme violence away from, and in the service of, colonial power.
7. This was not unique to India. When the United States entered the war in 1917, Filipinos subscribed heavily to Liberty Bond drives and tried to organize a division of Filipino troops to fight alongside white soldiers; US authorities rejected their efforts. See Paul Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, & the Philippines* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 383–384.
8. Mary Renda, *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation & the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915–1940* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 15. See for example Max Boot's piece "The Case for American Empire," *Weekly Standard* (October 15, 2001): 27. Boot suggested that the "troubled lands" such as Afghanistan "cry out for the sort of enlightened foreign administration once provided by self-confident Englishmen in jodhpurs and pith helmets."
9. Purnima Bose and Laura Lyons, "Dyer Consequences: The Trope of Amritsar, Ireland, and the Lessons of the 'Minimum' Force Debate" *Boundary* 2, 26 (Summer 1999), 200; I am also referencing Mike Davis' harrowing, although polemical, *Late Victorian Holocausts* (New York: Verso, 2001), and Priya Satia's "The Defense of Inhumanity: Air Control and the British Idea of Arabia," *The American Historical Review* 111, 1 (February 2006): 17. For a study on imperial violence between the 1750s and 1850s see Richard Gott, *Britain's Empire: Resistance, Repression, and Revolt* (New York: Verso, 2011).
10. In particular, Jordanna Bailkin's "The Boot and the Spleen: When was Murder Possible in British India?" *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 48, 2 (2006): 462–493 explores Curzon's attempts to contain British violence. See especially pages 484–486.
11. Ivan Evans, *Cultures of Violence: Lynching and Racial Killing in South Africa and the American South* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 21.
12. See chapter 8 of Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, 1976).

13. Cited in Enzo Traverso, *The Origins of Nazi Violence* (London: New Press, 2003), 51.
14. As both Sudipta Sen and Nick Dirks have pointed out in their studies of eighteenth-century India, rhetorical appeals to British concepts of "sovereignty" legitimized colonial violence *ex post facto*. See, respectively, *Distant Sovereignty: National Imperialism and the Origins of British India* (New York: Routledge, 2002) and *The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain* (Cambridge: Harvard/Belknap, 2006), 25, 257.
15. Bernard Cohn, *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge* (Princeton University Press, 1996).
16. See Susan Bayly, "Caste and 'Race' in the Colonial Ethnography of India," in Peter Rob, ed., *The Concept of Race in South Asia* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995) 165–218; and Rosalind O'Hanlon, "Manliness and Imperial Service in Mughal North India," *Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient* 42, 1 (1999): 47–93; and "Masculinity and the Bangash Nawabs of Farukhabad," in Antoinette Burton and Tony Ballantyne, eds, *Bodies in Contact: Rethinking Colonial Encounters in World History* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005) pp. 19–37.
17. Ashis Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism* (Oxford University Press, 1988).
18. Dow cited in Metcalfe, *Ideologies of the Raj* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 8.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., Orme cited in Metcalfe, *Ideologies*, 9.
21. Orme cited in Mrinalini Sinha's *Colonial Masculinity: The "Manly Englishman" and the "Effeminate Bengali" in the Late Nineteenth Century* (Manchester University Press, 1995), 14–15. The French missionary Jean-Antoine Dubois, by way of further example, had echoed Orme's appraisal of Bengali frailty in his *Description of the Character, Manners, and Customs of the People of India* (London: Printed for Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1817). The Madras government, after judging Dubois' work as "the most correct, comprehensive, and minute account extant in any European language of the Hindus," paid him for the rights to print it as a reference and training manual for its officials. See C. E. Buckland, *Dictionary of Indian Biography* [DIB] (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1906), 124.
22. Quoted by Sinha, *Colonial Masculinity*, 15.
23. As Suleri points out, Mill and his contemporary Thomas Babington Macaulay proved extremely dismissive of any Indian claims to cultural agency. Macaulay curtly noted that the entire *corpus* of Indian and Arabic literature was worth less than "a single shelf of a good European library," while Mill opined that India's historical legacy rested on no more than their tendency to "derive a peculiar gratification from pretensions to a remote antiquity."
24. George Clarke, 1st Baron Sydenham of Combe(Gov. of Bombay 1907–1913), *My Working Life* (London: John Murray, 1927), 219, 282.

25. Indira Chowdhury, *The Frail Hero and Virile History: Gender and the Politics of Culture in Colonial Bengal* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 13–15. As Chowdhury further notes, the Tagores put forward their program in the pages of the *National Paper*, first published in 1867. Devendranath Tagore, the father of Nobel Prize winner Rabindranth Tagore, had assumed leadership of the *Brahmo Samaj* in 1843 and exercised great influence among the Bengali middle-class. For a pioneering text on colonial gender see John Roselli's "The Self Image of Effeteness: Physical Education and Nationalism in 19th Century Bengal," *Past and Present* 86, 1 (1980): 121–148.
26. Ibid. Cited in Chowdhury, *The Frail Hero*, 21, 12–13. The *lathi* is a bamboo stave, often metal-tipped. The British would have never recruited *lahtiyals* so soon after the Mutiny.
27. Sinha, *Colonial Masculinity*, 17. Sinha refers us to Christine Baxter's "The Genesis of the Babu: Bhabanicharan Bannerji and *Kalikata Kamalay*," in Peter Robb and David Taylor, eds, *Rule, Protest, Identity, Aspects of Modern South Asia* (London: Curzon, 1978), 193–206.
28. Sinha, *Colonial Masculinity*, 18.
29. In Bengal alone the number of students at liberal arts colleges increased from 1,374 in 1870–1871 to over 5,200 in 1890–1891. The number of colleges rose from 16 to 34 in the same period. Anil Seal, *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism, Competition and Collaboration in the Later Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge University Press, 1968), 19. Cited in Judith Brown, *Modern India: The Origins of an Asian Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 125.
30. See also Victor J. Seidler, *Unreasonable Men: Masculinity and Social Theory* (London: Routledge, 1994), 71.
31. Ibid., 16–17; J. A. Mangan, *Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School: The Emergence and Consolidation of an Educational Ideology* (Cambridge University Press, 1985). See also Mangan's *The Games Ethic and Imperialism: Aspects of the Diffusion of an Ideal* (London: Frank Cass, 1998) and his article "'The Grit of Our Forefathers': Invented Traditions, Propaganda, and Imperialism," in John Mackenzie, ed., *Imperialism and Popular Culture* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), 113–139, and Mangan's own edited volume *The Imperial Curriculum: Racial Images and Education in the British Colonial Experience* (New York: Routledge, 1993).
32. Michael C. C. Adams, *The Great Adventure: Male Desire and the Coming of World War I* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 26. The Mill quote is also from Adams.
33. See Roger Long, *The Man on the Spot: Essays on British Empire History* (Westport: Greenwood, 1995).
34. Quoted in Vidya Dhar Mahajan, *Leaders of the Nationalist Movement* (New Delhi: Sterling, 1975), 159. See also Ghose entry in Sachchidananda Bhattacharya, *A Dictionary of Indian History* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1972), 373.
35. David Knopf, *The Brahmo Samaj and the Shaping of the Modern Indian Mind* (Princeton University Press), 1979.

36. Valentine Chirol, taking a much softer stance in the 1920s, argued that the ICS system of recruiting and promotion "bore the stamp, barely disguised, of racial discrimination, at variance with the spirit, if not the letter, of the Queen's Proclamation." Chirol, *India Old and New* (New Delhi: Light and Life, 1975), 97.
37. Ranganathan Magadi, *The Literary Works of Ranganathan Magadi* (Raleigh, NC: Lulu.com), 595.
38. "Anglo-Indians," those Britons who lived and worked in South Asia most of their lives, had reacted violently to a proposal by the Government of India's Law Member, Sir Courtenay Ilbert, to give Indian judges the right to try Europeans in the colony's isolated rural areas. Indian judges already enjoyed this privilege in the urban areas of Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. Using a combination of vitriolic newspaper assaults and raucous town-meetings, the Anglo-Indian community effectively portrayed the "effeminate babu" as a threat to English womanhood. Once on the bench, so the argument ran, the lustful Hindu judge would invariably fall victim to his lack of manly self-control. Thus handicapped, he would not be able to resist his urge to place the white woman in a compromising position. See Edwin Hirschmann, "*White Mutiny,*" *The Ilbert Bill Crisis in India and Genesis of the Indian National Congress* (New Delhi: Heritage, 1980).
39. Sumit Sarkar, *Modern India*, *1885–1947* (Madras: Macmillan India, 1983), 88.
40. Ibid. See also Antoinette Burton's "'Tongues United' Salisbury's 'Black Man' and the Boundaries of Imperial Democracy," *Comparative Studies in Society & History*, 42, 3 (July 2000): 634.
41. Brown, *Modern India*, 185. The early Congress also contained a small, though influential, Muslim membership. The Muslim counterpart to the INC, the Muslim League, would not be formed until 1907. Curzon partitioned Bengal partly as a concession to the predominantly Muslim eastern half of the province, and partly to make administration easier.
42. Sarkar, *Modern India*, 111–112, 116.
43. As Mrinalini Sinha points out, imperial officials carefully cultivated visitors who might create a favorable impression of British rule in the press. Katherine Mayo's *Mother India* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1927)owed a great deal to ICS informants who emphasized the sexually degenerate nature of Hindu society. See Sinha, *Specters of Mother India: The Global Restructuring of an Empire* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 79.
44. Valentine Chirol, *The Indian Unrest* (New Delhi: Light and Life, 1979), 210–212.
45. Ibid., 78.
46. Chirol, *India Old and New*, 97.
47. See, for example, Martin Pugh's *The Pankhursts: The History of One Radical Family* (London: Random House, 2009) and Jane Purvis, *Emmeline Pankhurst: A Biography* (New York: Routledge, 2002), for a view of Emmeline Pankhurst, who advocated civil disobedience and hunger strikes as a means of gaining votes for women.

48. Cited in Susan R. Grayzel, *Women's Identities at War: Gender, Motherhood and Politics in Britain and France during the First World War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 207.
49. The victory was incomplete. Trade union leaders ensured that most women would simply resume their prewar lives by successfully campaigning against the more recent danger of "dilution"—the fear that women would take away jobs from men by refusing to return to the domestic sphere once the war had ended. Arthur Marwick's *The Deluge: British Society and the First World War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970).
50. See Antoinette Burton's *Burdens of History: British Feminists, Indian Women, and Imperial Culture, 1865–1915* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994) and Anna Davin's "Imperialism and Motherhood," *History Workshop* (Spring 1978) 5, 9–65.
51. Authorities maintained a ratio of 2:1 Indian to British troops, a policy instituted after the Mutiny of 1857.

2 The Violent Mahatma: Gandhi and the Rehabilitation of Indian Manhood

1. I would like to thank Rowman & Littlefield for permission to reuse elements of my previously published chapter "Strategies of Inclusion: Lajpat Rai and the Critique of the British Raj" that appeared in *The Human Tradition in Modern Europe, 1750 to the Present*, Cora Granata and Cheryl Koos, eds (2008).
2. Charles Roberts, Speech to House of Commons, November 26, 1914, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 4th ser., vol. 68 (1914), col. 1357.
3. The majority of the attacks occurred in Bengal. See Peter Heehs, "Terrorism in India during the Freedom Struggle," *The Historian* 55, 1993: 470 and *The Bomb in Bengal: The Rise of Revolutionary Terrorism in India, 1900–1910* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
4. The literature on the colonial press is relatively thin. Margarita Barnes' *The Indian Press* (London: George, Allen, & Unwin, 1940) was probably the first significant exploration of the phenomenon. As Barnes noted, the Bombay Presidency alone had no fewer than 62 Indian language newspapers as early as the 1880s (276). For a table on the professional\occupational membership of the INC see Judith Brown's *Modern India: The Origins of an Asian Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 186.
5. Antoinette Burton, "Tongues Untied: Salisbury's 'Black Man' and the Boundaries of Imperial Democracy," *Comparative Studies in Society & History* 42, 3 (July 2000), 634.
6. One Government of India official, Sir Harcourt Butler, explicitly spelled out the link between the nationalist movement and the Indian press to his friend J. A. Spender of the *Westminster Review*: "a syndicate of Hindu lawyers lately

bought the *Tribune* of Lahore, the *Bengalee* is owned by Surendranath Bannerjea and the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* by Motilal Ghose. . . . Malabari owns *East and West*. Madan Mohan Malaviya the *Leader* at Allahabad." Harcourt's commentary reads like a "Who's Who" of nationalist journalists, and of course Gandhi, like many of his colleagues, was both a lawyer and a publisher. Sir Harcourt Butler to J. A. Spender, July 14, 1914, Butler Collection, MSS EUR. F/116/47, 3, India Office Library [IOL].

7. Babu Lal Sud, "London Daily Morning Newspapers," *Modern Review* 18, 3 (September 1915), 289, 291.
8. Government of India officials carefully monitored the Indian press. As one official observed: See Note 6 above. All of the persons mentioned by Butler were prominent members of the nationalist movement.
9. More conservative Anglo administrators sought an explanation in political opportunism, while what one may call "optimists" saw colonial allegiance as proof of the empire's overall benevolence and the realization on the part of indigenous leaders that the Raj, though it might be the devil, was at least an uneasily familiar one.
10. For the best work on the notion of "information panics" and intelligence gathering see C. A. Bayly, *Empire and Information*: *Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780–1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). For control of the press see N. G. Barrier, *Banned: Controversial Literature and Political Control in British India* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1974).
11. I use the term "second wave" to denote the less moderate successors to "collaborationist" nationalism of the mid-Victorian era.
12. Padraic Pearse, *Collected Works of P.H. Pearse* (Dublin: Phoenix Publishing, 1922), 216.
13. Cited in Vijaya Chandra Joshi, ed., *Lala Lajpat Rai: Writings and Speeches* (Delhi: University Press, 1966), 261. Originally published as "Save India for the Empire—An Open Letter to David Lloyd George," dated June 13, 1917, New York.
14. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, *Bal Gangadhar Tilak*: *His Writings and Speeches* (Madras: Cambridge, 1918), 319, 321.
15. Cited in Annie Besant, *India: A Nation* (Madras: Theosophical Publishing House, 1918), 54. Moderates too drew an unfavorable comparison between their current state of abjection and a romanticized past of literary, artistic, and architectural brilliance. The generally pro-British INC leader G. K. Gokhale tied the lack of Indians in the upper reaches of the government to a "kind of dwarfing or stunting of the Indian race. . . . We must live all our days in an atmosphere of inferiority, and the tallest of us must bend in order that the exigencies of the existing system may be satisfied." Cited in Besant.
16. Besant and Gandhi developed a strong rivalry during the war. Besant did not believe that Gandhi's tactics of civil disobedience and boycotting, which had worked so well in South Africa, could succeed in India. She was proved right in predicting that violence would inevitably erupt. Gandhi was well aware as

well that she had opposed his bid to take over the reins of India's moderate leadership after the death of moderate Congressman G. K. Gokhale in 1915. The final split came in February 1916, at the laying of the foundation stone at Benares Hindu University, a project that Besant had worked on for years. The guest list included an impressive array of Indian princes and the viceroy, Lord Hardinge. Gandhi, who was slated to talk just before Besant, immediately began by berating the Indian princes in the audience for their display of wealth. With the crowd already murmuring, Gandhi turned his attention to the dreaded Criminal Investigation Police, or CID. men, who peppered the crowd, admonishing that it was "better that a viceroy took risk being shot than the innocent people of the town" be harassed by the CID. The result was a firestorm of controversy. The Indian princes, who had flanked the rostrum to Gandhi's left and right, left the building. Besant angrily approached Gandhi immediately after the speech, rebuking him for ruining the occasion. See Sri Prakasa, *Annie Besant; As Woman and as Leader* (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1962), 188, 191–192.

17. Sir Francis Younghusband, *Dawn in India* (New York: Frederic A. Stokes, 1931), 190–191. To describe Younghusband as "colorful" would be an understatement. He is best remembered for his expeditions through Central and North Asia, particularly the 1903–1904 Tibet expedition, where accompanying Gurkha soldiers massacred several hundred monks who opposed the incursion. He expressed regret over the event later in life, and became deeply attracted to Eastern spiritualism. He proposed a universal religion based on racial masculinity and believed that cosmic rays had mystical power. He also believed that spiritually advanced extraterrestrials watched over events on earth. See Francis Younghusband, *Modern Mystics* (New York: Dutton, 1935), 258; and *The Living Universe*, also from Dutton, 1933, pp. 191, 195.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., 199.
20. Younghusband was one of the few Britons who envisioned an autonomous India with a continued white presence, rather than a British exodus in the event of independence. Writing to his wife in August 1917, Younghusband objected not so much to Indian rule, but British interference from the metropole: ". . . we Englishmen who have had our life work in India and help to build India up shall with the Indians really govern from India and not from here [London]. We must get decent Englishmen out to India [and] carry all the better class of India with us—like that old Daleep Singh—and run India ourselves and have the full responsibility for it." Sir Francis Edward Younghusband to Mrs. Younghusband, August 17, 1917, MSS EUR. F 197/196, IOL.
21. For an examination of the development of imperial ideology in India see Thomas Trautman's *Aryans and British India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997) and Thomas Metcalfe's *Ideologies of the Raj* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

22. Gandhi practiced law in Cape Colony's Indian community for 21 years. His *Satyagraha* began in 1907 and helped in the removal of laws that, among other things, refused to recognize non-Christian matrimony, effectively fined Indian indentured servants who wished to remain in the area after their terms were completed, and which required "Asians" to register with the government and carry identification cards.
23. D. G. Tendulkar, *Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi*, vol. 1 (Delhi: Government of India edition, 1960), 152. *Satyagraha*, roughly translated, means "soul force." For Gandhi, it signified passive resistance and nonviolent forms of social and political protest.
24. Robert Payne, *The Life and Death of Mahatma Gandhi* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1969), 274–275. See also Gandhi to Charles Roberts, August 10, 1914, in *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*. Hereafter *CWMG* (Delhi: Government of India Publications Division, 1964), XII, 526.
25. Quoted in James D. Hunt, *Gandhi in London* (New Delhi: Promilla, 1978), 179.
26. Gandhi to Roberts, August 14, 1914, *CWMG* XII, 527–528.
27. Rajmohan Gandhi, *The Good Boatman: A Portrait of Gandhi* (New York: Viking, 1995), 10–15. During the Boer War, Gandhi had suggested that Indian troops serve in any capacity, including a combatant role. The South African government initially declined to use even the ambulance unit until heavy losses forced them to call upon the Indians.
28. Gandhi, *The Good Boatman*, 12. During the Boer campaign Gandhi's unit carried the only son of Field Marshal Lord Roberts from the field after he was killed at Colenso in December 1899. At the battle of Vallkranz just weeks later, Gandhi himself worked desperately to hustle the mortally wounded British General Woodgate to an aid station before he succumbed to his wounds. See Payne's *Life and Death of Mahatma Gandhi*, 120, 123.
29. Quotes are cited in Sukanya Banerjee, *Becoming Imperial Citizens: Indians in the Late Victorian Empire* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 1. For Gandhi's concept of "earned" citizenship see pp. 97–99.
30. Ibid., 10.
31. *Indian Opinion*, 9–6–1906.
32. Mohandas K. Gandhi, *An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with the Truth* (Boston: Beacon, 1993), 347.
33. Jad Adams, *Gandhi: The True Man behind Modern India* (New York: Pegasus Books, 2011), 90.
34. Singh and his English wife, Cathleyne Kinsey Singh (nee Brook), made frequent contributions to Indian, British, and American periodicals, including the *Hindustan*, *Indian*, *London Quarterly*, and *Modern Review*, as well as the *Westminster Gazette*. Singh himself had also served in an editorial capacity for New York's *Literary Digest* and acted as the London Correspondent for Calcutta's *Amrita Bazar Patrika* newspaper. Social reform, notably in regard to women's rights, childcare, and the need for modernization in India,

absorbed much of his attention. See *Who was Who in Literature, 1906–1934* (New York: Gale Research Company, 1979), vol. 2, 1051–1052.

35. See part III of St Nihal Singh's three part series, "How the Orient is Represented on the London Stage: Caricatures of India and Indians," *Modern Review* 8, (December 1915), 652.
36. Antoinette Burton, *At the Heart of Empire: Indians and the Colonial Encounter in Late Victorian* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 1.
37. Sant Nihal Singh, "India's Part in the War," *London Quarterly Review* 123 (January 1915), 323.
38. Ibid., 323, 326, 333.
39. "An Indian," "Indians and the War," *Living Age* 284 (January 2, 1915), 57–58. Article excerpted from the *Hindustan Review*. Sinha later became a member of the viceroy's legislative council and the first Indian to gain a peerage.
40. Significant numbers of Indians went to southern Africa to build the Ugandan railroad, as well as to South America, the Caribbean, and the Pacific, where they worked on plantations. See, for example, Madhave Kale's *Fragments of Empire: Capital, Slavery, and Indian Indentured Labor Migration in the British Caribbean* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999).
41. Excerpt from article in April 1915 edition of *Indian Review* by Dr. Satish Chandra Bannerji, "Reciprocity with Colonies," *Modern Review* 17, 6 (June 1915), 738.
42. Ramananda Chatterjee, "Non-European Soldiers in European Wars," *Modern Review* 16, 3 (April 1914): 115–119.
43. *CWMG*, XII, 531; Gandhi, *The Good Boatman*, 18.
44. Gandhi, *The Good Boatman,* 18.
45. Speech at Surat, August 1, 1918, CWMG, 17, 169–170.
46. The Alipore Bomb case occurred in 1908 when Bengali revolutionaries attempted to assassinate a British magistrate known for handing out especially harsh sentences to radical nationalists. The attack missed its target and instead killed the wife and daughter of one of his colleagues. Ghose was acquitted for lack of evidence even though British authorities were convinced of his involvement in the attack. Wyllie, an Indian Army retiree, was serving as the aide-de-camp to the Secretary of State for India in London. For the Ghose case see Peter Hees, *The Lives of Sri Aurobindo* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 165–166.
47. Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj*, cited in Bruce Lawrence and Aisha Karim, eds, *On Violence: A Reader* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 116.
48. Ibid.
49. Cited in Gandhi, *The Good Boatman*, 142.
50. Cited in Bruce Lawrence and Aisha Karim, eds, *On Violence: A Reader* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 124.
51. See also Michael Adas, "Contested Hegemony: The Great War and the Afro-Asian Assault on the Civilizing Mission Ideology," *Journal of World History* 15, 1 (2004), 31–64.

52. Cited in Lawrence Sondhaus, *World War I: The Global Revolution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 374.
53. Brian Lapping, *End of Empire* (New York: St Martin's, 1984), 36.
54. Gandhi went so far as to claim that advocates of the Reform Bill of 1832 had violated their duty by using "brute force" to extend the voting franchise. This is a telling reference, one meant to warn Indian students away from violence and to signal British officials on the hunt for seditious literature that Gandhi's nonviolence was in fact milder than English traditions of riotous constitutionalism. Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj*, 117–118.
55. Mohandas K. Gandhi, *An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with the Truth* (Boston: Beacon, 1993), 45, 47.
56. Ibid., 47.
57. Joseph Alter, *Gandhi's Body: Sex, Diet, and the Politics of Nationalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 126.
58. Ashis Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983), 71–72.
59. Scott published four novels between 1965 and 1975: *The Jewel in the Crown, The Day of the Scorpion, The Towers of Silence, and A Division of the Spoils*. Scott begins the first novel in the midst of World War II India and concludes Spoils with the tumult of independence in 1947.
60. Rajmohan Gandhi, *Eight Lives: A Study of the Hindu/Muslim Encounter* (Albany: State University of New York, 1986), 123–124.
61. Vidya Dhar Mahajan, ed., *Leaders of the Nationalist Movement* (New Delhi: Sterling, 1975), 158.
62. Burton, "'Tongues Untied,'" 632–661.
63. Cited in Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 237.
64. http://www.pbs.org/rootsinthesand/i_bhagat1.html, accessed August 30, 2012.
65. *CWMG*, 43, pp. 15–16.
66. Henry Cotton, "India Now and After," *Contemporary Review* 107 (February 1915), 195–201. Henry Cotton (1845–1915): Entered ICS in 1867; Chief Secretary of Bengal 1891 and Home Secretary to Government of India in 1896. Chief Commissioner of Assam from 1896 till retiring in 1902. President of 20th INC in Bombay in 1904, where he advocated a "United States of India." Sachchidananda Battacharya, ed., *Dictionary of Indian History* (Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1967), 258. Hereafter *DIH*.
67. Ibid., 199–200.
68. Sir Roper Lethbridge, "The War and the Mighty Voice of India," *Asiatic Review* 5 (October 1, 1914): 279
69. Cited in Narain Dass, "India and the War," *Modern Review* 16, 6 (December 1914), 561–563.
70. Ibid.
71. Valentine Chirol to Sir Harcourt Butler, November 19, 1914, Butler Collection, MSS EUR. F 116/37/38, IOL.

72. Ibid., Hardinge to Butler, September 12, 1914.
73. Ibid., Hardinge to Butler, February 4, 1915. Dated as "Good Friday" in the original document.
74. Ibid., Butler to Hardinge, April 9, 1915.

3 Measures of Manliness: The Martial Races and the Wartime Politics of Effeminacy

1. B. K. Roy, "When India Fights for England," *Independent* 82 (April 19, 1915), 106.
2. Gavin Rand, "'Martial Races' and 'Imperial Subjects': Violence and Governance in Colonial India, 1857–1914," *European Review of History—Revue europe´enne d'Histoire* 13, 1 (March 2006), 2.
3. This is not to oversimplify the complex manifestations of gender that operated within metropolitan and colonial societies. Rather, it is merely to point out that the Anglo-Indian ethos often represented the "native" in a decidedly binary fashion, even more so if it believed itself to be under a concerted attack from Indian interests.
4. The best and most recent studies come from Heather Streets, *Martial Races: The Military, Masculinity and Race in British Imperial Culture, 1857–1914* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004) and Kaushik Roy, *The Army in British India: From Colonial Warfare to Total War 1857–1947* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013).
5. Maia Ramnath, "Two Revolutions: The Ghadar Movement and India's Radical Diaspora, 1913–1918," *Pacific Historical Review* 92 (Spring 2005), 7–30, and *Haj to Utopia: How the Ghadar Movement Charted Global Radicalism and Attempted to Overthrow the British Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).
6. David Omissi, *The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army 1860–1940* (London: Macmillan, 1994), 4–6; Byron Farwell, *Armies of the Raj* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989), 179–180; Philip Mason, *A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, its Officers and Men* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1974), 23.
7. Mason, *A Matter of Honour*, 247–252; Omissi, *Sepoy and the Raj*, 5.
8. Thomas Metcalfe, *Ideologies of the Raj* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 23.
9. Tony Ballantyne, *Orientalism and Race: Aryanism in the British Empire* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 5. See also Sachchidananda Bhattacharyia, *Dictionary of Indian History* (Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1967), 498.
10. Septimus S. Thornburn, *The Punjab in Peace and War* (London: William Blackwood, 1904), 74–75, 89.
11. Sir Herman Edwardes and Herman Merivale, *Life of Sir Henry Lawrence* (London: Smith, Elder and Company, 1873), 484.

12. Sir Henry's "project" did indeed reach fruition, though he did not live to see it. He was killed during the siege of Lucknow in July 1857 by a sepoy shell. Sir John survived the Mutiny and went on to become viceroy from 1864 to 1869 and followed a policy opposed to that of the "forward school" with regard to Afghanistan.
13. Omissi, *Sepoy and the Raj*, 6.
14. For a table depicting these shifts in the Indian Army see Omissi, *Sepoy and the Raj*, 11.
15. Field Marshal Lord Roberts of Kandahar, *Forty-one Years in India* (London: Richard Bentley, 1897), 383.
16. Ibid., 441.
17. Ibid. These climatic explanations went at least as far back as Robert Orme's *Government and People's of Indostan* (1753) and Alexander Dow's *History of Hindostan* (1770). Orme averred that "the climate and habits of Indostan" had enervated the strong fibers with which the Tartars had conquered it, while Dow opined that Indians simply could not overcome the "languor" created by the regions heat and humidity, Cited in Metcalfe, *Ideologies of the Raj*, 8–9.
18. Sir O'Moore Creagh, *Indian Studies* (London: Hutchinson, ca. 1918), 13, 233. Creagh also argued that India's generally pro-British princes were disqualified due to their overly-sexual nature and the constant presence of a "harem" (45–47).
19. Sir George MacMunn, *The Martial Races of India* (London: Sampson, Low, and Marston), 1933, 8.
20. Ibid., 5.
21. Ibid., 4, 10.
22. Sir George MacMunn, *Turmoil and Tragedy in India in 1914 and After* (London: Jarrolds, 1935), 45, 85, 233.
23. Lionel Caplan, *Warrior Gentlemen:"Gurkhas" in the Western Imagination* (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1995), 12.
24. Ibid.
25. P. D. Bonnerjee, *A Handbook of the Fighting Races of India* (New Delhi: Asian Publication Services, 1975), 101–102. Reprint of 1899 edition (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink & co., 1899).
26. Roper Lethbridge, "The War and the Mighty Voice of India," *Asiatic Review* 5 (October 1, 1914), 269–279.
27. Quested is a "griffin," or newcomer in Anglo-Indian slang. See A. C. Burnell and Colonel Henry Yule, *Hobson-Jobson: A Glossary of Colloquial Anglo-Indian Words and Phrases Etymological, Historic, Geograhic and Discursive* (London: John Murray, 1903), 395–396.
28. E. M. Forster, *A Passage to India* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1984 edition), 204–205. Forster's time as a secretary to the Maharaja of Dewas in the early 1920s furnished some of the material for his novel.
29. In the India Office archives Bell is listed as the wife of an Indian Army officer killed in action in the Great War, yet Travers wrote at least 8 novels using the Bell

pseudonym. Odder still, the quotation is taken from correspondence between "Bell," not Travers, and Malcolm Seton. Travers/Bell's comments were made after observing a meeting of the Imperial Legislative Council. It seems unlikely that a woman would be allowed to watch the proceedings, and curious that Travers would write to Seton using his pseudonym. "Eva Mary Bell" to Malcolm Seton, January 24, 1919, MSS EUR. E/267/7/9/g, Seton Collection, IOL.

30. Streets, *Martial Races*, 157.
31. MacMunn, *The Martial Races*, 3.
32. Forster, *A Passage to India*, 166.
33. MacMunn, *The Martial Races*, 4. The fact that MacMunn reflected upon French women and Indian soldiers is in itself an interesting commentary.
34. Creagh, *Indian Studies*, 16, 233.
35. Lord Chelmsford to Edwin Montagu, September 22, 1917, MSS EUR. D 523/6, India Office Library. Extracts are from a copy of O'Dwyer's speech sent as an enclosure to Montagu.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. "Zeres", "Top-hat or Turban," *Blackwood's Magazine* 203 (June 1918), 747.
40. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, *Bal Gangadhar Tilak: His Writings and Speeches* (Madras: Ganesh, 1919), 321.
41. Sant Nihal Singh, "War: The Leveler," *Living Age* VIII, 295 (November 24, 1917), 475–482. Originally published in *Hindustan Review*.
42. Sant Nihal Singh, "India's Manpower," *The Contemporary Review* 113 (June 1918), 665.
43. Ibid., 666.
44. Ibid.
45. The Garhwalis, in MacMunn's words, "earned such undying fame" in the Great War as to almost be classified as storm troops. They were also one of the few units to gain the title "Royal" before their unit designation. See MacMunn, *The Martial Races*, 287–288.
46. Singh, "India's Manpower," 667.
47. Farwell, *Armies of the Raj*, 217.
48. Harold A. Gould, *Sikhs, Swamis, Students, and Spies: The Indian Lobby in the United States, 1900–1946* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2006), 145–146.
49. Karl Hoover, "The Hindu Conspiracy in California, 1913–1918," *German Studies Review* 8, 2 (May 1985), 246–249; B. R. Deepak, "Revolutionary Activities of the Ghadar Party in China," *China Report* 35, 4 (1999), 439–442. For a general study of the Ghadar Movement see also Harish K. Puri, *Ghadar Movement: Ideology, Organisation & Strategy* (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 1993). An acquaintance of Dayal's later described him as favoring a Russian anarchism of the "confiscate-everything-and-cut-everybody's-throat type," Hoover, "Hindu Conspiracy," 248.

50. Deepak, "Ghadar Party in China," 441.
51. Mason, *A Matter of Honour,* 426–427.
52. Hoover, "Hindu Conspiracy," 60, 249.
53. Sir Michael O'Dwyer, *India as I Knew It* (London: Constable, 1925), 14.
54. Hoover, "Hindu Conspiracy," 249.
55. Lewis D. Wurgraft, *The Imperial Imagination: Magic and Myth in Kipling's India* (Westport, CT: Wesleyan, 1983), 77.
56. O'Dwyer, *India as I Knew It*, 190–191.

4 Frontline Masculinity: The Indian Corps on the Western Front, 1914–1915

1. I would like to thank NYU Press for permission to reuse elements of my previously published chapter "The Indian Corps on the Western Front: A Reconsideration" that appeared in Geoffrey Jensen and Andrew Wiest, eds. *War in the Age of Technology: Myriad Faces of Modern Armed Conflict* (2001).
2. Indian soldiers earned 12 Victoria Crosses and another 12,908 decorations. Rozina Visram, *Asians in Britain: 400 Years of History* (London: Pluto, 2000), 170.
3. See, for example, Philip Mason's *A Matter of Honour*: *An Account of the Indian Army, its Officers and Men*. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974), 427–443 for a brief discussion of the Mesopotamian Campaign and A. J. Barker's more extensive *The Bastard War: Mesopotamia 1914–18* (New York: Dial Press, 1967). Another 200,000 Indians served in the Dardanelles, Palestine, or in Persia where they protected British oil supplies. See too David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Holt, 1989), 200–203.
4. Lt. Col. J. W. B. Merewether and Sir Frederick Smith, *The Indian Corps in France* (London: John Murray, 1919), x.
5. Ibid.
6. See especially Sir Algernon Rumbold, *Watershed in India, 1914–1922* (London: Athlone, 1979).
7. G. D. Sheffield, *Leadership in the Trenches: Officer Man Relations, Morale and Discipline in the British Army in the Era of the First World War* (New York: St. Martin's, 2000), 104.
8. Byron Farwell, *Armies of the Raj: From the Great Indian Mutiny to Independence, 1858–1947* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989), 75.
9. Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, *Military Operations in France and Belgium, 1914*, I (London: MacMillan, 1926), 2 vols, 12–13. Hereafter referred to as *Military Operations.*
10. Ibid., I, 224; vol. II, 222.
11. General Sir James Willcocks, *With the Indians in France* (London: Constable, 1920), 81.
12. Merewether and Smith, *Indian Corps in France*, 479.

13. Philippa Levine, *Prostitution, Race and Politics: Policing Venereal Disease in the British Empire* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 161. Chapter 6 of Levine's work brilliantly reveals the anxieties of racial miscegenation harbored by British authorities as Indian soldiers made their way to England either for recovery, or carefully escorted trips designed to display the metropole's magnificence.
14. For an examination of French attitudes to colonial troops see Tyler Stovall's "The Color Line behind the Lines: Racial Violence in France during the Great War," *American Historical Review* 103, 3 (June, 1998), 737–769.
15. Merewether and Smith, *Indian Corps in France*, 484.
16. General Sir James Willcocks, *The Romance of Soldiering and Sport* (London: Cassell, 1925), 282–283.
17. Jeffery Greenhut offers an exploration of officer-man relations in his "Sahib and Sepoy: An Inquiry into the Relationship between the British Officers and Native Soldiers of the British Indian Army," *Military Affairs* 48 (January 1984), 15–18.
18. Merewether and Smith, *Indian Corps in France*, 70–75; Jeffery Greenhut, "The Imperial Reserve: The Indian Corps on the Western Front, 1914–15," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 12, I (October 1983), 56.
19. Cited in Greenhut, "Imperial Reserve," 59–60.
20. Ibid., 54–55; Merewether and Smith, *Indian Corps in France*, 40, 206;
21. W. S. Thatcher, *The Fourth Battalion D. C. O. Tenth Baluch Regiment in the Great War (129th Baluchis)* (Cambridge: printed by W. Lewis at Cambridge University Press, 1932), 253; Merewether and Smith, *Indian Corps in France*, 41.
22. Thatcher, *Tenth Baluch Regiment*, 19, 27.
23. Greenhut, "Imperial Reserve," 59–60; Merewether and Smith, *Indian Corps in France*, 175–181. The latter account provides a particularly harrowing description of the fighting.
24. General Sir Henry Rawlinson to Lord Kitchener, December 23, 1914, PRO 30/57, #WB-11, London: Public Records Office.
25. Cited in Charles Cheverix Trench, *The Indian Army and the King's Enemies, 1900–1947* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1988), 43.
26. Robert Graves, *Goodbye to All That* (New York: Anchor Books, 1985), 181–182.
27. Alexander Watson, *Enduring the Great War: Combat, Morale, and Collapse of the German and British Armies in 1914–1918* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 145.
28. Ibid., 174.
29. Ibid., 143, 147.
30. Farwell, *Armies of the Raj*, 188.
31. Stephen P. Cohen, *The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 70.
32. Captain C. P. Ranking, "The Best Method of Recruiting the Indian Armies," Second Prize Essay, *Journal of the United Service Institution in India* 26 (1897), 261.
33. Ranking, "The Best Method of Recruiting," 241.

34. Ibid.
35. Captain G. S. F. Napier, "The Best Method of Recruiting the Indian Armies," *Journal of the United Service Institution in India* 26 (1897), 261.
36. W. K. Scharlieb, "The Best Method of Recruiting the Indian Armies," *Journal of the United Service Institution in India* 26 (1897), 317–318.
37. The army later extended recruiting to a few groups with close ethnic ties to existing "martial races," or to groups that had been termed "martial races" in the past, but which had lost that status.
38. Merewether and Smith, *Indian Corps in France*, 464–465.
39. George MacMunn, *The Martial Races of India* (London: Sampson Low, Martin, 1933, 328.
40. Greenhut, "Imperial Reserve," 55. See also Merewether and Smith, *Indian Corps in France*, 468, pages 481–485 also offer an interesting glimpse into the officer ethos.
41. Sir James Willcocks to Captain Oswald Fitzgerald, November 11, 1914, Kitchener Papers, PRO. Fitzgerald served as Kitchener's aide-de-camp, and drowned with Kitchener when their ship, the *Hampshire*, struck a mine off the Orkney coast in June 1916.
42. Mason, *A Matter of Honour*, 341.
43. Cohen, *The Indian Army*, 50.
44. Willcocks, *With the Indians*, 6.
45. Cited in Mason, *A Matter of Honour*, 348.
46. Excerpted from the *London Gazette*, November 4, 1915, in *Historical Record of the Thirty-Ninth Royal Garhwal Rifles, 1887–1922*, compiled by Brigadier J. Evatt, D. S. O. (Aldershot: Cale and Polden, 1922).
47. Thatcher, *Tenth Baluch Regiment*, 246.
48. Greenhut, "Imperial Reserve," 57.
49. Willcocks to Kitchener, November 12, Kitchener Papers, PRO.
50. Cited in Greenhut, "Imperial Reserve," 57.
51. Malingering is simply avoiding duty by feigning illness or through some other means. Shirking implies loafing or delay.
52. Joanna Bourke, *Dismembering the Male: Men's Bodies, Britain, and the Great War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 94–95.
53. Helen B. McCartney, *Citizen Soldiers: The Liverpool Territorials in the First World War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 174.
54. Bourke, *Dismembering*, 93. Sichel initially came up with a lower figure and altered his methods to be more "foolproof," which yielded significantly higher numbers.
55. Ibid.
56. Sir Walter Lawrence to Lord Hardinge, May 10, 1915, Lawrence Collection, MSS EUR. F 143/73, IOL.
57. Seton to Lawrence, July 23, 1915, Lawrence Collection, MSS EUR. F 143/66.
58. Ibid.

59. Ibid., Lawrence to Hardinge, August 24, 1915, MSS EUR. F 143/73.
60. Philppa Levine, "Battle Colors: Race, Sex, and Colonial Soldiery in World War I," *Journal of Women's History* 9, 4 (Winter 1998), 106, 107–111; *Prostitution, Race and Politics*, 234–235.
61. Merewether and Smith, *Indian Corps in France*, 494–496.
62. Greenhut, "Imperial Reserve," 62; Merewether and Smith, *Indian Corps in France*, 494.
63. The best discussion of desertion comes from Andrew Tait Jarboe's recent dissertation "Soldiers of Empire: Indian Sepoys in and beyond the Imperial Metropole during the First World War, 1914–1919," Northeastern University, 2013. Jarboe cogently argues that desertion should be read as a form of resistance and agency.
64. Edmonds, *Military Operations*, I, 53, 73–75.
65. Willcocks, *With the Indians*, 207.
66. Major General H D'U Keary to F. W. Keary, March 7, 1915, Keary Paper, London, Imperial War Museum.
67. Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, *Command on the Western Front: The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson, 1914–1918* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 46; Edmonds, *Military Operations*, I, 98; Merewether and Smith, *Indian Corps in France*, 249.
68. Edmonds, *Military Operations*, 1915, I, 111.
69. Excerpt from Jacob's report to Willcocks, cited in Willcocks, *With the Indians*, 217–218.
70. See Tim Travers, *The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front, and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900–1918* (Barnsley: Pen and Sword Military Classics, 2003) for an excellent account on the treatment the Somme and Passchendaele campaigns received in the *Official History.* Edmonds ordered the first draft of the Passchendaele volume to be rewritten so that Sir Douglas Haig would be cast in a more positive light. Edmonds also altered the accounts of the Somme to satisfy commanders who took offense to the handling they received in the first draft.
71. Prior and Wilson, *Command on the Western Front*, 52–55.
72. Merewether and Smith, *Indian Corps in France*, 249.
73. Prior and Wilson, *Command on the Western Front*, 71.
74. The works of Pradeep Barua and Heather Streets provides a more nuanced view of the martial races, noting the doctrine's manufactured nature. Streets links the development of the martial races to the growing popularity of the empire in late nineteenth-century Britain and the tendency of officers like Lord Roberts to use empire's higher profile as a means of bolstering recruiting and budgets. See Pradeep Barua, "Inventing Race: The British and India's Martial Races," *The Historian* 58 (Autumn 1995), 107–116; Heather Streets, the aforementioned *Martial Races*.

75. Greenhut, "Imperial Reserve," 54–73, and "Sahib and Sepoy: An Inquiry into the Relationship between the British Officers and the Native Soldiers of the British Indian Army," *Military Affairs* 48 (January 1984), 15–18.
76. We should also draw attention to Pradeep Barua's study of the Indian officer in the late colonial period, *The Army Officer Corps and Military Modernisation in Later Colonial India* (Hull: University of Hull Press, 1999), 148–152. Prof. Barua reveals that Indian led units often performed admirably against Japanese and German formations.
77. Charles Cheverix Trench, *The Indian Army and the King's Enemies, 1900–1947* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1988), 43.
78. Mason, *A Matter of Honour*, 320–325.
79. Omissi, *Sepoy and the Raj*, 104.
80. H. D'U Keary to Captain F. W. Keary, June 11, 1915, Keary Papers.
81. Willcocks to FitzGerald, October 5, 1915, Kitchener Papers.
82. H. D'U Keary to Captain F. W. Keary, April 30, 1915, Keary Papers.
83. Merewether and Smith, *Indian Corps in France*, 297–298, 340.
84. H. D'U Keary to Capt. F.W. Keary, April 30, 1915, Keary Papers.
85. Edmonds, *Military Operations*, II, 21–22, 38; Greenhut, "Imperial Reserve," 65–66; Merewether and Smith, *Indian Corps in France*, 353–356.
86. Merewether and Smith, *Indian Corps in France*, 360–362.
87. "Extract of Report of Mesopotamia Commission," http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/firstworldwar/battles/p_meso_commission.htm, accessed August 2, 2013.
88. See Uday Mehta, "Liberal Strategies of Exclusion," in Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeoise World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 59–86. For a more detailed treatment see Mehta's *Liberalism and Empire* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
89. See Rai's *Young* India: *An Interpretation and a History of the Nationalist Movement from Within*. (New York: B. W. Heubsch, 1916), and *The Political Future of India* (New York: B. W. Heubsch, 1919). Zeres personally attacked the Raj in his "Top-hat or Turban" article, arguing that the "Young Indian" did not recognize that he owed his existence to English schooling. Raj's "fretful unreason" had made him "incapable of Britain's undeniably helpful association with his land."
90. For a study of reform movements see Kenneth Jones' *Socio-religious Reform Movements in British India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1989, and *Arya Dharm: Hindu Consciousness in 19th Century Punjab* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); see also S. K. Gupta's *Arya Samaj and the Raj, 1875–1920* (New Delhi: Gitanjali, 1991).
91. Michael O'Dwyer, *India as I Knew It* (London: Constable, 1925), 190.
92. Jonathan Rose, *The Edwardian Temperament, 1895–1919* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1986), 117–162.

93. Cited in Bradford Spangenberg, *British Bureaucracy in India: Status, Policy, and the ICS in the Late Nineteenth Century* (Columbia, MO: South Asia Books, 1976), 4–5.
94. Lajpat Rai, "Open letter to Edwin Montagu," in Vijaya Chandra Joshi, ed., *Lala Rajpat Rai Writings and Speeches*, I (Delhi: University Press, 1966), 288.
95. Ibid., 289.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid., 295–296.
98. Merewether and Smith, *Indian Corps in France*, xxii.

5 The Road to Amritsar

1. Rupert Brooke, *Collected Poems of Rupert Brooke* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1922), 107.
2. Zeev Sternhell, *The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 238.
3. See Samuel Hynes, *A War Imagined: The First World War and English Culture* (New York: Random House, 2011). Brooke never made it to the fighting, but died aboard ship in early 1915 while sailing for the Dardanelles. He was buried in Greece.
4. Sumit Sarkar, *Modern India, 1885–1947* (Madras: MacMillan India, 1983), 168–171. As Sarkar notes, at least 355,000 men were recruited from the Punjab, while grain prices increased over 35 percent. The landless and poorer peasantry especially suffered, while business groups linked to the jute trade and the cotton textile industry benefited.
5. S. D. Waley, *Edwin Montagu: A Memoir and Account of His Visits to India*. (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964), 136. Montagu served as the Secretary of State for India from 1917–1922 after the scandal over the disastrous Mesopotamian campaign against Ottoman Turkey forced out his predecessor, Austen Chamberlain. Frederic Thesiger, later Viscount Chelmsford, served as the ineffectual Viceroy of India from 1916–1921, when Lord Hardinge finished his six-year term as head of the colony. Unlike Chelmsford, Hardinge proved sympathetic to Indian aspirations and popular in nationalist circles.
6. Judith Brown, *Modern India: The Origins of an Asian Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 204–207. Only Madras, where 116,000 women gained suffrage, saw notable gains.
7. Prior studies of the Montagu Reforms have come mainly from the hoary "Cambridge School" of South Asian scholars. For an overview see Howard Spodek's, "Pluralist Politics in British India: The Cambridge Cluster of Historians of Modern India," *The American Historical Review* 84, 3 (June 1979), 688–707. Sir Algernon Rumbold's *Watershed in India, 1914–1922* (London: Athlone Press, 1979) covers the reforms in great detail, while Judith Brown aptly shows the link between the war and the quickening of Indian

political demands. See her "India and the War of 1914–1918," in Dewitt Ellinwood and S. D. Pradhan, eds, *India and World War I* (Columbia, MO: South Asia Books, 1978), 22–23. Chapter 7 of Chandrika Kaul's *Reporting the Raj: The British Press and India, circa 1880–1922* (New York: Palgrave, 2003) provides an accurate assessment of the debates in the imperial press, but provides no gender analysis.

8. Sinha, chapter 4; Edwin Hirschmann, "*White Mutiny,*" *The Ilbert Bill Crisis in India and Genesis of the Indian National Congress* (New Delhi: Heritage Publishers, 1980).
9. Excerpted from the *Indian Spectator*, quoted by Lucien Wolf in his *Life of the First Marquess of Ripon* (London: John Murray, 1921), II, 131. As Mrinalini Sinha further reminds us, the questions raised by the Ilbert Bill were at the heart of practically every major dispute in Indian politics during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. See also Edwin Hirschmann, '*White Mutiny,*' *The Ilbert Bill Crisis in India and Genesis of the Indian National Congress* (New Delhi: Heritage Publishers, 1980).
10. Hardinge of Penshurst, *My Indian Years, 1910–1916* (London: John Murray, 1948), 118.
11. See Antoinette Burton and Tony Ballantyne, eds, *Bodies in Contact: Rethinking Colonial Encounters in World History* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005) and *Moving Subjects: Gender, Mobility, and Intimacy in an Age of Global Empire* (Champaign-Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009). For a useful overview of Burton's pioneering work see the collected volume *Empire in Question: Reading, Writing, and Teaching British Imperialism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011).
12. For a view on social hierarchy within British India see chapter 7, "The Order of Precedence," in Charles Allen, *Plain Tales from the Raj* (London: Futura Publications, 1978), 96–97.
13. At the outbreak of the war the Indian members of the Viceroy's Council could only interpellate, or formally question, a policy. As such, their role remained purely advisory.
14. While both suffragists and Indian nationalists sought to challenge extant notions of national and imperial citizenship, the former had an advantage in claiming to speak for downtrodden Indian women. See Antoinette Burton, *Burdens of History: British Feminism, Indian Women, and Imperial Culture, 1865–1915* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994). Nicoletta F. Gullace's "*The Blood of Our Sons*": *Men, Women, and the Renegotiation of British Citizenship during the Great War* (New York: Palgrave, 2002) has argued that the suffragists, far from suspending agitation during the war, hoped to use it to leverage their status as citizens. Gullace does not, however, examine similar efforts in India to challenge *imperial* citizenship. One of the best studies of imperial citizenship overall comes from Elizabeth Thompson, *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

15. Laura Nym Mayhall, *The Militant Suffrage Movement: Citizenship and Resistance in Britain, 1860–1930* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 89.
16. W. C. Madge, "The British Indian Mystery of Equity," *Calcutta Review* (December 1916), 415–416.
17. Ibid.
18. Lord Sydenham of Combe, "The Danger in India," *The Nineteenth Century and after* 80 (December 1916), 1117.
19. Lord Sydenham of Combe, *My Working Life* (London: John Murray, 1927, 387.
20. Ibid., 219.
21. The conservative "princely states" constituted about 500 nominally independent territories of greatly varying size and wealth. The "Imperial Service Troops" were small, mainly ceremonial, armed forces maintained by various princes. See Barbara Ramusack's *The Princes of India in the Twilight of Empire: Dissolution of a Patron-Client System, 1914–1939* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1979).
22. See "Zeres," "India Revisited: A Recent Record of Candid Impressions.," *Blackwood's Magazine* 202 (November 1917), 571–600, and "Tophat or Turban," *Blackwood's Magazine* 203 (June 1918), 737–753. Blackwood's contributors frequently spoke in defense of the empire. See David Finkelstein's "Imperial Self-Representation: Constructions of Empire in *Blackwood's Magazine*, 1880–1900," in Julia F. Codell, ed., *Imperial Co-histories: National Identities and the British and Colonial Press* (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press), 2003.
23. "Zeres," "India Revisited," 585.
24. Ibid., 584.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., 586
27. Ibid., 587.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., 582.
30. Ibid., 589.
31. "Zeres," "Tophat or Turban," 747, 742–743.
32. Ibid.," 742–743.
33. Madge, "Mystery of Equity," 417.
34. Waley, *Montagu*, 39.
35. Quoted in Thomas Weber, "Anti-Semitism and Philo-Semitism among the British," *English Historical Review* 108 (February 2003), 475. As Weber notes, anti-Semitism tended to manifest itself more directly at Oxford, Montagu's *alma mater*, as opposed to Cambridge.
36. Lord Derby commented that Montagu's Jewish background had "created an uneasy feeling both in India and here [England]." Derby, in spite of his reservations, had a "high opinion" of the new secretary and thought he would "do well." Waley, *Montagu*, 130.

37. Pierre Loti (1850–1923) wrote extensively on the "Near East" and the Pacific in his travels as a French naval officer. Nicholson (1821–1857), served as Deputy Commissioner at Peshawar during the Mutiny and died leading the final assault in the recapture of Delhi, while Clive (1725–1774) had almost single-handedly destroyed the French position in India and asserted the suzerainty of the East India Company over Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa.
38. "Zeres," "India Revisited," 595.
39. Madge, "Mystery of Equity," 419.
40. Brown, "India and the War of 1914", 31; see also Dr. Upendra Narayan Chakravorty, *Indian Nationalism and the First World War* (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1997), 211–213.
41. Elizabeth Buettner, *Empire Families: Britons and Late Imperial India* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 188–219.
42. L. F. Rushbrook, *India in 1917–18* (Delhi: Anmol Publications, 1985), 43. Reprint of Government of India Home Office edition, ca. 1919.
43. No Author, "India and Empire, A New Protective Association," *The Times*, October 31, 1917, 5a.
44. Editorial, "Mr. Montagu's Mission to India," *The Times*, November 6, 1917, 7d.
45. Ibid.
46. Indo-British Association, *The Interests of India*, Seton Collection MSS EUR E/267/1/e, IOL, 6.
47. Ibid., 6.
48. Ibid., 10–11.
49. IBA Pamphlet, *Do the Indian Masses want "Home Rule?"* Seton Collection, MSS EUR E/267/1/v, IOL.
50. IBA Pamphlet, *Interests of India*, 11. Seton Collection, MSS EUR E/267/1/v, IOL.
51. Jordanna Bailkin's "The Boot and the Spleen: When was Murder Possible in British India?" *Society of the Comparative Study of Society and History* 48, 2 (2006), 462–493, in particular explores Curzon's attempts to contain British violence. See especially pages 484–486.
52. Partha Chatterjee, *The Black Hole of Empire: History of a Global Practice of Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).
53. For the role of Indian industrialist and the nationalist movement see A. P. Kannangara, "Indian Millowners and Indian Nationalism before 1914," *Past and Present* 40 (July 1968), 147–164.
54. Sir Stanley Reed to Sir Claude Hill, 30 June 1917, Malcolm Seton Collection, MSS EUR. E/267/7/9/u, IOL.
55. Ibid.
56. Cited in Bernard Spangenberg's classic study *British Bureaucracy in India: Status, Policy, and the ICS in the Late Nineteenth Century* (Columbia, MO: South Asia Books, 1976), 2. The correspondence was in 1902.

57. Ibid., 2.
58. George Orwell, *Burmese Days*, http://www.george-orwell.org/Burmese_Days/1.html, accessed August 15, 2013.
59. George Orwell, "Shooting an Elephant," 1936.
60. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds, *Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press), 78.
61. Helen Fein, *Imperial Crime and Punishment: The Massacre at Jallianwallah Bagh and British Judgment, 1919–1920* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1977), 76–77.
62. Nigel Collett, *Butcher of Amritsar: Brigadier- General Reginald Dyer* (London: Hambledon & London, 2005), 219–220; Mohandas K. Gandhi, *An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with the Truth* (Boston: Beacon, 1993), 463–466.
63. Sarkar, *Modern India*, 187.
64. Indeed, two leading members of the nationalist movement, Annie Besant and the radical B. G. Tilak, warned Gandhi violence would inevitably result if he entered the province. "Report of the Committee Appointed by the Government of India to Investigate the Disturbances in the Punjab, etc.," Parliamentary Papers, 1920 (Cmd. 681), 5 (hereafter *Punjab Report*); Collett, *Butcher of Amritsar*, 221; Gandhi, *Autobiography*, 463–466.
65. Ibid., 232–236.
66. *Punjab Report*, 24–25; Collett, *Butcher of Amritsar*, 234.
67. Collett, *Butcher of Amritsar*, 234.
68. Ibid., 253.
69. *Punjab Disturbances*, 28–29. Dyer's action contrasts with that of officers in Delhi, who first fired warning shots over the heads of the crowds in an attempt to disperse them.
70. Derek Sayer, "British Reaction to the Amritsar Massacre, 1919–1920," *Past and Present* 131 (May 1991), 131. As Sayer relates, Robert Furneaux's 1963 study *Massacre at Amritsar* put forth the novel suggestion that Dyer's arteriosclerosis clouded his judgment. Indian scholars such as V. N. Datta took an opposite tack, claiming that Anglo-Indian officials conspired to commit premeditated murder.
71. Cited in Sayer, "British Reaction to the Amritsar Massacre," 133.
72. Nancy Paxton, *Writing under the Raj: Gender, Race, and Rape in the British Colonial Imagination, 1830–1947* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1999), 4, 223; see too Jenny Sharpe, *Allegories of Empire: The Figure Woman in the Colonial Text* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003).
73. Manu Goswami, "Englishness on the Imperial Circuit: Mutiny Tours in Colonial South Asia," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 9, 1 (1996), 54–84.
74. Vinay Lal, "The Incident of the 'Crawling Lane': Women in the Punjab Disturbances of 1919," *Gender* 16 (Spring 1993), 35–60. See page 45.
75. Ibid.

76. Sayer, "British Reaction to the Amritsar Massacre," 145.
77. Collett, *The Butcher of Amritsar*, 5.
78. Lal, "Incident of the Crawling Lane," 40, 41.
79. Collett, *Butcher of Amritsar*, 31–33.
80. Sir Michael O'Dwyer, *India as I Knew It* (London: Constable, 1925), 6–8, 12.
81. Lal, "Incident of the Crawling Lane," 37.
82. *Punjab Disturbances*, 83–84.
83. Ibid., 85.
84. Ibid.
85. Quoted in Lal, "Incident of the Crawling Lane," 54.
86. E. M. Forster, *A Passage to India* (New York: Harcourt, 1984), 200, 243.
87. Orwell, *Burmese Days*.

6 Epilogue: The Historical Stakes of New Imperial History

1. Arun Khadnani, *The End of Tolerance: Racism in 21st Century Britain* (London: Pluto, 2007). See especially chapters 6 and 11. The evolution of how historians have treated empire since the independence movements of the late 1940s and 1950s is telling. A. P. Thornton's *The Imperial Idea and its Enemies: A Study in British Power* (New York: Macmillan, 1959) declared a sort of benign neutrality by claiming that "English patriotism has never been racial." In the 1980s Margaret Thatcher and "historian-adviser" Hugh Thomas denounced critiques of colonialism to be a "denigration of our national history." See Peter Fryer's pioneering studies *Black People in the British Empire* (London: Pluto, 1988), xiii–xiv, and *Staying Power: The History of Black People in Great Britain*, Pluto, 1987. Conservative Hindu groups have been complicit as well in distorting the colonial past. In 2000, the government-funded Indian Council for Historical Research [ICHR] demanded that Oxford University Press return two volumes of the long awaited "Towards Freedom" project edited by Kavalam N. Pannikar and Sumit Sarkar. While Pannikar and Sarkar's secular bent certainly rankled the ICHR, it was their claim that Indian independence resulted partly from the British desire for imperial devolution rather than solely from "heroic" resistance to the *raj* that most offended scholars bent on creating a unitary imagined past. More to our point, historians engaged in revising the country's history find the fact that many Indians *supported* Britain during the Great War unpalatable and best left unsaid. Kavalam N. Pannikar, "Leaders' History Fears Prompted Withdrawal," in *The Statesman* (India), February 2, 2000.
2. Britain suffered its own horrific July 7, 2005 suicide bombings that killed 52 innocent people on three separate London Underground trains and a city bus. Presumably a number of this work's readers would be familiar with the area of Kings Cross and St. Pancras, home to the British Library and a significant South Asian Muslim population. The three underground trains attacked either

originated or passed through King's Cross, as did the Tavistock bus that was also destroyed. The bombings occurred one day after the announcement of London's successful bid to host the 2012 Summer Olympic Games. The fact that the attack was carried out by three English-born Muslims of Pakistani origin and a Jamaican convert raised in England made it even more disturbing. The bombings occurred one day after the announcement of London's successful bid to host the 2012 Summer Olympic Games.

3. Bernard Porter's work, *The Absent-Minded Imperialists*, *Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain* (New York: Oxford University Press,2006) has suggested that most Britons, especially the working classes, paid only passing heed to colonial affairs.
4. Mike Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third World* (New York: Verso, 2002), 27. A hundredweight is approximately 480 lbs., although it varied somewhat in practice in British India.
5. M. E. Falkus, "Russia and the International Wheat Trade," *Economica* 33, 132 (November 1966), 417, 423.
6. Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts*, 111.
7. Sneh Mahajan, *British Foreign Policy, 1874–1914: The Role of India* (New York: Routledge, 2002), viii.
8. Max Boot, "The Case for American Empire," *The Weekly Standard* (October 15, 2001), 27.
9. Stanley Kurtz, "Democratic Imperialism: A Blueprint," *Policy Review* 118 (April & May 2003). Available online at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3449176.html.
10. Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill: The Stricken World, 1919–1922*, Companion Volume, pt. III (London: Heinemann, 1977), 1973–1974.
11. Helen Fein, *Imperial Crime and Punishment: The Massacre at Jallianwala Bagh and British Judgment, 1919–1920* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1977).
12. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds, *Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 78.

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